With the advent of socio-technical systems that gather and process personal data, the capacity to identify and even locate people in an automated fashion has dramatically increased. This article discusses what militaries need to know about data protection and the right to digital privacy/private life when personal data is processed. The focus in this discussion is on sensitive data that makes individuals identifiable. It is here argued that the right to data protection and the right to digital privacy/private life are distinctive and separate rights and should be treated as such, despite some overlaps. Although the law of armed conflict approaches processing of sensitive data in a topical manner, it remains firm on the delimitation between what is permissible and what becomes unlawful when it comes to processing data. This article illustrates that elements of both data protection and protection of the right to privacy/private life can be traced in the law of armed conflict. In fact, both rights remain distinctive also in times of armed conflict and must be separately protected through obligations of result as well as obligations of conduct.

This article explores the implications of attaching military chaplains and similar religious personnel to State and non-State fighting forces, and what this means for international humanitarian law (IHL). IHL assigns religious personnel a non-combatant humanitarian function equivalent to medical personnel, stipulating that they should perform exclusively religious duties. This underestimates the scope of “religious” activity, however, particularly the moral dimension of their ministry and the force-multiplying and restraining effects that this has on combatant behaviour. As representatives of non-State institutions embedded within military structures, many religious personnel also enjoy a unique degree of access to – and separation from – the chain of command, and can leverage this autonomy to influence the conduct of hostilities. The more that religious personnel are invested in the achievement of a fighting force's military objectives and are involved in its military operations, the likelier it is that they will test the parameters of their humanitarian function, and the protections they enjoy, under IHL. Moreover, some clerics associated with fighting forces do not aspire to non-combatant or exclusively humanitarian status, and should not be considered religious personnel. It is in the midst of armed conflict that religious personnel are most needed, however, and the tensions and ambiguities between their religious and military support functions are integral to their cross-cutting role. The contribution that religious personnel can make to humanizing war, and socializing IHL or corresponding religious principles, depends on them being present to support combatants and not confining themselves to a separate, but less effectual, humanitarian space. Criteria for their humanitarian exclusivity, attachment to fighting forces and protections under IHL therefore require some clarification.

This article outlines and evaluates several unique challenges associated with legal support to special operations. It describes the essential differences between special tactics, techniques and procedures and conventional military operations. It offers a US perspective on how treaty and customary international laws apply to various special operations, including precision attacks against “high-value targets”, hostage rescue missions, and support to partner and proxy forces. It examines the benefits and drawbacks of heavy reliance on special operations during armed conflict, including an assessment of the legal challenges that arise when special operations forces become a primary feature of a military campaign. Finally, it highlights how the assumption of substantial military and political risk impacts the application of international law to special operations at the tactical level.

How international law applies to the use of information and communications technology by States is still a matter of discussion. Against this background, cyberspace has become the main area of competition between States, and this competition, to put it simply, is resulting in a constant low-intensity warfare below the threshold for a use of force. Such low-intensity cyber warfare, from a legal point of view, revitalizes the debate over the concept of a “state of intermediacy” that has the potential to overcome the dichotomy between peace and war. In the present author's opinion, this state of intermediacy also supports the idea that the international humanitarian law (IHL) principle of distinction should be applied, even before the eruption of a full-scale war, whenever wartime means and capabilities are employed by States. This paper argues that some opacities in international law have created favourable conditions for such constant low-intensity warfare, and that tackling the identified opacities would therefore be beneficial in order to achieve a more peaceful cyberspace. Thus, the paper goes on to address one of the identified opacities, namely the definition of espionage under international law, because, as international law now stands, it does not allow us to tackle the other identified opacities. Finally, the paper discusses how the proposed narrow interpretation of espionage can cope with the IHL principle of distinction in the cyber domain.

