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Defending “Distinctively Mathematical” Scientific Explanations
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 December 2025
Abstract
Jha et al. (2024) offer several objections to Lange’s account of “distinctively mathematical” scientific explanations (DMEs). This article argues that these objections fail. Jha et al.’s arguments fail to show that Lange is inconsistent in characterizing DMEs—that, by Lange’s lights, every causal explanation involving mathematical facts is a DME. Jha et al.’s arguments fail to suggest that on Lange’s account, DME’s are too common or explanatorily insubstantial to underwrite any philosophical lessons about explanation. Jha et al.’s arguments also fail to show that Lange relies on underhanded manipulations of the explananda targeted by DMEs.
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- © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Philosophy of Science Association
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