Introduction
For over a century, the United States has projected power across multiple regions of the world, anchoring its foreign policy in robust narratives of global leadership, ideological struggle, and strategic necessity. In Europe, for example, the US has long positioned itself as a perceived guardian of liberal democracy, from the Marshall Plan and support of NATO to the post-Cold War enlargement of Euro-Atlantic institutions (Gaddis, Reference Gaddis2005; Ikenberry, Reference Ikenberry2004). In the Middle East, successive administrations have built and justified interventions on the basis of defending vital interests, countering terrorism, or securing energy flows (Brands, Reference Brands2014; Khalidi, Reference Khalidi2009). These regions have become spaces through which the United States sustains its sense of self as a hegemon, a stabilizer, and a moral actor in international politics.
The Arctic, however, has never fully occupied such a role in the American strategic imagination. Despite the 1867 purchase of Alaska granting the United States Arctic territory and a significant northern coastline, the region has historically been treated as marginal – an environmental frontier, a domestic periphery, or, more recently, a climate concern (Gricius, Reference Gricius2022). This ontological underdefinition has had material and institutional consequences: US Arctic policy has been marked by scattered engagement, underinvestment, and inconsistent rhetoric. Unlike Europe or the Middle East, the Arctic has not served as a stable narrative anchor through which the United States enacts and reproduces its identity. As a result, the US approach to the region has often lacked coherence, continuity, and urgency.
This paper argues that this absence of ontological clarity has become increasingly unsustainable for American foreign policy. In recent years, a combination of environmental change, strategic competition, and regional activism has forced the United States to confront the Arctic not only as a space of policy but as a space of meaning. The United States’ limited leadership role does not preclude identity work: officials still articulate Arctic-specific roles and obligations (as an Arctic state, via Alaska, Indigenous governance, infrastructure, and risk). In the face of expanding Russian military infrastructure, Chinese polar ambitions, and growing demands for Indigenous inclusion and sustainable governance, the United States has entered a new phase of Arctic engagement, driven by status anxiety. This form of anxiety arises not from external threats per se, but from a perceived gap between the identity the United States claims and the role it plays – or fails to play – in the Arctic (Onea, Reference Onea2014; Rumelili, Reference Rumelili2014a). Status anxiety, then, is defined here as the specific dissonance that emerges when an actor historically situated at the top of global hierarchies perceives itself to be lagging in a domain that is becoming increasingly salient.
While the literature on Arctic geopolitics has grown in recent years, much of it emphasizes great power competition, institutional governance, or environmental challenges (Dodds & Nuttall, Reference Dodds and Nuttall2016; Huebert, Reference Huebert2009; Young, Reference Young2005). Recent work by Lavelle (Reference Lavelle2025) and Thomas-Jones (Reference Thompson-Jones2025) charts the gap between stated aims and institutional follow-through in the region, while Murkowski and Wohlforth (Reference Murkowski and Wohlforth2025) highlight how congressional advocacy sought to narrow that gap. While these are crucial dynamics, they often overlook the symbolic and emotional labor states perform to situate themselves within a region. Drawing on ontological security studies (OSS), this paper treats the Arctic as an object of identity negotiation. It traces how the United States has historically struggled to articulate what the Arctic means to its broader sense of self and how this underarticulation has given rise to reactive policy, symbolic overcorrection, and mounting anxiety. Additionally, while ontological security is inherently relational – shaped by recognition and (mis)recognition from others – this article deliberately centers the United States’ self-narrative as it appears in public strategy documents and congressional hearings. Rather than reconstructing how other Arctic actors perceive US status, I trace how US officials define the problems, roles, and appropriate action for themselves. External perceptions undoubtedly condition the durability and effects of this self-story; mapping those perceptions is beyond the present scope but is a clear avenue for future research.
The paper identifies four broad eras of US Arctic engagement. The first, from 1867 to the 1960s, treated the Arctic primarily as a domestic frontier in the context of the purchase of Alaska. The second, during the Cold War, reframed the Arctic as a strategic buffer zone, especially in relation to Soviet military activity, but still failed to generate a deep narrative of Arctic identity. The third, from the early 2000s to 2014, saw the moment of Arctic exceptionalism, where the region was cast as a uniquely peaceful space of environmental cooperation. This framing allowed the US to engage without investing or competing. It was only after 2014, amid Russian militarization, Chinese investments in its Polar Silk Road, and growing concern within the US Congress, that a fourth era emerged, marked by heightened attention and securitized discourse. Yet, even in this stage, the United States has struggled to fully reconcile its Arctic posture with its broader identity as a global leader.
This pattern raises a fundamental question: What is the Arctic, ontologically, to the United States? Unlike other theaters of engagement, the Arctic has resisted being fully woven into the American foreign policy identity. It is not a clear site of liberal order-building like postwar Europe, nor a battleground for moral struggle like the Middle East. The Arctic, instead, is a region that destabilizes identity by virtue of its ambiguity. This paper argues that such ambiguity has served as an active source of anxiety, particularly status anxiety, to the United States, which arises when a dominant actor perceives itself to be falling behind in a region it had long ignored (Onea, Reference Onea2014).
This paper proceeds as follows. First, it reviews the theoretical lens of ontological security and status anxiety, analyzing how emotions and symbolic narratives shape state behavior. Second, it traces the four eras of US Arctic engagement, drawing on Arctic strategy documents and congressional hearings from 1867 to 2024. Third, it analyzes how recent developments – especially the 2022 and 2024 Arctic Strategy documents and rising concern over Chinese and Russian capabilities – signal a shift toward a more assertive but still unsettled Arctic identity. Finally, it reflects on the implications of Arctic underdefinition for US leadership, regional cooperation, and the emotional politics of great power status in the 21st century.
Empirically, this paper maps the evolution of American Arctic engagement in relation to shifting identity scripts and symbolic gaps. Conceptually, it advances a reading of status anxiety not as a behavioral pathology but as a driver, pushing states to confront neglected dimensions of their identity and recalibrate their role in an evolving regional order. In so doing, it joins a growing body of work that treats the Arctic not as a blank slate of geopolitical competition, but as a rich terrain for understanding how power, identity, and emotion intersect in international politics.
