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Direct Democracy, Public Opinion, and Public Policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 September 2009

Michael New
Affiliation:
University of Alabma

Abstract

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Type
Association News
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 2009

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