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Theory Change and Bayesian Statistical Inference

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Jan-Willem Romeijn
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Abstract

This paper addresses the problem that Bayesian statistical inference cannot accommodate theory change, and proposes a framework for dealing with such changes. It first presents a scheme for generating predictions from observations by means of hypotheses. An example shows how the hypotheses represent the theoretical structure underlying the scheme. This is followed by an example of a change of hypotheses. The paper then presents a general framework for hypotheses change, and proposes the minimization of the distance between hypotheses as a rationality criterion. Finally the paper discusses the import of this for Bayesian statistical inference.

Information

Type
Decision Theory
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 72 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers , December 2005 , pp. 1174 - 1186
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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