It is sometimes said that cruel yet short wars are better for humanity than restrained yet lengthy ones. The idea finds sympathy among Francis Lieber and his Prussian contemporaries, as well as some modern writers who back selective non-compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) on act-utilitarian grounds. This article refutes three underlying claims and reaffirms that IHL progressively narrows room for crude interest-balancing by its duty-bearers. First, it is claimed that toughening wars quickens them, whereas moderating wars prolongs them. This empirical claim overlooks how actions of the party resorting to brutality – the “brutalizer”, for short – interact with the intention of its adversary. Although the brutalizer clearly controls the amount of violence that it chooses to inflict on its opponent, it does not control the opponent's will to resist and, consequently, the length of the war it fights. History abounds with instances where adding cruelty has stiffened the enemy's resolve rather than accelerating surrender. Second, it is claimed that ruthless but swift wars lessen net inhumanity. On this act-utilitarian view, it is normatively superior to hasten wars through barbarity than to lengthen them through moderation; it is therefore the brutalizer's responsibility to toughen fighting and the brutalized party's responsibility to refrain from resisting the brutalizer. Problematically, the brutalizer usurps authority by imposing its own utilitarian considerations upon the brutalized party. Moreover, the brutalizer blames its disobliging adversary for the extra bloodshed to which it resorts in the name of maximum utility. Third, it is claimed that IHL does or should permit non-conformity when non-conformity stands a reasonable chance of increasing net humanity. This position is inconsistent with IHL's functions, however. IHL does aim to reduce net wartime harm, but it would be a mistake to assume that utilitarian ends necessarily justify, let alone require, utilitarian means. When IHL enacts unqualified rules, it predetermines their conformity or non-conformity through processes that are distinctly not act-utilitarian. Nowhere in these processes do lesser-evil justifications naturally belong.

Imagine a future where man and machine become one on the battlefield, where soldiers direct weapon systems through a neural implant. Research advances on brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) may eventually allow such control of arms at the speed of thought. This article sketches two modes of BCI-controlled weapon systems. In Mode A (active BCI), the soldier opens fire by actively imagining that he is pushing a button with his hand. By contrast, Mode B (reactive BCI) captures neural signals evoked instantly after having spotted a target, before the operator becomes consciously aware of it. If he deems the target lawful, the brain signal is translated into a command to fire. Arguing that such man–machine collaboration transforms the operating soldier into a means of warfare, this article conducts a weapon review in line with Article 36 of Additional Protocol I (AP I) to answer the question of whether BCIs can be lawfully used to control weapons in international armed conflict. Consequently, the two set-ups are reviewed on their compliance with the customary targeting principles of international humanitarian law. Since Mode B casts doubt on the amount of control that the soldier retains over his targeting decision, the concept of meaningful human control is transposed from the debate on lethal autonomous weapon systems and applied to BCIs. It is found that reactive BCIs cannot be meaningfully controlled and thus violate the principles of distinction and proportionality. Hence, reactive BCIs are unlawful under Article 36 of AP I.

This article provides the personal perspectives of US military operational attorneys and analyzes three significant challenges in applying international humanitarian law (IHL) to modern military space operations: the lack of clear standards for assessing when IHL rules govern particular military activities in outer space; the challenges of effectively distinguishing between civilian objects and military objectives when targeting space systems; and the difficulties of applying IHL rules of proportionality when attacking space systems. To address these challenges, the article argues that States should take steps to develop non-binding norms for military space operations that contribute to broader understanding of States’ views on how IHL applies in space.

In the quest for “identity dominance” over the enemy, armed forces are increasingly leveraging biometrics for a variety of purposes. This paper focuses on the combat employment of one of them – facial recognition, which, unlike other biometrics, does not appear to have been widely utilized for targeting purposes yet. With the purchasing patterns of advanced militaries suggesting that such a development is around the corner, this paper assesses the compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) of the use of facial recognition technologies for targeting purposes. It peruses the applicable legal framework to demonstrate that IHL is neutral towards the use of new technologies and that the right to privacy under international human rights law does not preclude the use of biometrics in hostilities. The analysis zooms in on two specific use cases in which facial recognition is likely to be employed on the battlefield, namely (1) targeted killings against combatants and (2) targeted killings against civilians directly participating in hostilities. The paper closes with an acknowledgment that while facial recognition does have obvious operational benefits, it also has the potential to exacerbate targeting practices that stretch the limits of IHL.

Although there is one law, there are many motivations for complying with it. This was one of the key findings of the Roots of Restraint in War study published in 2018 by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Building on this insight, this article examines a few recent accounts of international humanitarian law (IHL) violations and two general categories of psychological states which may have given rise to them. It then explores the modern-day value of warrior codes and martial notions of honour, and reviews the ICRC’s recent work to find convergences between IHL and various religious or traditional value systems. The article offers some important caveats which should be kept in mind when undertaking work which compares morality, ethics and the law, before finally presenting some implications of this work for IHL integration and dissemination activities. Civilian IHL practitioners do not need to embed themselves into military life in order to understand military perspectives on IHL, but it would be helpful for them to consider the many ways in which troops internalize norms and how to incorporate extra-legal concepts into IHL integration and dissemination activities in an appropriate way.

