Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 September 2022
Numerous recent country studies demonstrate that beneficiaries of conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs vote for incumbents at higher rates. It is reasonable to expect that, as a consequence, those incumbents will perform better nationally in the next election. This article warns against such an extrapolation. It analyzes an original cross-national data set with information for eighty-four Latin American presidential elections that took place between 1990 and 2010. My results reveal that CCT programs have not improved incumbents' aggregate electoral performances in the region, contradicting common speculative claims of the literature. They also confirm the classic economic voting hypothesis that incumbents are held accountable in the polls for their economic performance.
Diversos estudos recentes mostram que beneficiários de programas de transferência de renda condicionada (TRC) votam em incumbentes com maior frequência. Consequentemente, é razoável esperar que esses incumbentes tenham um melhor desempenho na eleição seguinte. Este artigo serve de advertência contra este tipo de extrapolação. Nele, eu analiso um banco de dados cross-nacional com informações sobre oitenta e quatro eleições presidenciais latino-americanas que ocorreram entre 1990 e 2010. Meus resultados revelam que programas de TRC não melhoraram o desempenho eleitoral agregado de incumbentes, contradizendo especulações frequentes da literatura. Eles também confirmam a hipótese clássica do voto económico de que incumbentes são chamados a prestar contas nas eleições pelo desempenho da economia.
I appreciate the advice and suggestions from my former PhD advisor José Cheibub during the time I did the research that led to this article. I also want to thank professors Matthew Winters, Damarys Canache, and Rodolfo Hoffman, as well as three anonymous referees, for their insightful comments and critiques. All shortcomings of this article are my own responsibility.
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