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Choosing Between Confirmation Theories

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

R. G. Swinburne
R. G. Swinburne*
Affiliation:
University of Hull
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Abstract

The paper considers on what grounds we ought to choose between competing confirmation theories. It begins by distinguishing between confirmation theories and other theories which might be confused with them, such as theories of acceptability. It then argues that the task of a confirmation theory is to analyze rather than explicate our ordinary standards of confirmation, to “draw out” from our intuitive judgments the standards implicit in them. A theory of confirmation will do this in so far as it is coherent and does not yield counter-intuitive judgments.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 37 , Issue 4 , December 1970 , pp. 602 - 613
Copyright
Copyright © 1970 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

REFERENCES

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