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Authoritarian, Abusive or Window-dressing? Three Constitutionalisms under One Constitution: Colombia, 1930–74
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 August 2025
Abstract
This article analyses a complex period in Colombian history, from the electoral victory of the Liberal Party in 1930 to the end of the Frente Nacional (National Front) in 1974, from the perspective of constitutional politics and constitutional theory. During this period, Colombia transited from democracy to dictatorship (civilian and military) and back to democracy. We therefore divide the period according to changes in regime type and also to changes in the degree of institutional constraints on power. We show that, due to combinations of regime type and constraints on power, under the same Constitution of 1886 three different constitutionalisms ensued: abusive, window-dressing, and authoritarian constitutionalism. Our analysis on Colombia highlights the role of powerful actors, such as the armed forces and the Catholic Church, that breathed life back into key constitutional provisions when these served as focal points for coordinating their actions even under an authoritarian regime.
Este artículo analiza un período complejo de la historia colombiana, desde la victoria electoral del Partido Liberal en 1930 hasta el fin del Frente Nacional en 1974, desde la perspectiva de la política y la teoría constitucionales. Durante este período, Colombia transitó de la democracia a la dictadura (civil y militar) y de regreso a la democracia. Por lo tanto, dividimos el período según los cambios en el tipo de régimen y también según las transformaciones en el grado de restricciones institucionales al poder. Mostramos que, debido a las combinaciones de varios tipos de régimen y sus limitaciones al poder, bajo la misma Constitución de 1886 surgieron tres constitucionalismos diferentes: el abusivo, el de fachada y el autoritario. Nuestro análisis sobre Colombia destaca el papel de actores poderosos, como las fuerzas armadas y la iglesia católica, que dieron nueva vida a disposiciones constitucionales claves cuando estas sirvieron como puntos nodales para coordinar sus acciones incluso bajo un régimen autoritario.
Este artigo analisa um período complexo da história da Colômbia, desde a vitória eleitoral do Partido Liberal em 1930 até o fim da Frente Nacional em 1974, sob a perspectiva da política constitucional e da teoria constitucional. Durante esse período, a Colômbia transitou da democracia para a ditadura (civil e militar) e de volta para a democracia. Dessa forma, dividimos o período de acordo com as mudanças no tipo de regime e também de acordo com as mudanças no grau de restrições institucionais ao poder. Mostramos que, devido às combinações de tipos de regime e restrições de poder sob a mesma Constituição de 1886, seguiram-se três constitucionalismos diferentes: constitucionalismo abusivo, de fachada e autoritário. Nossa análise sobre a Colômbia destaca o papel de atores poderosos, como as forças armadas e a igreja católica, que deram vida às principais disposições constitucionais quando elas serviram como pontos focais para coordenar suas ações, mesmo sob um regime autoritário.
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References
1 As an old joke once said about the many French constitutions in the nineteenth century.
2 See, for example, John D. Martz, Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1962); Vernon Lee Fluharty, Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia, 1930–1956 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957); Paul H. Oquist, Violence, Conflicts, and Politics in Colombia (London: Academic Press, 1980); Alexander Wilde, ‘Conversations among Gentlemen: Oligarchical Democracy in Colombia’, in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds.), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Robert A. Karl, Forgotten Peace: Reform, Violence, and the Making of Contemporary Colombia (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2017); Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, ¿Lo que el viento se llevó?: los partidos políticos y la democracia en Colombia (1958–2002) (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2007) and La destrucción de una república (1930–1946) (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, Taurus, 2017).
3 Mark Tushnet, ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism’, Cornell Law Review, 100: 1 (2015), pp. 391–462; Roberto Gargarella, ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Latin America: From Past to Present’, in Helena Alviar García and Günter Frankenberg (eds.), Authoritarian Constitutionalism. Comparative analysis and critique (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019), pp. 115–36; Andrea Pozas-Loyo and Julio Ríos-Figueroa, ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism’, in Conrado Hübner Mendes, Roberto Gargarella and Sebastián Guidi (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Constitutional Law in Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022).
4 Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Autocratic Legalism’, University of Chicago Law Review, 85: 2 (2018), pp. 545–83.
5 David Landau, ‘Abusive Constitutionalism’, University of California Davis Law Review, 47: 1 (2013), pp. 189–260.
6 Mark Tushnet, ‘Constitutional Hardball’, J. Marshall Law Review, 37: 1 (2004), pp. 523–53.
7 Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa (eds.), Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Clara Lagacé and Jennifer Gandhi, ‘Authoritarian Institutions’, in Jennifer Gandhi and Rubén Ruíz-Rufino (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Comparative Political Institutions (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 278–92.
8 Melissa Crouch, ‘Pre-emptive Constitution-Making: Authoritarian Constitutionalism and the Military in Myanmar’, Law and Society Review, 54: 2 (2020), pp. 487–515.
