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Causal Loops and the Independence of Causal Facts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Phil Dowe
Phil Dowe*
Affiliation:
University of Tasmania
*
†Please send requests for reprints to the author. School of Philosophy, University of Tasmania, GPO Box 252–41, Hobart, 7001 Australia; email: Phil.Dowe@utas.edu.au.
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Abstract

According to Hugh Mellor in Real Time II (1998, Ch. 12), assuming the logical independence of causal facts and the ‘law of large numbers’, causal loops are impossible because if they were possible they would produce inconsistent sets of frequencies. I clarify the argument, and argue that it would be preferable to abandon the relevant independence assumption in the case of causal loops.

Information

Type
Metaphysics and Methodology of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 68 , Issue S3: No. 3 Supplement: Proceedings of the 2000 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers Sep., 2001 , 2001 , pp. S89 - S97
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 2001

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Footnotes

‡

I thank Jossi Berkovitz for first drawing my attention to this problem, in particular to the result proved in Appendix 2. His work on this point has priority over mine (see Berkovitz 2001). This work was supported by the Australian Research Council.

References

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