Decision-makers rely on intelligence to make targeting decisions that comply with international humanitarian law (IHL), yet the relationship between intelligence and the law is not frequently discussed. This article explores crucial elements of intelligence and intelligence analysis that decision-makers should understand to increase their compliance with IHL, focusing on three crucial decision points: (1) the determination of whether a potential target is a military objective, (2) proportionality in attack analysis, and (3) the taking of effective precautions.

Newly emerging US cyberspace warfighting concepts highlight the need to update US legal doctrine. Concepts adapted to future high-intensity, high-paced armed conflict, including command post dispersal and integration of cyberspace into other targeting domains, present opportunities to refine US understandings of the law of war attack threshold and overlooked rules applicable to destruction and seizure. The advantages of staking out clear and current opinio juris on these and other matters extend beyond providing responsible and consistent operational law advice. Updated and authoritative military cyber legal doctrine will serve the strategic and diplomatic legal interests of the United States and the international legal system as a whole.

The “othering” of international humanitarian law has a demonstrated past resulting from the exclusion of so-called “Enemies of the Faith” from the laws of chivalry. It is no surprise, then, that the idea of “sharp war” should seem so natural to some commentators given its historical application “by the discretion of the commander and such rules of justice and humanity as recommend themselves in the particular circumstances of the case”. The application of humanitarian principles, in other words, was the measure of the commander's charity rather than the result of legal compulsion.

The viability of sharp war appears to have increased in attractiveness as conventional State-on-State warfare has seemingly decreased in frequency; however, the question of sharp war has never been approached through a legal historical lens. Utilizing the research found in The Laws of Yesterday's Wars, a multi-author series edited by the present author, this paper seeks to fill this gap by scoping over a range of geographically and temporally disconnected case studies and the customary law developed to mitigate warfare. Ultimately, the paper highlights that “soft war” has naturally evolved in all cultures and that arguments for sharp war are a historical anomaly.

This case note examines the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) 2022 reparations judgment in Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda, analyzing the Court’s legal reasoning, its evidentiary approach, and the implications for future reparations cases. The 2022 judgment follows the ICJ’s 2005 ruling that found Uganda responsible for violations of international law during its military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Given the failure of negotiations between the parties, the ICJ determined the amount of reparations owed, awarding a global sum of $325 million – substantially lower than the DRC’s claim. The case addresses complex legal and evidentiary questions, including the causal link between Uganda’s wrongful acts and the damages claimed, the standard and burden of proof for reparations, and categorizing harm. The Court examined four heads of damage, which were damage to persons, damage to property, damage to natural resources and macroeconomic damage, dismissing the latter due to insufficient proof of causation. A key aspect of the judgment was the ICJ’s adoption of a global sum approach – an uncommon approach in the Court’s practice. This case note assesses the lack of clear reasoning and methodology for determining the exact amount awarded for each head of damage.

Additionally, the ICJ’s over-reliance on United Nations reports and its application of standards of proof raise concerns about consistency and clarity in reparations proceedings. This case sets a precedent for State responsibility in mass violations of international law but highlights challenges in quantifying harm and ensuring equitable reparations. The Court’s reasoning and methods in the case may influence future cases involving State responsibility, armed conflicts, and reparative justice under international law.

The principle of equality of belligerents mandates that the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) apply equally to each party in an armed conflict, regardless of the legality of their use of force under jus ad bellum. This principle has been extensively analyzed in academic literature; its importance is universally recognized and its legal foundations and effects are well defined. However, this is primarily true with respect to its application in international armed conflicts (IACs) – in contrast, the principle does not receive equivalent recognition in situations of non-international armed conflict (NIAC), where at least one party is a non-State armed group. The issue arises from the lack of an accepted definition of the principle in NIACs, given the absence of any applicable international jus ad bellum in such conflicts. The present paper will try to remedy this issue by proposing that the principle is composed of two elements: symmetry of application and symmetry of substance. It will introduce this definition as it applies to IACs and NIACs and argue that the principle in NIACs is primarily defined by its symmetry of substance component. It will also evaluate the principle’s nature as a general principle of IHL and explore some of its concrete effects on IHL rules.

As the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other international organizations (IOs) are undergoing significant digital transformation and operate in an increasingly digitalized environment, questions as to how they can continue to ensure their information security are becoming more acute. Legal tools to protect IOs from harm in the digital age are central in this regard, alongside technical and organizational measures. This article focuses on one specific legal tool that can be used to foster IOs’ information security, namely legal interpretations of the concept of inviolability. Specifically, the article explores how the Agreement on the ICRC’s privileges and immunities in Luxembourg interprets the scope of the concept of inviolability, and the obligations arising under it.