Two seemingly contradictory objections are raised against the traditional rules of liability for damage; on the one hand the requirement of fault appears to preclude just compensation of many persons who have suffered loss or injury, particularly such as is caused by modern dangers—motor traffic, the use, storage or transportation of high explosives, or the release of atomic energy. On the other hand damage caused by even the slightest degree of negligence may exceed by far what can justly be demanded from the person responsible.

In Dunne v. North Western Gas Board no less that 46 coal gas explosions occurred simultaneously in the streets of Liverpool. The people injured were unable to recover because it turned out that the defect in the gas mains had developed without the fault of any person. In Fowler v. Lanning the plaintiff suffered injuries from pellets discharged from the defendant's gun. He pleaded this fact as a sufficient cause of action, leaving it to the defendant to explain the accident. That seems indeed to have once been the law. Today, however, the plaintiff has at least to allege negligence (if not intention) or to set out facts which “shout negligence”; only then does the rule res ipsa loquitur relieve him of the burden of proof, and then only of that burden alone. Ought not a hunter to be responsible for his gun, a gas board for its pipes?

A release has been defined as the “giving up or abandoning of the claim or right to the person against whom the claim exists. A release is itself a discharge of the claim or obligation.”

Strictly speaking both releases and covenants not to sue are instruments under seal. A simple agreement, if supported by valuable consideration, has in equity the same effect as a release. Therefore the terms “release” and “covenant not to sue” are now often applied to such agreements, and in the present article they will be used in this extended sense.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the rule as to release, to analyze the reasons underlying it and to make some suggestions for reform.

There are two fundamental approaches to the problem of legal interpretation, one concentrating on the use of abstract concepts and their analysis by pure logic, and the second concentrating on policy considerations which underlie legal rules and the function they are to serve.

It cannot be denied that the “conceptual” method appears, at first glance, more “scientific” and precise as compared with the “functional” method, but in real fact it does not always ensure certainty and predictability. In many cases, the use of vague general concepts may lead to unexpected results, because the actual construction given to these concepts by the courts may vary according to the concrete facts involved (e.g. the concept of “proximity” in the law of attempt).

But even if, generally speaking, the “conceptual” method achieves a higher standard of certainty than the other method mentioned, one cannot overlook the fact that in some cases the use of the “conceptual” method may lead to injustice, or at least to a failure to achieve the social aims the legislator had in mind.

The importance of certainty and predictability, especially in criminal matters, is beyond dispute, but the weight given to this value in relation to other social values may differ from society to society and from time to time.

More than a year has passed since the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242 on November 22, 1967, concerning the “grave situation in the Middle East”. On the basis of this resolution, the Secretary-General of the United Nations designated Ambassador Gunnar Jarring as a Special Representative “to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement…” It is not proposed here to analyze all the political and diplomatic aspects of the Resolution or its practical prospects to bring about peace in the Middle East. Nor is it proposed to advance any particular interpretation of its substantive contents or to assess its merits and shortcomings. The sole purpose of this article is to examine the legal nature and implications of the Resolution within the framework of the United Nations Charter.

Intellectual curiosity and academic research are not the only motivations for this legal inquiry. Sceptics of the political relevance of such “theoretical” inquiry need only obtain the November 24, 1968 issue of Pravda, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.