9 Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993).
10 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
11 Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1971); Freedom House, 2005 Freedom House Annual Report: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/2005.pdf (all URLs last accessed 11 Feb. 2025).
12 José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi and James Raymond Vreeland, ‘Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited’, Public Choice, 143: 1 (2010), pp. 67–101. Adopting a minimalist or procedural conception of democracy allows one to identify regime type, but of course further analysis of the actions taken by political actors in each regime is necessary, for instance, regarding the exercise of civil and political liberties and other fundamental rights.
13 See Cheibub et al., ‘Democracy and Dictatorship’.
14 Robert Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Tushnet, ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism’, pp. 391–462. We take the two-step process, first defining the regime type and then assessing the degree of institutional limits on the use of power, from Pozas-Loyo and Ríos-Figueroa, ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism’, pp. 340–2.
15 For a discussion on the distinction between access to and exercise of power see Sebastián L. Mazzuca, ‘Access to Power versus Exercise of Power: Reconceptualizing the Quality of Democracy in Latin America’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 45: 3 (2010), pp. 334–57.
16 We use this concept from David Landau who defines it as ‘the use of constitutional change to undermine democracy’ in his seminal article (Landau, ‘Abusive Constitutionalism’, p. 195). However, we use the concept in a broader sense to include not only constitution-making (after all, the concept is not ‘abusive constitution-making’) but also other cunning uses of legal form to weaken democracy and institutional limits on power, such as abuses of constitutional emergencies, executive decrees, gross interventions in constitutional courts and manipulation of judicial interpretations. In this broader sense, the concept is close to other similar concepts such as Kim Lane Scheppele’s autocratic legalism (see Scheppele, ‘Autocratic Legalism’, pp. 547–8). Crucially, both Landau’s and Scheppele’s concepts intend to capture legalistic practices that take place under democratic regimes to undermine them, which is what we emphasise in the two periods that we categorise as abusive constitutionalism. We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer whose engagement with the conceptual distinctions in our article allowed us to clarify our typology.
17 The Conservative Party could block the reforms in the Senate, where it had a majority; see Cristopher Abel, Política, Iglesia y partidos en Colombia (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FAES, 1987), pp. 99–105. It is noteworthy that the Senate was indirectly elected by an electoral college whose members were appointed by regional assemblies, amply dominated by the Conservatives. See Article 13 of Legislative Act 3 of 1910: Acto Legislativo 3, Diario Oficial, N. 14131, 31 October 1910: https://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?id=1825559.
18 Mario Cajas Sarria, ‘Historia constitucional de las restricciones a los derechos políticos y militares en Colombia, 1886–1991ʹ, Historia constitucional, 25:1 (2024), pp. 1454–62.
19 Acto Legislativo (Legislative Act) 1 of 1936 expanded the right to vote in Article 8 that says, ‘[all adult men enjoy] the quality of active citizenship [that] is a necessary condition to vote, to be elected, and to become a public servant in positions that carry authority or jurisdiction’. Article 13 of the same act, on the relation between religion and the state, says: ‘Nobody will be required to explain or justify his religious opinions, nor compelled to profess a religion that is contrary to his beliefs. Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all religions that do not contradict Christian morality or laws. See Acto Legislativo 1, Diario Oficial, N. 23263, 5 Aug. 1936, p. 5: https://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?id=1824914.
20 Abel, Política, Iglesia y partidos, p. 115.
21 It is important to note here the emergence of a political figure that would be key in the next period: Conservative leader Laureano Gómez. According to Cristopher Abel, at that point: ‘Gómez utilized the Liberal reforms to unify and to consolidate the Conservative Party, re-establishing the connection to the Catholic Church. Gómez made the leaders of the Party sign a letter against the Liberal reforms to force them to reveal their allegiance to the Party and the Conservative creed’; Abel, Política, Iglesia y partidos, p. 116.
22 See Acto Legislativo 3 (1910).
23 According to Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, the relevance of the 1910 amendment is that it ‘reincorporated the Liberal Party into the political and constitutional system, which became the framework for pacification and stabilization for the following decades. Though the political negotiation behind the reform gradually eroded, it did guarantee almost forty years of regulated political competition’; see Gutiérrez Sanín, La destrucción de una república, p. 48.
24 The constitutional reform of 1910 also empowered the Supreme Court, as we will explain in the following section.
25 Santos negotiated a new concordat between Colombia and the Vatican, in which the Catholic Church retained special privileges in the country, but instead of being included in the constitution these were established in an international treaty. This allowed the Liberals to retain their constitutional reforms and also gave legal stability to the Catholic Church’s privileges given that a modification to such a treaty requires the consent of both states.
