Hostname: page-component-857557d7f7-v48vw Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-11-28T23:50:34.245Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Dogmatism Paradox à la Kripke

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2025

Kaave Lajevardi Open the ORCID record for Kaave Lajevardi [Opens in a new window]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I aim at dissolving Saul Kripke’s dogmatism paradox by defending the idea that, with respect to any particular proposition p known by a subject A, it is not irrational for A to ignore all evidence against p. Here my defence of the dogmatic attitude depends on the crucial assumption – and this is an assumption made by Kripke himself in the setting of the paradox – that A wishes above all else to avoid gaining a false belief or losing a true one. An appendix briefly examines the possibility of a knowledge version of the paradox, as opposed to Kripke’s original true-belief version.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , First View , pp. 1 - 20
Check for updates
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of Philosophy.

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Alsharif, Hassan and Symons, John, ‘Open-Mindedness as a Corrective Virtue’, Philosophy, 96 (2021), 73–97.10.1017/S0031819120000352CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baehr, Jason, The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011).10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199604074.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baumann, Peter, ‘Knowledge and Dogmatism’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 63 (2013), 1–19.10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00104.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Borges, Rodrigo, ‘On Synchronic Dogmatism’, Synthese, 192 (2015), 3677–3693.10.1007/s11229-015-0715-3CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carter, J. Adam and Gordon, Emma C., ‘Openmindedness and Truth’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 44 (2014), 207–224.10.1080/00455091.2014.923247CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Douven, Igor and Olders, Diederik, ‘Unger’s Argument for Skepticism Revisited’, Theoria, 74 (2008), 239–250.10.1111/j.1755-2567.2008.00020.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fantl, Jeremy, The Limitations of the Open Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).10.1093/oso/9780198807957.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Feldman, Richard, ‘Subjective and Objective Justification in Ethics and Epistemology’, The Monist, 71 (1988), 405–419.10.5840/monist198871326CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harman, Gilbert, Thought (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973).Google Scholar
Hawthorne, John, Knowledge and Lotteries (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).Google Scholar
Kripke, Saul A., ‘A Puzzle about Belief’, in Margalit, A. (ed.), Meaning and Use (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 239–283.10.1007/978-1-4020-4104-4_13CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kripke, Saul A., Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).Google Scholar
Kripke, Saul A., ‘On Two Paradoxes of Knowledge’, In Kripke, Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume I, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011), 27–51.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199730155.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kwong, Jack M.C., ‘Is Open-Mindedness Conducive to Truth?’, Synthese, 194 (2017), 1613–1626.10.1007/s11229-015-1008-6CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lasonen-Aarnio, Maria, ‘The Dogmatism Puzzle’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 92 (2013), 1–16.Google Scholar
Lewis, David, ‘Elusive Knowledge’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74 (1996), 549–567.10.1080/00048409612347521CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nozick, Robert, Philosophical Explanations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).Google Scholar
Sharon, Assaf and Spectre, Levi, ‘Dogmatism Repuzzled’, Philosophical Studies, 148 (2010), 307–321.10.1007/s11098-008-9330-1CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Smart, J. J. C., ‘Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 6 (1956), 344–354.10.2307/2216786CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sorell, Tom, ‘Harman’s Paradox’, Mind, 90 (1981), 557–575.10.1093/mind/XC.360.557CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sorensen, Roy A., ‘Dogmatism, Junk Knowledge, and Conditionals’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 38 (1988), 433–454.10.2307/2219708CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, Ernest, ‘For the Love of Truth?’, In Fairweather, Abrol and Zagzebski, Linda (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), 49–62.10.1093/oso/9780195140774.003.0004CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, Ernest, ‘Reply to Linda Zagzebski’, in Greco, John (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004), 319–322.Google Scholar
Unger, Peter, ‘An Argument for Skepticism’ Philosophic Exchange, 5 (1974), 131–155.Google Scholar
Veber, Michael, ‘What Do You Do with Misleading Evidence?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 54 (2004), 557–569.10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00372.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williamson, Timothy, Knowledge and its Limits (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000).Google Scholar