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The Aloneness Argument fails

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 November 2021

Timothy Joseph Pawl Open the ORCID record for Timothy Joseph Pawl [Opens in a new window]  and
W. Matthews Grant
Timothy Joseph Pawl*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN, USA
W. Matthews Grant
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN, USA
*
Corresponding author Timothy Joseph Pawl, E-mail timpawl@stthomas.edu
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Abstract

Schmid and Mullins present what they call ‘the Aloneness Argument’ for the inconsistency of four theses from classical theism: the doctrine of divine simplicity, the doctrine of divine omniscience, the claim that God is free to create or not to create, and the claim that it is possible that God and nothing but God exist. We deny that they have shown an inconsistency between these theses. We maintain that, depending on how certain premises are interpreted, one or another premise is false. We also offer a positive proposal regarding a simple God's knowledge that he is alone in a world where he doesn't create anything.

Keywords

Aloneness Argumentclassical theismdivine freedomdivine omnisciencedivine simplicityextrinsic predicationsextrinsic properties

Information

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 59 , Issue 1 , March 2023 , pp. 139 - 155
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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