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Constructivism, moral realism, and the possibility of Kant's rational religion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 April 2017

SAMUEL DUNCAN
SAMUEL DUNCAN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Tidewater Community College, Virginia Beach, VA, USA
*
e-mail: sld24688@email.vccs.edu
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Abstract

In this article I challenge Kantian constructivism both as an interpretation of Kant's own philosophical commitments and on its own merits as a moral theory, and argue in favour of a moral realist interpretation of Kant. I do so by focusing on Kant's own religious views and the question of whether a Kantian moral theory can be religiously neutral. I show that constructivist readings have severe problems on both fronts, while realist readings of Kant do not. This provides strong evidence that realist forms of Kantian ethics are preferable both as readings of Kant and as approaches to moral theory.

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Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 54 , Issue 4 , December 2018 , pp. 455 - 473
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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