26 Conservative leader Laureano Gómez openly supported the coup, calling the Colombian people to rise in arms against the radical Liberal regime.
27 Legislative Act 1 of 1945 stated in Article 86 that ‘The Senate will have as many members as there are citizens, in a proportion of 1 for each 190000 […] and this number will be updated each census […] to keep the proportion in the electoral base of each senator’. See Acto Legislativo 1, Diario Oficial, 16 Feb. 1945: http://bdigital.binal.ac.pa/bdp/boletin/derecho9.pdf.
28 See Roberto Gargarella, ‘Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810–2010: The Engine Room of the Constitution’ (New York: Oxford Univresity Press, 2013).
29 Legislative Act 3 of 1910 stated, in Article 33, that ‘In case of exterior war or internal commotion, the president with the signature of his cabinet ministers can declare a state of siege in the entire Republic or part or it. […] The executive decrees made under the state of siege will be mandatory as long as they are signed by all cabinet ministers. The executive can suspend, but not repeal, laws during the state of siege’. See Acto Legislativo 3 (1910).
30 See Executive Decrees no. 1632, 1633 and 1634 from 10 July 1944 and 1636 from 11 July 1944.
31 Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny, pp. 3–11.
32 Scheppele, ‘Autocratic Legalism’, p. 548.
33 Landau, ‘Abusive Constitutionalism’, p. 195.
34 The violence unleashed is in itself a complex and multilayered process, as analysed in specialised publications including the works cited in footnote 2 above.
35 A more detailed account of these events can be found in: Alberto Bermúdez, Del Bogotazo al Frente Nacional (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1995); James D. Henderson, La modernización en Colombia: Los años de Laureano Gómez 1889-1965 (Medellín: Universidad de Antioquia, 2006); Daniel Pecaut, Orden y violencia (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2003); Alexander Wilde, Conversaciones entre caballeros: la quiebra de la democracia en Colombia (Bogotá: Tercer Mundo, 1982).
36 Decreto 3520, 10 Nov. 1949, p. 3: https://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?ruta=Decretos/1529917.
37 Literally, Article 41 of Legislative Act 3 of 1910 stated: ‘The Supreme Court is the guardian of the constitution. Therefore, it will decide in last instance on the constitutionality of statutes and decrees that are challenged by the government or by any citizen, after the attorney general gives his opinion on the matter’. See Acto Legislativo 03 de 1910.
38 A president, during a state of siege, can issue a decreto-ley, a legislative decree, which is an administrative act that has the same status as a piece of legislation.
39 Decreto 3519, 10 Nov. 1949: https://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?id=1912655.
40 Ibid.
41 Guarantees of free and fair elections, and of no political persecution against members of the Liberal Party.
42 Common slang for a military and/or political commander, and Gómez’s nickname from early on in his career with the Conservative Party.
43 Laureano Gómez, Mensaje del Excelentísimo señor Presidente de la República, doctor Laureano Gómez, en la instalación del Congreso Nacional de 1951, in Estudios constitucionales, tomo 1, p. 16 (Bogota: Ministerio de Gobierno, 1953).
44 See Carlos Restrepo Piedrahita, Constituciones políticas nacionales de Colombia (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2004), p. 25.
45 Extract from ‘El gobierno presenta las bases de su reforma a la Constitución’, El Tiempo, 8 May 1953: https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=N2osnxbUuuUCanddat=19530508andprintsec=frontpageandhl=es. For Conservatives, Rousseau’s conception of democracy was harmful because it emphasised the principle of popular majority. In contrast, the Bolivarian and Catholic conceptions of democracy emphasised a harmonious collaboration of pre-established social orders. See: Tomás Barrero, ‘Laureano Gómez y la democracia’, in Rubén Sierra Mejía (ed.), La restauración conservadora 1946-1957 (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2012).
46 Gómez said the following about former president Mariano Ospina: ‘When it was my turn to speak during those long debates that our comeback required, I always witnessed the elegant silhouette of the financier collecting his papers into his briefcase and exiting the room, because he believed that struggle to be beneath him. It was a time to wound and be wounded and he didn’t know how to be there.’ Laureano Gómez Castro, ‘Contra Ospina Pérez’, in Laureano Gómez, Obras completas, tomo VI: Presidencia, exilio y Frente Nacional (Bogotá: Instituto Caro y Cuervo, 1984), p. 70.
47 On this issue there are several points of view. The closest narrative to Gómez’s account can be found in Bermúdez, Del Bogotazo, p. 336. A different view on the same issue can be found in Alberto Donadío and Silvia Galvis, El jefe supremo: Rojas Pinilla, en la violencia y el poder (Bogotá: Planeta, 1988), p. 567.
