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Discussion: What Would Happen if Everyone Did It? A Reply to Collier and Giere on Frequency Dependent Causation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Elliott Sober
Elliott Sober*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, University of Wisconsin, Madison
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Abstract

In a recent article (Sober 1982), I criticized an account of causation proposed by Giere (1979, 1980) by describing a series of examples concerning natural selection. Collier (1983) has criticized my criticisms, saying that I misapplied Giere's proposal and misconstrued the biology. More recently, Giere (1984) has defended his theory against my criticisms. Here I argue that my criticisms still stand.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 52 , Issue 1 , March 1985 , pp. 141 - 150
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

My thanks to Ellery Eells and the anonymous referees of this journal for helpful suggestions. I also am grateful to the National Science Foundation and the University of Wisconsin, Madison Graduate School for financial support.

References

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