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Some Thoughts on Wesley Salmon's Contributions to the Philosophy of Probability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Paul Humphreys
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Abstract

Wesley Salmon provided three classic criteria of adequacy for satisfactory interpretations of probability. A fourth criterion is suggested here. A distinction is drawn between frequency-driven probability models and theory-driven probability models and it is argued that single case accounts of chance are superior to frequency accounts at least for the latter. Finally it is suggested that theories of chance should be required only to be contingently true, a position which is a natural extension of Salmon's ontic account of probabilistic causality and his own later views on propensities.

Information

Type
Wesley C. Salmon 1925-2001: A Symposium Honoring His Contributions to the Philosophy of Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers , December 2004 , pp. 942 - 949
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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