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What's Wrong with Salmon's History: The Third Decade

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

James H. Fetzer
James H. Fetzer*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Duluth
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Duluth, MN 55812, USA.
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Abstract

My purpose here is to elaborate the reasons I maintain that Salmon has not been completely successful in reporting the history of work on explanation. The most important limitation of his account is that it does not emphasize the critical necessity to embrace a suitable conception of probability in the development of the theory of probabilistic explanation.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 59 , Issue 2 , June 1992 , pp. 246 - 262
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1992

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Footnotes

†

I would like to express appreciation to Paul Humphreys, to Wesley Salmon, and to Ellery Eells for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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