Literature review
Ontological security studies
Ontological security, introduced by Giddens (Reference Giddens1991), has become a central framework in international relations for analyzing how states seek narrative stability in the face of uncertainty. It highlights the importance of routines, relationships, and coherent self-narratives in maintaining a sense of continuity. Early proponents of this framework within international relations include Mitzen (Reference Mitzen2006), who argued that states can become attached to stable – even conflictual – relationships to preserve identity, and Steele (Reference Steele2008), who built on this by showing how states perform identity through symbolic acts, often prioritizing ontological needs over material interests.
Subsequent work has deepened and diversified ontological security’s analytical scope. Kinnvall (Reference Kinnvall2004) has shown how crises, such as migration, globalization, or populist backlash, prompt states to double down on nostalgic or exclusionary narratives. Berenskötter (Reference Berenskötter2014) and Subotić (Reference Subotić2016) emphasize the role of collective memory and historical trauma in shaping how states imagine themselves over time. Others have examined how states respond to misrecognition or status denial in ways that reaffirm identity through foreign policy moves (Gustafsson Reference Gustafsson2014; Zarakol Reference Zarakol2010). Rumelili (Reference Rumelili2014a) and Croft (Reference Croft2012) also demonstrate that, when narratives become incoherent, states may respond with either conflictual posturing or reflexive recalibration, depending on the availability of alternative identity scripts.
This paper draws on these insights to position the Arctic as a space of ontological ambiguity to the United States – neither fully domestic nor foreign, neither core nor periphery. This ambiguity has generated reactive, symbolic, and sometimes contradictory policies, from the issuance of Arctic strategies to investments in icebreakers and alliance signaling. By viewing the Arctic as a site of identity negotiation, the paper contributes to a growing body of work that examines how states cope with narrative uncertainty through rhetorical, institutional, and material practices (Browning & Joenniemi Reference Browning and Joenniemi2017; Rumelili & Çelik Reference Rumelili and Çelik2017). In doing so, it illustrates how ontological ambiguity can act not only as a source of anxiety but also as a catalyst for renewed identity work and strategic repositioning.
Anxiety in world politics
Anxiety is by no means a new field of study in international relations, especially due to its explanatory potential in how uncertainty drives foreign policy decisions. This paper draws upon anxiety as a concept to explain how status anxiety, an emotional response to geopolitical uncertainty, has catalyzed the evolution of US Arctic policy. By understanding anxiety not merely as a psychological condition but as a force that shapes state behavior, this section provides the theoretical foundation for analyzing US policy recalibration in the Arctic.
In the 1990s, post-structuralist literature frequently referenced and critiqued a “Cartesian anxiety,” which Rumelili (Reference Rumelili2022) describes as “a modernist epistemological unease that without an ultimate foundation to knowledge, there would be a plunge into the void of relativism and arbitrariness.” In recent years, furthering research in Ontological Security Studies (OSS) also brought a surge in the study of anxiety. Brent Steele’s Ontological Security in International Relations differentiates fear from anxiety in order to introduce the concept of ontological insecurity, and Jennifer Mitzen’s Ontological Security in World Politics highlighted the role of narratives and routines in order to counter and manage anxiety as uncertainty. Rumelili, on the other hand, has expanded on the relationship between anxiety and conflict, arguing that anxiety can have a positive effect in driving a leap of faith towards peace (Rumelili, Reference Rumelili2014b).
Because of differences in the epistemological understanding of anxiety, there is not a unified definition of anxiety in the international system. Most of the IR literature, however, characterizes it as a state of inner unease caused by uncertainty, possibility, and change. In existentialist and psychoanalytical literature, anxiety has been theorized at both the individual and state levels as an emotional state arising out of deep uncertainty and unpredictability (Mitzen, Reference Mitzen2006), radical changes and crises (Ejdus & Rečević, Reference Ejdus and Rečević2021), and non- or misrecognition (Gustafsson, Reference Gustafsson2016).
In 2020, a symposium promoted by the journal International Theory called anxiety “the key emotion central to the constitution of subjectivity in ontological security research” (Zevnik, Reference Zevnik2021). The overwhelming conclusion of the symposium contributors was that, despite its diverse meanings, anxiety was fundamentally different from fear due to its lack of a specific object. Contributors traced the theoretical roots of this concept to existentialist and psychoanalytic thought while also highlighting its often-overlooked manifestations in Hobbes (Rumelili, Reference Rumelili2020). The symposium delved into the different forms of political agency associated with anxiety, asserting that, unlike fear, anxiety holds the potential to unleash emancipatory and radical agency, challenging the stabilizing mechanisms of the existing social order.
Gustafsson & Krickel-Choi (Reference Gustafsson and Krickel-Choi2020) also explored the origins of ontological insecurity in existentialist psychology, distinguishing between normal and neurotic anxiety. Their paper emphasizes that, while the latter characterizes the incapacitating state of ontological insecurity, the former allows for adaptation and creativity in changing circumstances. Additionally, Eberle (Reference Eberle2019) proposed a Lacanian conceptualization of anxiety, arguing that it arises from the inevitable lack of foundation to an identity beyond the unstable categories dictated by the social order.
This debate was expanded in a forum in the Journal of International Relations and Development, centered around Rumelili’s 2019 keynote address at the Central and Eastern European International Studies Association’s convention in Belgrade. Rumelili put forth a conceptualization of anxiety as an episodic social emotion shaping international relations intermittently, aligning with the Convention’s theme, the “Age of Anxiety” (Rumelili, Reference Rumelili2021). Steele (Reference Steele2021) emphasized the distinct nature of today’s anxiety, pointing out that sources of anxiety management and mitigation employed by governments, especially in populist responses, can also raise anxiety in certain groups. Furthermore, Gustafsson (Reference Gustafsson2021) furthered the discussion by exploring the constructive use of anxiety for creative change, challenging the notion that it should be avoided. Zevnik (Reference Zevnik2021) delved into how anxious political action and transformation manifest through the identification of needs in existing orders and the construction of new fantasies around them. This new wave of anxiety theorizing in international relations (IR) extends beyond Giddens, drawing from a diverse intellectual heritage. Despite the recent emergence of literature on anxiety, scholars already exhibit a variety of approaches, incorporating conceptions from thinkers like Heidegger, Lacan, and May.
