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The Declining Role of Western Powers in International Organizations: Exploring a New Model of U.N. Burden Sharing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Gi-Heon Kwon
Gi-Heon Kwon
Affiliation:
Kyung Hee University, Seoul**
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Abstract

Collective-action theory suggests that a country's economic size determines its contribution to international organizations, with large economies paying a disproportionate percentage of their GNP for maintenance of these organizations. This paper argues against this reigning paradigm, finding that it fails to predict current contribution patterns in the United Nations (UN). Instead, the paper offers a more elaborate model of burden sharing that takes into account the domestic political setting and international setting that helps determine a nation's contribution to international organizations.

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Type
Articles
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Journal of Public Policy , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , January 1995 , pp. 65 - 88
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1995

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