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Dissociable Realization and Kind Splitting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Carl F. Craver
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Abstract

It is a common assumption in contemporary cognitive neuroscience that discovering a putative realized kind to be dissociably realized (i.e., to be realized in each instance by two or more distinct realizers) mandates splitting that kind. Here I explore some limits on this inference using two deceptively similar examples: the dissociation of declarative and procedural memory and Ramachandran's argument that the self is an illusion.

Information

Type
Realization and Explanation in Neuroscience
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 71 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2002 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers , December 2004 , pp. 960 - 971
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Thanks to Lindley Darden, Stuart Glennan, Jeff Poland, Rob Wilson, Peter Machamer, and Barbara Von Eckardt for comments on earlier drafts.

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