This paper, then, draws upon Eberle’s (Reference Eberle2019) Lacanian conceptualization of anxiety as arising from the unstable foundations of identity. This becomes evident in the US’s Arctic rhetoric, where narratives of exceptionalism clash with a historically passive stance, amplifying anxiety. As Rumelili (Reference Rumelili2021) and Steele (Reference Steele2021) also suggest, today’s anxiety is shaped by populist pressures and systemic shifts – factors that resonate strongly with the US’s Arctic challenges.
Status anxiety
Within modern societies, an actor’s social standing is determined by a variety of criteria, usually encompassing income, education, occupation, age, ethnicity, and gender. The concept of status, denoting an individual’s overall societal position, is dependent on the delicate interplay of these categories, some of which may be incongruent. This lack of uniformity when analyzing status, however, prompted two classifications: status inconsistency and status anxiety, which have been applied to the international system when analyzing a state’s position within a group.
Actors grappling with status inconsistency strive to enhance their position in certain dimensions conferring status, while concurrently lagging behind in others. Consequently, their efforts are directed at ameliorating their standing in the areas where they fall short. Defined as such, status inconsistency predominantly characterizes up-and-coming entities. The enhancement in specific dimensions is imperative for an actor’s overall status elevation, as excellence in one dimension forms the basis for asserting additional status, yet does not assure recognition akin to excelling in all dimensions. Hence, specialization at the expense of neglecting other dimensions becomes an often-used, although unsustainable, approach.
Conversely, status anxiety affects higher-ranked actors witnessing a decline in one or more dimensions conferring status compared to a rising competitor – in this case, the United States and its perceptions of Russia and China. In such instances, these actors perceive a threat to their overall rank, instigating a fear of demotion or status anxiety. While ontological anxiety concerns internal coherence and narrative disruption, status anxiety reflects fear of diminished external recognition. In this paper, both are entangled: the US fears losing not only strategic influence but also its identity as an Arctic leader. It is crucial to note that status anxiety is not merely any incongruity in the statuses of a high-ranked actor, as even dominant actors seldom rank uniformly high across all dimensions. Instead, status anxiety pertains to a specific incongruity arising from the perceived competition of an actor poised to surpass them in one or more areas (Onea, Reference Onea2014). For example, the post-Cold War dominance of the United States is more pronounced in military capabilities than in economics or prestige, without instigating status anxiety. However, if the US appears on the brink of being overtaken by another state in any of these dimensions, status anxiety ensues. Consequently, status inconsistency in one actor is likely to trigger status anxiety in another, as an improvement in one dimension for the former implies a simultaneous reduction in available status for the latter, leading to perceived threats to self-esteem. In line with Tajfel and Turner’s (Reference Tajfel and Turner2010) argument, even the dominant or high-status group may experience insecure social identity, prompting them to resist perceived threats and uphold their superior position. Therefore, status anxiety serves as a motivating factor for dominant actors to impede the progress of new entrants, maintain superiority in areas where they excel, and recuperate losses in those where they have fallen behind.
Onea (Reference Onea2014) describes that three major hierarchies confer a polity international status, and, in order for a state to dominate the others, it would need to excel in all of them: military capabilities, economic capabilities, and prestige. Whenever a state experiences a change in rankings under these three aforementioned hierarchies, a discrepancy of status and will to balance or rebalance them would occur. Additionally, should a dominant state perceive a threat to its standing in any of those three dimensions due to the ascent of a competitor, it would experience status anxiety. Consequently, this anxiety propels dominant states to resist assertions of equality or superiority from emerging powers. This resistance can be elucidated by the principles of prospect theory, which posit that status anxiety is more keenly felt than status inconsistency. This is attributable to the psychological tendency to resent losses more intensely than gains, implying that a decline in status holds greater significance for an actor than further advancement. Consequently, dominant powers are inclined to adopt a more risk-acceptant stance compared to rising powers, as they strive to safeguard their established status. Conversely, rising powers tend to be more risk-averse and, therefore, more inclined toward conciliation.
Besides the conceptualization of status anxiety, Onea (Reference Onea2014) also describes the methods through which to identify it in international relations through a three-step process. First, one should “encounter evidence that it was the dominant state’s intransigence that affected the initiation and the continuation of rivalry” (Onea, Reference Onea2014, p. 138). Second, one should monitor primary sources from decision-makers, such as official statements, speeches, correspondence, and memoirs. The confirmation of status anxiety is evident when decision-makers express apprehension about the decline in their state’s standing compared to a competitor and harbor concerns about the potential displacement by the emerging power. Third, there should be policies reflective of a heightened sense of physical threat, indicating that the security language employed by policymakers was actually translated into material action.
Methods
In order to analyze the influence of anxiety – and particularly status anxiety – in US Arctic politics, I conduct discourse and content analyses of the five main Arctic doctrines published by the United States (1994, 2009, 2013, 2022, and 2024), looking for indications of securitizing moves, perceptions of ontological security, and depictions of enemies and allies. In the content analysis, the documents were scanned for a series of keywords: threat, security, anxiety, survival, food, population, planetary, global warming, climate change, unpredictable, uncontrolled, extraordinary, uncertain, unforeseen, crisis, unprecedented, extreme, Indigenous, resilient, adapt, mitigate, drastic, catastrophic, vulnerable, fragile, Russia, China, West, allies, and NATO.
