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Humean Laws in an unHumean World

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2017

SAMUEL KIMPTON-NYE Open the ORCID record for SAMUEL KIMPTON-NYE [Opens in a new window]
SAMUEL KIMPTON-NYE*
Affiliation:
KING'S COLLEGE LONDONSamuel.kimpton-nye@kcl.ac.uk
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Abstract:

I argue that an unHumean ontology of irreducibly dispositional properties might be fruitfully combined with what has typically been thought of as a Humean account of laws, namely, the best-system account, made popular by David Lewis (e.g., 1983, 1986, 1994). In this paper I provide the details of what I argue is the most defensible account of Humean laws in an unHumean world. This package of views has the benefits of upholding scientific realism while doing without any suspect metaphysical entities to account for natural law. I conclude by arguing that the Humean laws-unHumean ontology package is well placed to provide an account of objective, nontrivial chances, a famous stumbling block for the Humean laws-Humean ontology package developed by Lewis.

Keywords

chancedispositionslawsmodalityontology

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Type
Articles
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Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , Summer 2017 , pp. 129 - 147
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2017 

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