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Time for helping

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2025

Anastasia Danilov  and
Timo Vogelsang
Anastasia Danilov*
Affiliation:
Department of Corporate Development and Business Ethics, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany
Timo Vogelsang*
Affiliation:
Department of Personnel Economics and Human Resource Management, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany
*
danilov@wiso.uni-koeln.de
e-mail: vogelsang@wiso.uni-koeln.de
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Abstract

This study investigates whether individuals engage in prosocial behavior when it requires an investment of their time, but not money. In a laboratory experiment with rigorous anonymity arrangements, senders receive their payoff at the beginning. They may then engage in a tedious task to increase the earnings of exogenously disadvantaged recipients who otherwise receive no earnings. We find that senders are willing to sacrifice time to benefit recipients. Whether or not the recipient is present in the laboratory during the working time does not alter this decision. However, in a treatment variation some senders also display antisocial behavior.

Keywords

Laboratory experimentSocial preferencesTimeOpportunity costsDictator gameNon-monetary giving

JEL classification

D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior J22: Time Allocation and Labor Supply

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Journal of the Economic Science Association , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , May 2016 , pp. 36 - 47
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2015

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:10.1007/s40881-015-0020-4) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Time is life itself….

Michael Ende (Momo, 1973).

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