I also analyze how key policymakers have depicted Arctic security and its position against competitors through procedures, speeches, and releases made available in the Congressional Records. Documents transcribing congressional proceedings were filtered to only include hearings containing the words “Arctic,” “security,” “Russia” (or “Soviet Union”), and its variations, from 1867 (the purchase of Alaska and the start of the US as an Arctic state) through December of 2023. This search rendered 1,287 results, which were downloaded and run through NVivo for content analysis. In a first step, documents about procedural and routine issues were removed. The remaining documents were then grouped in themes of economic, military, and ontological security concerning Russia and the United States. Documents were coded for terms expressing decline, urgency, or comparative weakness – e.g. “falling behind,” “losing leadership,” and “catching up to Russia.” These linguistic markers were cross-checked to establish their consistency across time periods and actor types.
In this paper, I use national strategies and congressional hearings as the institutional venues where US officials articulate and authorize policy claims. The analysis does not equate rhetoric with implementation. Because I treat status anxiety as primarily ontological, I expect its first manifestations to be narrative: language that casts the United States as lagging, losing recognition or leadership, or needing to “catch up,” alongside heightened urgency and revised problem definitions. References to institutional adjustments within the documents (for example, proposals to elevate posts or coordinate agencies) are treated as discursive signals, not as evidence of subsequent action. The scope of inference is therefore limited to what these texts make sayable and legitimate at a given time. The contribution lies in showing how anxiety-laden narratives recur and shift across time, shaping the bounds and tempo of plausible Arctic policy without making claims about implementation or capability growth.
Data analysis and results
US Arctic doctrine documents
Although American Arctic legitimacy dates from the purchase of Alaska in 1867, its first document regarding foreign policy in the region dates from 1994, with the United States Policy on the Arctic and Antarctic Regions. Prior to that, the Arctic was mainly discussed in the domestic context of Alaska, figuring in policy documents as a wilderness to be conquered or a source for scarce natural resources. The 1994 document highlights six objectives for the United States in the Arctic:
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1. Meeting post-Cold War security and defense needs,
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2. Protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its biological resources,
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3. Assuring that natural resource management and economic development in the region are environmentally sustainable,
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4. Strengthening institutions for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations,
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5. Involving the Arctic’s indigenous peoples in decisions that affect them, and:
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6. Enhancing scientific monitoring and research into local, regional, and global environmental issues.
This document reflects priorities and the geopolitical context of the post-Cold War, which are also still in effect to this day. From the need to create and strengthen institutions in the Arctic, the United States (alongside Canada and Finland) was one of the proponents of the Arctic Council, which was created in 1996 and promotes dialogue on issues of regional environmental conservation, research, monitoring, and governanceFootnote 1 . In regard to security and defense needs, the document emphasizes that, although geopolitical tensions had lowered, it was still a priority to “maintain the ability to protect against attack across the Arctic, to move ships and aircraft freely under the principles of customary law reflected in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, to control our borders and areas under our jurisdiction and to carry our military operations in the region” (The White House, 1994). Emphasis on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is regarded by the literature as one of the key points of American foreign policy. According to Steinberg (Reference Steinberg2015), compromises made by the United States reflecting the UNCLOS negotiations pertaining to the establishment of exclusive economic zones reveal that, when necessary, the United States has found it beneficial to sacrifice some resource extraction access in exchange for navigational rights.
Another characteristic of the 1994 policy is that it places equal importance on the Arctic and Antarctic, treating them as similar terrains for policy. This view was later debunked by the 2009 US Arctic Foreign Policy document, officially known as the National Security Presidential Directive 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 25, signed by then-President George W. Bush. The document, now completely focused on the Arctic region, states that “The geopolitical circumstances of the Arctic region differ sufficiently from those of the Antarctic region such that an ‘Arctic Treaty’ of broad scope – along the lines of the Antarctic Treaty – is not appropriate or necessary” (The White House, 2009). The document also demonstrates, although subtly, two concerns for the United States regarding the Arctic region: internationalization and territorialization (Steinberg, Reference Steinberg2015). By denying the need for a binding treaty regarding the Arctic region, the United States gains freedom in independently resolving issues in its Arctic territory. Similarly, its dependence on and continuous mention of UNCLOS throughout the document also suggest that the territorialization of Arctic sea routes (most notably the Northern Sea Route and the Northwestern Passage) continues to be an issue, in favor of prioritizing navigational rights and freedom of navigation.
The 1994 and the 2009 policies also diverge in two ways. Firstly, while the 1994 document stated that “the United States has been an Arctic nation,” the 2009 policy says “the United States is an Arctic nation.” While this change may seem insignificant at first, this transition underscores a shift in the way the Arctic is viewed by the United States, moving from a passive acknowledgment of its historical Arctic identity to an active reaffirmation of its current and strategic significance in the region. Secondly, the 2009 report emphasizes Arctic interests as matters of national interest and not simply related to the concerns of Alaska as a state.
The 2009 policy was updated in 2013 during the Obama administration by the National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The 2013 document was focused on three lines of interest – 1) advancing US interests in the region, 2) pursuing responsible stewardship of the region, and 3) strengthening international cooperation – and echoes the predominant feeling of Arctic exceptionalism – or treating the Arctic as a region of exceptional peace, where state-centric competition dynamics could be put aside in favor of cooperation and dialogue. This becomes evident from the prologue to the document, written by then-President Barack Obama, which states, “The Arctic region is peaceful, stable, and free of conflict” (The White House, 2013).
The 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region lays out four pillars for American Arctic interest for the next decade: security, the environment, sustainable economic development, and international governance (The White House, 2022). The document release also followed the appointment of a US Ambassador-at-Large for Arctic Affairs, Michael Sfraga. The document highlighted increased Chinese and Russian investments in the Arctic region and called for increased vigilance amongst Western allies. Additionally, it names climate change as one of the main causes of increased interest and presence in the Arctic region. There is, however, a fundamental change to what the United States considers valuable resources in the region. While the 2013 Arctic policy highlighted the vast deposits of critical minerals, oil, and gas in the Arctic, the 2022 strategy foregoes any mention of oil and gas.
