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The US–China Competition, Restructuring the Global Supply Chain, and Economic Security

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 March 2025

Wonjae Hwang ,
Wooyeal Paik  and
Haeyong Lim
Wonjae Hwang*
Affiliation:
University of Tennessee, TN, USA
Wooyeal Paik
Affiliation:
Yonsei University
Haeyong Lim
Affiliation:
Sungshin Women’s University, Seoul, Korea
*
Corresponding author: Wonjae Hwang; Email: whwang@utk.edu
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Abstract

Mounting geoeconomic competition between the United States (US) and China alongside the global shocks due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia–Ukraine war have drawn significant attention to the instability and vulnerability issues in the global supply chain (GSC), which is critical for international trade, production, and economic security. Can the US, South Korea, and Japan successfully coordinate their efforts to establish a secure and resilient GSC in key industries? Can these efforts promote economic security? By defining the efforts to reshape the GSC as part of the US–China power competition, this study evaluates the impact of its restructuring around the US on various aspects of the economic and national security of South Korea and Japan. Overall, the findings highlight that restructuring the GSC poses complex challenges for South Korea and its foreign policy in the contemporary globalization era.

Keywords

global supply chainseconomic securitytechnologypowercompetition
Type
Article
Information
Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 24 , Issue 3 , November 2024 , pp. 324 - 342
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The East Asia Institute

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