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Inference to the Best Explanation Made Coherent

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Igor Douven
Igor Douven*
Affiliation:
Utrecht University
*
†Department of Philosophy, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 8, 3584 CS Utrecht, The Netherlands, e-mail: igor.douven@phil.uu.nl.
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Abstract

Van Fraassen (1989) argues that Inference to the Best Explanation is incoherent in the sense that adopting it as a rule for belief change will make one susceptible to a dynamic Dutch book. The present paper argues against this. A strategy is described that allows us to infer to the best explanation free of charge.

Information

Type
Explanation, Confirmation, and Scientific Inference
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 66 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 1999 , 1999 , pp. S424 - S435
Copyright
Copyright © 1999 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I am greatly indebted to Jos Uffink for many helpful discussions and for detailed criticisms of previous versions of this paper; I am also grateful to Patrick Maher and Bas van Fraassen for valuable comments.

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