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Some Decision Factors in Scientific Investigation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

David S. Emmerich  and
James G. Greeno
David S. Emmerich
Affiliation:
Indiana University
James G. Greeno
Affiliation:
Indiana University
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Abstract

An empirical law or evidence which supports a theory tends to have the greatest scientific value when it seemed improbable before it was investigated. Evidence which falsifies a theory tends to have the greatest value when it seemed probable that the investigation would confirm the theory. A scientist who wishes to optimize his contribution to knowledge probably will investigate most frequently hypotheses which seem neither very probable nor very improbable of being confirmed. This strategy leads neither to a maximum number of confirmations of a theory, nor to a set of tests which are maximally severe.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , September 1966 , pp. 262 - 270
Copyright
Copyright © 1966 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

[1] Carnap, R., Logical Foundations of Probability, Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago, 1962.Google Scholar
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[4] Salmon, W. C., “The Status of Prior Probabilities in Statistical Explanation,” Philosophy of Science, XXXII, (1965).CrossRefGoogle Scholar