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Self-Selection and the Pricing of Bank Services: an Analysis of the Market for Loan Commitments and the Role of Compensating Balance Requirements

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Christopher James
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Extract

The idea that various characteristics of financial contracts and institutions can be explained as a rational response to problems created by information asymmetries has received a great deal of attention recently. A central theme of the literature in this area is that while moral hazard may hamper the direct transfer of information between market participants, information may be conveyed indirectly through the actions of market participants. For example, the characteristics of the insurance contract purchased may convey information as to riskiness of the insured. Recognition of the possible effects of information asymmetries has provided valuable insights into the role of financial intermediaries and the characteristics of the contracts they offer. In this paper we apply this literature to an analysis of the market for bank loan commitments. Through our analysis we are able to explain the use of various payment options such as fees and compensating balance requirements associated with loan commitments. Extensions of our analysis into the pricing of other bank services are also explored.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 16 , Issue 5 , December 1981 , pp. 725 - 746
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1981

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References

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