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Rejoinder to Tuana

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Philip L. Quinn
Philip L. Quinn*
Affiliation:
Brown University and The Ohio State University
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Extract

Consider the two Duhemian theses S, according to which no single or individual theoretical hypothesis by itself has any observational consequences, and F, which states that no single theoretical hypothesis can be conclusively falsified by any observations.

Does the truth of F follow from the truth of S? I had conjectured that Duhem may have thought so, but I argued that it does not [1]. Nancy Tuana contends that my argument misses the mark, and she goes on to argue that it does [2]. It seems to me that her arguments are decisive on this point, and so I welcome the correction.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 3 , September 1978 , pp. 463 - 465
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

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References

[1] Quinn, P. L. “What Duhem Really Meant.” Methodological and Historical Essays in the Natural and Social Sciences, ed. Cohen, R. S. and Wartofsky, M. W. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1973. pp. 33–56.Google Scholar
[2] Tuana, N. “Quinn on Duhem: An Emendation.” Philosophy of Science 45 (1978): 456–462.CrossRefGoogle Scholar