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On the Relativist Fallacy of the Impossibility of Value Neutral Inquiry in Political Economy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 June 2009

Mark Tomass
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Extract

The dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, that of differing points of view, seems to betray an underlying paradox. Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them; yet the existence of a common system belies dramatic incomparability (Davidson, 1984, p. 184).

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Journal of the History of Economic Thought , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 1998 , pp. 279 - 298
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1998

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References

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