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A Sensible Pragmatist Conception of Truth

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 August 2022

Cheryl Misak
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Abstract

This essay traces the evolution of the pragmatist elements in Wiggins's distinctive view of truth and shows its connections to the founder of pragmatism, C.S. Peirce and one of Peirce's greatest successors, F.P. Ramsey. Wiggin's pragmatism, like that of Peirce and Ramsey, is a pragmatism that attempts to arrive at what Wiggins calls ‘a sensible subjectivism’ – an account of truth that respects both the human inventiveness and the objectivity that are each a part of our search for the truth

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Type
Research Article
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Philosophy , Volume 97 , Special Issue 3: In honour of David Wiggins , July 2022 , pp. 275 - 294
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of Philosophy

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