Lastly, the 2024-released Arctic Strategy starts by highlighting the high stakes of great power competition with Russia and the People’s Republic of China. The document continuously highlights that, while China is not an Arctic state, it has been increasing its presence in the Arctic, as well as its possession of three icebreaker ships. In regard to Russia, the reopening of Soviet-era Arctic installations, made possible with Chinese investment, also figures in the document as a threat to the United States and its NATO allies, necessitating a response. The document states that
In addition to nuclear, conventional, and special operations threats, Russia seeks to carry out lower-level destabilizing activities in the Arctic against the United States and our Allies, including through Global Positioning System jamming and military flights that are conducted in an unprofessional manner inconsistent with international law and custom (US Department of Defense, 2024).
The word distribution between US Arctic Strategy Documents from 1994 to 2024, seen in Figure 1, showcases a marked increase in terms associated with security and threats, reflective of status anxiety about maintaining US influence in the Arctic amidst rising competition from Russia and China. The term “Russia” is mentioned only 7 times in the 1994 document, but this jumps significantly to 20 mentions in 2022 and 29 in 2024, indicating growing concerns about Russian activities and influence in the Arctic. Similarly, “China” is absent from the documents until 2022, when it appears 4 times, and then surges to 23 mentions in 2024, highlighting the rising anxiety over China’s increasing involvement in the Arctic.
Figure 1. Word distribution: US Arctic strategy documents. Source: Compiled by the author.
In terms of security and threats, the word “security” appears only 3 times in 1994 but increases almost ten-fold to 28 mentions in 2009 and remains high in subsequent documents, with 33 mentions in both 2013 and 2024. This consistency underscores the enduring emphasis on security concerns in the region. Additionally, the term “threat” is mentioned just once in 1994, disappears in 2009 and 2013, but then reappears with significant frequency in 2022 (6 mentions) and 2024 (16 mentions), signaling growing anxiety about perceived threats from rival powers.
The emphasis on allies and NATO also demonstrates this status anxiety. Mentions of “allies” are absent until 2013, where it appears 6 times, then increases sharply to 28 in 2022 and 62 in 2024, highlighting the US’s strategic shift towards strengthening alliances to counterbalance Russia and China’s influence. The term “NATO” is not mentioned until 2022, appearing 5 times, then rising to 24 mentions in 2024. This reflects an increasing reliance on NATO for collective security in the Arctic, indicating anxiety about unilateral capabilities and the need for allied support.
In summary, US Arctic strategy documents have evolved significantly since the first formal policy in 1994. The latest strategies, particularly the 2022 and 2024 documents, highlight a stark shift towards addressing the growing geopolitical tensions with Russia and China. These recent documents underscore an increased focus on security and strategic competition, identifying Russia’s aggressive maneuvers and China’s rising influence in the region as significant threats. This evolution illustrates a broader trend of the US adapting its Arctic policies to address contemporary geopolitical realities while maintaining a commitment to environmental stewardship and international cooperation. The increasing focus on Russia and China as revisionist powers reflects US anxiety about maintaining its status and influence in the Arctic amidst rising global competition. The explicit identification of these nations as threats, along with heightened vigilance and calls for allied cooperation, also highlights the US’s strategic recalibration to counter perceived challenges.
Congressional hearings
Congressional hearings in this case can help illustrate not only the imagery behind US status anxiety but also identify its sources. In this paper, I argue that there are four eras of American narratives in regard to the Arctic region, each with distinct characteristics. First, an era of domestic interest fueled by the purchase of Alaska and lasting until the 1960s. Second, a period of highlighted competition and militarization, reflective of the Cold War, which lasted until the start of the 1990s. Third, from the early 2000s to 2014, an era of idealism was fueled by the ideal of Arctic Exceptionalism, which promoted the development of research and institutions in the region. And lastly, an era of narratives of anxiety and competition, focused on the capabilities of Russia and China and a striking fear of falling behind.
1867–1960s: The era of resource curiosity
Until the end of World War II, US Arctic politics were predominantly framed through the domestic lens of Alaska, with limited engagement or recognition of the region’s broader international strategic significance (Gricius, Reference Gricius2022). In fact, up until 1961, no congressional hearing made simultaneous mention of Alaska, Russia, or the Arctic. Congress’s depictions of Russia, though, have encompassed themes of economic partnership, curiosity, competition, and animosity from the purchase of Alaska in the mid-1800s to current days.
Up until the 1900s, references to Russia and Alaska in US Congressional records were primarily centered around economic considerations. Congressional discussions often revolved around economic matters, including fisheries, furs, and trade. Furthermore, documents mentioned the bureaucracy behind the acquisition of Alaska, as well as the race for the region’s economic potential, as demonstrated by the comment from Republican politician Edward Joy Morris:
I am pleased to see that the Senate by a nearly unanimous vote has confirmed the treaty by which Russia cedes all her possessions in North America to the United States. The enterprise and capital of our countrymen will develop the resources of this comparatively inhospitable region of country, and will render it available to its utmost capacity for the agriculturist, the miner, and the fisherman along its coasts. Whatever of the productive wealth it may contain will now be brought to light (House of Representatives, 1867).
While this quote demonstrates the eagerness for resource discoveries in Alaska, congressional debate centered on domestic issues, rarely making mention of international involvements excluding trade. This goes in par with US foreign policy aspirations for the time, focused on other regions of the world (LaFeber, Reference LaFeber1994). It was during the 1890s that the United States experienced a significant shift in its traditional unilateral internationalist stance toward a more assertive role in the international system. This era marked the annexation of territories like Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. Besides that, the Spanish-American War of 1898 marked a turning point, leading to the acquisition of territories from Spain and establishing the United States as an emerging colonial power. Concurrently, the US advocated for the Open Door Policy in China to safeguard American commercial interests. This period also saw the reinforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, emphasizing US influence in the Western Hemisphere (LaFeber, Reference LaFeber1994).
