This paper discusses the place of ‘tacit knowledge’ in Hayek's writings. How did Hayek understand tacit knowledge? How did his understanding change through time? I address these questions and follow the change in Hayek's works from skills and techniques of thought in the 1930s to the use of ‘tacit knowledge’ in the1960s. Hayek uses Polanyi's concept in many writings, but remains short of approving its implications. The paper emphasizes that while Hayek was quite aware of the differences between tacit knowing and knowing-how, he was not keen to stress the divergence. In the end, I offer some potential explanations for this preference.

This paper examines the fundamental nature of numbers as they are used in economic systems. In the framework proposed, number sequences are technological objects (‘tools’) that are constituted by both form and function. To do their job, number sequences have to have the necessary internal structure – all elements (e.g. symbols) of the sequence must be distinct from one another, and the sequence must be a progression. In addition, numerical toolkits have to have the right external structure – they must be situated in a social network of economic agents that confers on them quantitative functions (e.g. identifying set sizes). Number sequences are the product of multilevel evolutionary processes, including psychological selection that screens sequences for their learnability by human users. Number tools are a kind of capital; they are material systems that are as real as other everyday objects. Just as changing physical tools alters the structure of productive activity, so too changing number sequences alters cognitive, behavioral, and social routines.

In this paper, we offer an empirical investigation of the relationship between social capital and human development across European countries for the post-war period. We argue that social organizations contribute directly to broader welfare aspects of development as part of the third sector of the economy, which undertakes the provision of public goods, such as health and education, in synergy with state institutions. This is counter to views that associate social organizations with anti-growth rent-seeking and lobbying activities. We begin with a multivariate regression analysis, which reveals that membership in social organizations is positively associated with human development, along with state institutions of public expenditure and the quality of governance. We then conduct a case study analysis to explore further the historical and cultural contextual factors of European welfare systems that determine the capacity of third sector organizations to enhance generalized co-operation, synergistic relations and social welfare against particularist interests.

We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally ‘switch’ from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society's surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be ‘trapped’ at lower levels of technology, perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model's main predictions.

Britain's Glorious Revolution of 1688 is one of the most widely studied cases of institutional change. Recent institutional analyses of the Glorious Revolution, however, have failed to address one of the central issues in political science: control of the state's comparative advantage in violence. This paper examines this issue through analysis of the standing army debates of the late 1690s. Participants in the debates disputed whether a standing army or a militia would be the most effective institutional arrangement to guard against threats from abroad and tyranny at home. Both sides of the debate analyzed the effects of a standing army in terms of the incentives that it created for soldiers, citizens, the monarch, and foreign governments.

In the past decade, Australia has begun to privatize its irrigation system. Two general models have emerged: a single and a dual ownership structure. This paper examines the trade-offs, costs and benefits, and the attendant efficiencies regarding costs of ownership. In particular, we examine member capital investment incentives and resultant risk-bearing costs related to capital formation. The paper concludes that the dual ownership structure system has significant economic advantages relative to its single-structured counterpart.