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On the Virtues of Cursory Scientific Reductions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Joel K. Press
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Abstract

Many philosophers accept a nonreductive physicalist view of at least some special sciences, which is to say that while they assert that each particular referent of any special science term is identical to some referent of a physical term, or token physicalism, they deny that special science types are identical to physical types. The most commonly cited reason for this position is Jerry Fodor's antireductionist argument based on the multiple realizability of many special science terms. I argue that if token physicalism is true, as nonreductive physicalists believe, then this multiple-realization argument fails to preclude reductive physicalism.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 78 , Issue 5 , December 2011 , pp. 1189 - 1199
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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