1960s–1990s: The era of American-Soviet competition
The 1960s mark a shift in how the United States has portrayed the Arctic in Congressional Hearings. In this decade, mentions of the Soviet Union as a competitor in the region, justifying the need for militarization, become more frequent. Again, this positioning is aligned with other geopolitical developments around the globe. Firstly, in the 1960s, the Soviet Union launched the nuclear-powered icebreaker Arktika, signaling a significant advancement in their Arctic capabilities and demonstrating their commitment to maintaining a strong presence in the Arctic, capable of navigating and controlling the icy waters year-round. This period was also marked by heightened Cold War tensions, with the Arctic region emerging as a critical strategic frontier due to its proximity to both the US and the Soviet Union, making it a potential flashpoint for military conflict. Recognizing the strategic importance of the Arctic for missile deployment, submarine operations, and early warning systems, the US increased its focus on Soviet activities in the region, as demonstrated by the following excerpt from 1966:
Icebreaker construction is being accelerated to provide a virtual armada that will permit nearly year-round access to northern Soviet ports. These ships — some of which may be atomic powered — will open up ice-locked ports in the Arctic […]. (Congress, Reference Congress1966)
The excerpt exemplifies how the Soviet Union significantly expanded its military infrastructure in the Arctic during the 1960s, constructing bases, airfields, and radar stations, which the US perceived as a direct threat to its national security and Arctic interests. Technological advancements in Arctic exploration and exploitation during this period, including improved icebreakers, satellite surveillance, and underwater detection systems, allowed both the US and the Soviet Union to enhance their operational capabilities in the harsh Arctic environment, further intensifying the competition for dominance in the region.
Additionally, the discovery of vast natural resources in the Arctic, such as oil, gas, and minerals, heightened the geopolitical stakes. The US became increasingly aware of the Soviet Union’s efforts to exploit these resources, which could potentially shift the balance of power and economic influence in the Arctic. These factors combined to reshape the US understanding of Russia’s involvement in the Arctic, leading to a heightened sense of urgency and a more strategic approach to countering Soviet influence in the region. This shift in perception laid the groundwork for subsequent US Arctic policies that emphasized the need for security, environmental stewardship, and international cooperation to address the evolving challenges posed by Russia’s Arctic ambitions.
2000s–2010s: The era of Arctic idealism
Following trends of Arctic exceptionalism, the years 2000–2015 saw a notably more cooperative and friendly environment in the Arctic region, as depicted in Congressional Hearings. This period was marked by a collective understanding among Arctic states that the region should be managed through peaceful collaboration and dialogue rather than competition and conflict.
During this time, the Arctic Council, established in 1996, became a central platform for multilateral cooperation. Congressional hearings from this period often highlighted the successes of the Arctic Council in promoting environmental protection, sustainable development, and scientific research. The emphasis was on cooperative frameworks that brought together Arctic nations to address shared challenges such as climate change, indigenous rights, and pollution control. The United States, alongside other Arctic states, frequently reaffirmed its commitment to these cooperative endeavors in Congressional discussions.
In line with narratives of Arctic exceptionalism, there was a notable reduction in military tensions in the region during this period. Congressional hearings reflected a strategic focus on demilitarization and the promotion of peaceful coexistence, especially through promoting institutionalization attempts with Russia. The Arctic was often described as a zone of low conflict where traditional military posturing was minimized. Instead, the discussions centered on confidence-building measures, search and rescue operations, and joint emergency response exercises. These activities were aimed at fostering trust and ensuring the safety and security of the Arctic region without escalating military competition. This strategy can be seen in the following excerpts:
The third and final track is to implement the kind of inclusive policy toward Russia that I described earlier. As a result, we have stepped up our efforts to support regional cooperation in these structures like the Council of Baltic Sea States, the Barents EuroArctic Council, the Arctic Council, each of which provides an effective forum for working alongside all nations of the region, including Russia, on a host of economic, social, and environmental issues (Committee on Foreign Relations, 1998, p.11)
Another prominent theme in Congressional hearings was the engagement with Arctic indigenous communities. The years 2000–2015 saw a heightened awareness of the rights and contributions of indigenous peoples in the Arctic. Hearings frequently discussed the importance of including indigenous voices in decision-making processes and respecting their traditional knowledge. This period was marked by efforts to ensure that development projects and policies in the Arctic were carried out in consultation with and to the benefit of indigenous populations.
Economic and infrastructural development in the Arctic was approached with a cooperative mindset during this time. Congressional hearings often highlighted the potential for sustainable economic development through joint ventures and international partnerships. There was a strong emphasis on ensuring that economic activities, such as resource extraction and shipping, were conducted in an environmentally responsible manner. The hearings underscored the need for robust regulatory frameworks and international cooperation to manage the economic opportunities presented by the opening Arctic.
Lastly, another shift in American narratives of Arctic security comes from the Russian annexation of Crimea and later war of aggression against Ukraine. This is the time with the most congressional hearings focused specifically on Arctic issues, with attempts to evaluate the current state of American interests and positioning in the region. Of these, I highlight “Charting the Arctic: Security, Economic, and Resource Opportunities” (2015), “The Northern Northern Border: Homeland Security Priorities in the Arctic” (2019 and 2020), “National Security Implications of Climate Change in the Arctic” (2021), “Amplifying the Arctic: Strengthening Science to Respond to a Rapidly Changing Arctic” (2022), and “Strategic Competition in the Arctic” (2023).
2014–2024: The era of Arctic status anxiety
By 2015, there was a growing recognition that the Arctic region was becoming a focal point for great power competition. A quote from 2015’s Charting the Arctic hearing stated, “From a geopolitical perspective, one can sense that a number of nations are scrambling to be the first mover in the territory. Russia, for example, is ahead of everyone in ice-breaking capabilities. This has both economic and military implications” (on Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 3). This acknowledgment represents well the shift towards viewing the Arctic not just as a region for cooperation, but as a strategic arena where national interests could potentially clash. The same document also acknowledges the infrastructural gap between the US and Russia, as the hearing noted, “Some of the things the Russians are doing I wish that we were doing along the north slope of Alaska right now in terms of preparing infrastructure for future human activity” (on Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 41). This sentiment highlighted the recognition that the US needed to enhance its infrastructure to support its strategic objectives in the Arctic.
