Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 October 2016
In this article, I argue that in the sense of greatest epistemological concern for Kant, empirical cognition is ‘rational sensory discrimination’: the identification or differentiation of sensory objects from each other (whether correctly or not), occurring through a capacity of forming judgements (whether correct or not). With this account of empirical cognition, I show how the Transcendental Deduction of the first Critique is most plausibly read as having as its fundamental assumption the thesis that we have empirical cognition, and I provide evidence that Kant understood Hume as granting this assumption.
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