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accepted by Editor-in-Chief Arie Y. Lewin
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Target article
Multinational Enterprises and International Cartels: The Strategic Implications of De-globalization
Related commentaries (2)
Comments on ‘Multinational Enterprises and International Cartels: The Strategic Implications of De-gobalization’ by Peter J. Buckley and Mark Casson
The Not So Brilliant Future of International Cartels