48 Autocracies with weaker institutional constraints on power, where constitutional mechanisms are manipulated by the government, include, for instance, the Dominican Republic under Trujillo. See Pozas-Loyo and Ríos-Figueroa, ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism’.
49 Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Maurice John Crawley Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967).
50 Robert Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship; Tushnet, ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism’, pp. 391–462. Ironically, as we will argue in the next section, this combination perfectly characterises Colombia after the military coup of General Rojas Pinilla.
51 See Acto Legislativo 1, Diario Oficial, N. 28329, 18 June 1953: http://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?id=1825120.
52 Gómez, ‘Primer mensaje desde el exilio’, in Gómez, Obras completas, tomo VI, p. 91–2.
53 Gilberto Alzate, ‘Declaraciones a la revista Estampa’, quoted in César Augusto Ayala Diago, Democracia bendita seas: Gilberto Alzate Avendaño, liberado (Bogotá: Fundación Gilberto Alzate Avendaño, 2013), p. 384.
54 ‘Por cuatro años la ANAC reeligió al Presidente Rojas Pinilla’, El Tiempo, 4 Aug. 1954: https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=N2osnxbUuuUCanddat=19540804andprintsec=frontpageandhl=es.
55 ‘Con veto al comunismo se clausuró ayer la ANAC’, El Tiempo, 8 Sept. 1954: https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=N2osnxbUuuUCanddat=19540908andprintsec=frontpageandhl=es. See also Acto Legislativo 2 de 1954, Diario Oficial, N. 28649, 13 Dec. 1954: https://www.suin-juriscol.gov.co/viewDocument.asp?id=1825450.
56 In Pinochet’s Chile, divisions within the Armed Forces were also the force behind the institutional limits that eventually forced him to call a plebiscite and leave office. See Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship.
57 Adolfo León Atehortúa Cruz, ‘El golpe de Rojas y el poder de los militares’, Folios, 31: 1 (2010), pp. 33–48.
58 See Barry R. Weingast, ‘The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law’, American Political Science Review, 91: 2 (1997), pp. 245–63.
59 Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship, p. 20.
60 Pozas-Loyo and Ríos-Figueroa, ‘Authoritarian Constitutionalism’.
61 Rodrigo Uprimny, ‘Entre el protagonismo, la precariedad y las amenazas: las paradojas de la judicatura’, in Francisco Leal Buitrago (ed.), En la encrucijada: Colombia en el siglo XXI (Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Norma, 2006), pp. 81–111.
62 Judicial control of states of exemption became important after the enactment of the Constitution of 1991, carried out by the Constitutional Court. See Andrea Scoseria Katz, ‘Taming the Prince: Bringing Presidential Emergency Powers under Law in Colombia’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 18: 4 (2020), pp. 1201–30.
63 Ana María Bejarano and Eduardo Pizarro, ‘From “Restricted” to “Besieged”: The Changing Nature of the Limits to Democracy in Colombia’, in Frances Hagopian and Scott P. Mainwaring (eds.), The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 235–60.
64 Julio Ríos-Figueroa, Constitutional Courts as Mediators: Armed Conflict, Civil Military Relations, and the Rule of Law in Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Oscar David Andrade Becerra, ‘Relaciones cívico-militares en Colombia: apuntes para un estado del arte’, Revista de Análisis Internacional, 6 (2012), pp. 145–71.
65 For instance, Martz, Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey; Fluharty, Dance of the Millions; Oquist, Violence, Conflicts, and Politics; Wilde, ‘Conversations among Gentlemen’.
66 Robert A. Karl, Forgotten Peace.
67 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, ¿Lo que el viento se llevó? and La destrucción de una república.
68 We thus also offer a complement to properly historico-juridical research on the Colombian Supreme Court during the same period, whose focus is the constitutional interpretation of laws and acts of government by Supreme Court Justices during this period. See Mario Cajas Sarillo, La historia de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de Colombia, 1886–1991 (Bogotá: Universidad de los Andes and Universidad ICESI, 2015).
69 See Andrea Pozas-Loyo, ‘Assessing Constitutional Efficacy: Lessons from Mexico’s Hegemonic Party Era’, in Thomas Christiano, Ingrid Creppell, and Jack Knight (eds.), Morality, Governance, and Social Institutions: Reflections on Russell Hardin (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), pp. 233–58; Crouch, ‘Pre-emptive Constitution-Making’; Mara Malagodi, ‘Dominion Status and the Origins of Authoritarian Constitutionalism in Pakistan’, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 17: 4 (2019), pp. 1235–57; Metin Heper, ‘The Justice and Development Party and the Military in Turkey’, Turkish Studies, 6: 2 (2005), pp. 215–31; Metin Heper, ‘Civil–Military Relations in Turkey: Toward a Liberal Model?’, Turkish Studies, 12: 2 (2011), pp. 241–52.