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Observational learning, group selection, and societal evolution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2008

ULRICH WITT
ULRICH WITT*
Affiliation:
Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Unit, Germany
*
*Correspondence to: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group, Kahlaische Str. 10, 07745 Jena, Germany. Email: Ulrich.Witt@econ.mpg.de
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Abstract

The core problem of any group selection hypothesis is the possibility that pro-social individual behavior contributing to a selection advantage for the group as a whole is potentially subject to free-riding. If group behavior and, hence, the conditions for group selection change through imitation and migration between groups, as argued in Hayek's theory of societal evolution, the explanation of group selection needs to account for the individuals' cognitively reflected motivation to adopt pro-social behavior in the face of free-riding. To do so a game-theoretic model is suggested that incorporates observational learning as a mechanism of acquiring, and choosing between, strategies.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , April 2008 , pp. 1 - 24
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2008

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