Furthermore, concerns about the activities of Russia and China as breakers of order in the Arctic became more pronounced. Another Congressional hearing in 2015 emphasized that “Both Russia and China are active in the north, and an increased US presence is necessary to demonstrate that we are not falling behind” (on Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 4). This sentiment highlighted the growing anxiety within US policymakers about maintaining a competitive edge in the Arctic. The hearings also began to reflect a more urgent tone, focusing on the need to bolster US capabilities and presence in the region.
The hearings reflected frustration with the pace of US efforts in comparison to those of Russia and China. One hearing lamented, “We talk about Russia as a security issue, but they really want to claim that area with China, and we sit on our hands” (on Foreign Affairs, 2015, p. 7). This criticism underscored the perceived need for the US to take more decisive action to protect its interests in the Arctic. The increased investments by Russia and China in the Arctic are continuously viewed with concern. A 2020 hearing pointed out, “Russia and China are making significant investments in the Arctic. To them, the Arctic is a new battlefield where they are seeking every advantage over the United States” (on Homeland Security, 2020, p. 6). This accusatory positioning is also significant of anxiety.
In sum, congressional hearings from 1867 to 2023 can be divided into four eras. First, an era of curiosity and domestic interest from the purchase of Alaska to the 1960s mostly focused on the new possibilities brought by Alaska. Second, in trend with the Cold War, a period of competition and militarization from the 1960s to the start of the 1990s, which pointed to the Soviet Union as a strategic competitor in the Arctic region. An era of idealism, focused on the development of research and institutional networks through the eight Arctic states, from the early 2000s to 2014. And finally, and more recently, a return to narratives of anxiety and competition, this time focused on the capabilities of Russia and China.
Status anxiety and US Arctic relations
The United States has formally been an Arctic state since 1867, but the region has since occupied a marginal position in its strategic imagination. By contrast, even where US narratives have been contested or cyclical elsewhere – Europe and the Middle East in particular – they have long been scaffolded by relatively durable identity scripts: alliance leadership and liberal order in Europe, and energy security and counterterrorism in the Middle East. These scripts fray and are renegotiated, but they still provide a stable referent function that organizes meaning and action. The Arctic still lacks that anchor. The region has, historically, lacked a stable referent function in American foreign policy identity, remaining ontologically ambiguous – neither fully domestic nor fully international, neither core nor periphery. This ambiguity has shaped the uneven trajectory of US Arctic engagement and continues to inform the anxieties now surrounding it.
While other Arctic states have embedded the region into their national narratives and institutional frameworks, the United States has maintained a more ad hoc and compartmentalized approach. Its Arctic presence has often been expressed through scientific cooperation, Alaskan domestic governance, and intermittent security deployments, but rarely through a coherent or sustained regional strategy. As Steinberg (Reference Steinberg2015, p. 179) notes, the Arctic has historically been treated less as a strategic theater in its own right and more as an extension of other geopolitical interests. This detachment has persisted despite the increasing relevance of the region for global governance, security, and climate change.
The consequences of this peripheral framing are reflected in the recurrent gap between policy discourse and material capability. US Arctic strategies and national security documents have long affirmed the importance of regional stability, cooperation, and leadership. Yet these rhetorical commitments have not been matched by institutional investments or sustained political attention. As Commander James Kraska observed in 2009, “As a nation, the United States views the Arctic with relatively minimal interest compared to every other Arctic nation… The United States is not focused on the Arctic, and, for the most part, other countries prefer it to be that way” (Kraska, Reference Kraska2011, p. 256). The comment captures the enduring lack of prioritization that has characterized the US Arctic posture.
In recent years, however, this stance has shifted. Congressional hearings, strategic documents, and defense appropriations all demonstrate a heightened sense of urgency regarding Arctic affairs. References to Russia and China have increased significantly in official discourse, particularly in the 2022 and 2024 Arctic strategies. Russian investments in Arctic military infrastructure, including its nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet and Northern Fleet modernization, alongside China’s ambitions as a “near-Arctic state,” have been interpreted as challenges to American credibility and influence in the region. These developments have catalyzed an anxious reevaluation of the United States’ regional role.
This anxiety emerges from the recognition that the Arctic, long considered a peripheral space, now constitutes a meaningful site of geopolitical competition. The United States is confronting the consequences of decades of narrative underdevelopment. Unlike its Cold War posture – anchored in clear geostrategic logics and sustained institutional commitments – the Arctic presents a case where discursive uncertainty has produced strategic inertia. As the region becomes central to broader questions of climate governance, maritime control, and great power rivalry, the lack of an established ontological position has become a liability.
The concept of status anxiety offers a useful framework for understanding this transformation. Rather than indicating a universal condition, status anxiety here refers to the specific dissonance that emerges when an actor historically situated at the top of global hierarchies perceives itself to be lagging in a domain that is becoming increasingly salient. In the Arctic, the United States now confronts a dual tension: the need to assert presence in response to external pressures and the challenge of doing so without a clearly defined regional identity to draw from. Anxiety in this context becomes a mechanism of policy activation – a catalyst for institutional innovation, resource mobilization, and symbolic assertion.
This shift is evident across multiple empirical indicators. Congressional testimony over the past decade has emphasized the strategic risks of Arctic passivity, often citing the disparity between the United States’ limited icebreaking capacity and Russia’s fleet of more than 30 vessels. Hearings have increasingly framed the Arctic as a “domain of competition,” with bipartisan calls for investment in infrastructure, domain awareness, and regional alliances. Strategy documents from 1994 to 2024 demonstrate a marked evolution in tone and content, moving from cooperative rhetoric to deterrence-focused language.
The transformation of Arctic policy should be read in light of a broader ontological question: What is the Arctic to the United States? The absence of a stable answer has made the region vulnerable to narrative contestation and strategic drift. As anxiety over relative decline intensifies, the United States is attempting to fill this void by articulating new narratives of leadership, resilience, and strategic foresight. This process is ongoing and fragmented, but it illustrates how emotional dynamics – particularly those tied to perceptions of status and identity – can inform shifts in foreign policy orientation.
