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Hempel and Oppenheim on Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Rolf Eberle ,
David Kaplan  and
Richard Montague
Rolf Eberle
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
David Kaplan
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
Richard Montague
Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles
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Abstract

Hempel and Oppenheim, in their paper ‘The Logic of Explanation’, have offered an analysis of the notion of scientific explanation. The present paper advances considerations in the light of which their analysis seems inadequate. In particular, several theorems are proved with roughly the following content: between almost any theory and almost any singular sentence, certain relations of explainability hold.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , October 1961 , pp. 418 - 428
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1961

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References

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