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Critical Notice: Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy, The Liar: An Essay on Truth and Circularity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Anil Gupta
Anil Gupta*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Illinois at Chicago
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Abstract

Some criticisms are offered of Barwise and Etchemendy's theory of truth, the principal one being that it violates a feature of truth called “supervenience”.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 56 , Issue 4 , December 1989 , pp. 697 - 709
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I would like to thank Barwise and Etchemendy for their comments and for showing me the “Postscript” that will appear in the paperback edition of their book. The reader will find in this Postscript a useful discussion of many of the issues raised below. I would like also to express my gratitude to Leah Savion for her extensive comments on this essay.

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