The Arctic case reveals the uneven and adaptive nature of hegemonic behavior. The region’s growing prominence has forced a recalibration, not only in capabilities and presence, but also in meaning. In attempting to catch up with Russia and China, the United States is also attempting to articulate what the Arctic is and what role it should play within its evolving identity as a global power.
What, ontologically, is the Arctic to the United States?
The United States has long been an Arctic state in legal and territorial terms, yet the Arctic has remained ontologically peripheral to its national identity. As the data across doctrine and congressional hearings reveal, the region has lacked a stable narrative function within American foreign policy, appearing alternately as a frontier climate laboratory, security buffer, or geopolitical battleground. This conceptual instability is a constitutive feature of the region’s place in American identity. From an ontological security perspective, the absence of a settled Arctic narrative has rendered the region vulnerable to symbolic overcompensation, and uneven strategic investment.
Throughout the four eras mapped in this paper, the Arctic’s identity position has remained suspended between incompatible roles. In the domestic imaginary of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, it was a wilderness to be surveyed and resourced, with Alaska as frontier rather than as Arctic periphery. During the Cold War, it became a liminal security space, adjacent to threat but not articulated as central to US self-conception. The post-2000 discourse of Arctic exceptionalism treated the region as a cooperative environmental zone, allowing the US to participate without anchoring the Arctic in its national identity scripts. Only in the most recent era, marked by growing anxieties about falling behind Russia and China, has the Arctic been pulled toward narrative centrality, but even then in a fragmented and reactive way.
What emerges from this pattern is a form of ontological indeterminacy. The Arctic is not consistently securitized or desecuritized, domesticated or externalized, marginal or central, but oscillates across these categories depending on shifting identity needs. This narrative drift has ontological consequences. Unlike other regions, the Arctic lacks a stabilizing narrative function. This has led to an identity-insecure foreign policy, where symbolic gestures such as Arctic strategies, increased references to NATO, or icebreaker investments serve as much to project power as to signal coherence in a space where narrative grounding is thin.
The rise of status anxiety further complicates this picture. As doctrine documents and hearings show, the US increasingly casts the Arctic in competitive terms, not because its identity there is strong, but because the absence of identity makes it a ripe site for performative recovery. The fear of “falling behind” Russia or China activates anxiety not only about material capabilities but also about legitimacy and recognition – two key elements in ontological security. The fact that Russia possesses a robust Arctic narrative while the US scrambles to define its own also deepens the perception of symbolic loss. The Arctic thus becomes a mirror, reflecting the instability of US identity in a multipolar world.
In this context, the Arctic should be seen as a site of ontological struggle. Its meaning to the United States has been historically deferred, its narrative role borrowed or reactive rather than foundational. The discursive volatility observed across strategy documents and congressional testimonies is symptomatic of a deeper identity void. The Arctic destabilizes the United States’ traditional self-image as a global leader with coherent regional scripts. And in response, the US gropes for meaning.
Conclusion
This paper has examined how the evolution of US Arctic policy reflects a deeper ontological uncertainty – an ongoing struggle to define what the Arctic is to the United States. While formally an Arctic nation since 1867, the US has historically approached the region as peripheral to its grand strategy. Unlike the Middle East, framed through the logics of energy and counterterrorism, or Europe, tied to alliance maintenance and liberal order-building, the Arctic has lacked a stable referent function in American foreign policy identity. Its ambiguous position – neither fully domestic nor fully global – has rendered it narratively underdeveloped and institutionally neglected.
Through the analysis of strategic documents and congressional hearings spanning more than a century, this paper has shown that recent US engagement in the Arctic is best understood through the lens of status anxiety. As Russia and China have expanded their Arctic presence with icebreakers, infrastructure, military deployments, and diplomatic narratives, the United States has responded with a recalibration of its own.
The concept of status anxiety helps make sense of this transformation. In the Arctic, the United States is not operating from a position of inherited dominance; instead, it is contending with the realization that it may be falling behind in a region that was never fully integrated into its hegemonic architecture. This anxiety has catalyzed new investments in infrastructure, increased diplomatic signaling, and the articulation of strategies that emphasize deterrence, resilience, and presence. The emotional undertones of these shifts – particularly those associated with perceived decline and the need to catch up – have played a constitutive role in reshaping US behavior.
What emerges from this dynamic is a story of ontological struggle. As climate change accelerates the region’s material transformation, the Arctic’s symbolic and strategic value is also evolving. This dual transformation – ecological and geopolitical – has exposed the absence of a coherent American narrative, making the region vulnerable to external pressures and internal contradictions.
In tracing four historical eras of US Arctic engagement, this paper shows that periods of low institutional commitment have often coincided with narrative ambiguity. Only when the Arctic became legible as a site of competition, particularly in relation to Russia and China, did American policy elites begin to treat it as a space worth defining and defending. This shift has been uneven and incomplete, but it reflects the emotional mechanics through which states respond to perceived status loss: by searching for coherence, asserting presence, and retroactively constructing purpose.
Reframing anxiety as a generative force rather than a pathological condition contributes to broader debates in international relations about the role of emotion in strategic behavior. In the case of the United States, anxiety has not paralyzed action; it has organized it. The Arctic’s ontological ambiguity, long a reason for policy drift, has now become the very site where identity, leadership, and legitimacy are being contested and rearticulated.
As the United States continues to define its place in the Arctic, anxiety is likely to remain a central driver – not because the region is inherently destabilizing but because its meaning has not yet been settled. In that sense, the Arctic is, beyond a theater of competition, a mirror, reflecting the limits and possibilities of American global power in a rapidly changing world.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Brent Steele, Jarrod Hayes, Adam B. Lerner, Angélica Durán-Martinez, and two anonymous reviewers who provided immeasurable feedback to earlier versions of this paper.
Competing interests
The author declares no conflict of interest.
Funding
The authors received no external funding for this work.
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