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Glymour on Confirmation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Aron Edidin
Aron Edidin*
Affiliation:
Princeton University
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Abstract

Glymour has developed an account of the confirmation of scientific hypotheses which he advocates as an alternative to the hypothetico-deductive and Bayesian accounts. This account is subject to a counter-example which may be accomodated by a slight modification. So modified it describes an important dimension of confirmation. If the modification of Glymour's account is slightly extended, both the resulting account and the hypothetico-deductive account may be seen as special cases of a Bayesian theory which is immune to Glymour's criticisms.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , June 1981 , pp. 292 - 307
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

Research for this paper was supported in part by the National Science Foundation.

References

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