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Ontology and Acquaintance: A Reply to Clatterbaugh

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Edwin B. Allaire
Edwin B. Allaire*
Affiliation:
University of Iowa
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Abstract

Consider a red circle, and suppose it is a paradigmatic thing. Some philosophers maintain that a thing is ontologically analyzable into a particular exemplifying properties, those properties truly ascribed to the thing by the customary words. Our red circle, then, consists of a particular, say a; two properties, red and circle; and exemplification, a tie tying a, red, and circle into “the red circle.” Upon this analysis, a is bare, i.e., not re-recognizable as such, whereas red and circle are natured, i.e., not bare, and, further, are universal, i.e., they may be exemplified by several particulars (or, somewhat differently, they may be in several things).

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 32 , Issue 3 , July 1965 , pp. 277 - 280
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1965

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References

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