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General Ontology and the Principle of Acquaintance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Kenneth C. Clatterbaugh
Kenneth C. Clatterbaugh*
Affiliation:
Indiana University
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Abstract

What one is acquainted with has always been important for the rejection or acceptance of any ontological description. Yet the relevance of acquaintance to ontology has not always been clearly stated. Some philosophers have held that they were acquainted with the simple entities of ontological analysis. They also held that if they were not acquainted with such entities, their analysis would be inadequately supported. In this paper I argue that acquaintance with ontological simples cannot be a reason for accepting or rejecting any ontological analysis. At the same time, I examine what I believe to be the relevance of acquaintance to ontological description.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 32 , Issue 3 , July 1965 , pp. 272 - 276
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1965

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References

[1] Allaire, Edwin B., “Bare Particulars,” Philosophical Studies, vol. 14, January-February 1963, pp. 1–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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[3] Bergmann, Gustav, “Strawson's Ontology,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 57, September 1960, pp. 601–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] Bergmann, Gustav, “Synthetic A Priori,” Logic and Reality (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), pp. 272–301.Google Scholar
[5] Russell, Bertrand, The Problems of Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).Google Scholar