Hostname: page-component-6bb9c88b65-bw5xj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-07-21T19:58:29.549Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

From Silence to Justice: A Critical Analysis of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Right to Remain Silent in India

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2025

Parth Singh
Affiliation:
Supreme Court of India, New Delhi, India
Vaibhav Yadav*
Affiliation:
Supreme Court of India, New Delhi, India
*
Corresponding author: Vaibhav Yadav; Email: mail@vaibhavyadav.org

Abstract

The right to silence and the presumption of innocence are fundamental to fair criminal proceedings. Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) permits courts in India to question the accused, allowing them to explain incriminating evidence. However, judicial interpretations of this provision have raised concerns about undermining these essential rights. This paper critically examines the evolving interpretations of Section 313 of the CrPC and their implications for the right to silence and the presumption of innocence. It argues that current judicial practices have turned the right to remain silent into a duty to provide explanations, contradicting natural justice principles. This study addresses three key questions: (1) How has the interpretation of Section 313 of the CrPC evolved in Indian jurisprudence, and what impact does this have on the accused’s right to remain silent? (2) In what ways does the current application of Section 313 of the CrPC conflict with Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which protects against self-incrimination? (3) What are the potential consequences of misapplying Section 313 on the presumption of innocence, and how can these issues be remedied through judicial or legislative reforms? The paper concludes with recommendations to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system and ensure robust protection of the right to silence and the presumption of innocence.

Abstracto

Abstracto

El derecho al silencio y la presunción de inocencia son fundamentales para un proceso penal justo. El artículo 313 del Código de Procedimiento Penal de 1973 (CrPC) permite a los tribunales de la India interrogar al acusado y permitirle explicar las pruebas incriminatorias. Sin embargo, las interpretaciones judiciales de esta disposición han suscitado preocupación por la posibilidad de que se socaven estos derechos esenciales. Este artículo examina críticamente la evolución de las interpretaciones de la Sección 313 CrPC y sus implicaciones para el derecho al silencio y la presunción de inocencia. Sostiene que las prácticas judiciales actuales han convertido el derecho a guardar silencio en un deber de dar explicaciones, contradiciendo los principios de la justicia natural. Este estudio aborda tres preguntas clave: ¿Cómo ha evolucionado la interpretación del artículo 313 del CrPC en la jurisprudencia india y qué impacto tiene esto en el derecho del acusado a guardar silencio? ¿De qué manera la aplicación actual de la Sección 313 CrPC entra en conflicto con el Artículo 20(3) de la Constitución, que protege contra la autoincriminación? ¿Cuáles son las posibles consecuencias de una mala aplicación del artículo 313 sobre la presunción de inocencia y cómo se pueden remediar estas cuestiones mediante reformas judiciales o legislativas? El documento concluye con recomendaciones para preservar la integridad del sistema de justicia penal y garantizar una protección sólida del derecho al silencio y la presunción de inocencia.

Abstrait

Abstrait

Le droit au silence et la présomption d’innocence sont fondamentaux pour une procédure pénale équitable. L’article 313 du Code de procédure pénale de 1973 (CrPC) autorise les tribunaux indiens à interroger l’accusé, leur permettant ainsi d’expliquer les preuves à charge. Cependant, les interprétations judiciaires de cette disposition ont suscité des inquiétudes quant à la possibilité de porter atteinte à ces droits essentiels. Cet article examine de manière critique l’évolution des interprétations de l’article 313 du CrPC et leurs implications pour le droit au silence et la présomption d’innocence. Il soutient que les pratiques judiciaires actuelles ont transformé le droit de garder le silence en un devoir de fournir des explications, en contradiction avec les principes de justice naturelle. Cette étude répond à trois questions clés : Comment l’interprétation de l’article 313 du CrPC a-t-elle évolué dans la jurisprudence indienne, et quel impact cela a-t-il sur le droit de l’accusé de garder le silence ? En quoi l’application actuelle de l’article 313 du CrPC est-elle en contradiction avec l’article 20(3) de la Constitution, qui protège contre l’auto-incrimination ? Quelles sont les conséquences potentielles d’une mauvaise application de l’article 313 sur la présomption d’innocence, et comment ces problèmes peuvent-ils être résolus par des réformes judiciaires ou législatives ? Le document se termine par des recommandations visant à préserver l’intégrité du système de justice pénale et à garantir une protection solide du droit au silence et de la présomption d’innocence.

摘要

摘要

沉默权和无罪推定是公平刑事诉讼的基础。1973 年⟪刑事诉讼法⟫第 313 条允许印度法院询问被告,允许他们解释定罪证据。然而,司法部门对这一条款的解释引发了对这些基本权利的破坏。本文批判性地审视了⟪刑事诉讼法⟫第 313 条的演变解释及其对沉默权和无罪推定的影响。它认为,当前的司法实践已将保持沉默的权利变成了提供解释的义务,这与自然正义原则相矛盾。本研究解决了三个关键问题: ⟪刑事诉讼法⟫第 313 条的解释在印度法学中是如何演变的,这对被告保持沉默的权利有何影响? ⟪刑事诉讼法⟫第 313 条的当前应用在哪些方面与⟪宪法⟫第 20(3) 条相冲突,该条保护被告不自证其罪? 误用第 313 条关于无罪推定的规定可能产生什么后果?如何通过司法或立法改革来解决这些问题? 本文最后提出了建议,以维护刑事司法系统的完整性,并确保对沉默权和无罪推定的有力保护。

خلاصة

خلاصة

إن الحق في الصمت وافتراض البراءة أمران أساسيان لإجراءات جنائية عادلة، وتسمح المادة 313 من قانون الإجراءات الجنائية لعام 1973 للمحاكم في الهند باستجواب المتهمين، مما يسمح لهم بتفسير أدلة التجريم وقد أثار هذا الحكم مخاوف بشأن تقويض هذه الحقوق الأساسية. وتدرس هذه الورقة بشكل نقدي التفسيرات المتطورة للمادة 313 من قانون الإجراءات الجنائية وآثارها على الحق في الصمت وافتراض البراءة، وتجادل بأن الممارسات القضائية الحالية قد حولت الحق في التزام الصمت في واجب تقديم تفسيرات تتعارض مع مبادئ العدالة الطبيعية تتناول هذه الدراسة ثلاثة أسئلة رئيسية :كيف تطور تفسير المادة 313 من قانون الإجراءات الجنائية في الفقه الهندي، وما تأثير ذلك على حق المتهم في التزام الصمت؟ ما هي الطرق التي يتعارض بها التطبيق الحالي للمادة 313 من قانون الإجراءات الجنائية مع المادة 20 (3) من الدستور، التي تحمي من تجريم الذات؟ ما هي العواقب المحتملة لسوء تطبيق المادة 313 بشأن افتراض البراءة، وكيف يمكن معالجة هذه القضايا من خلال الإصلاحات القضائية أو التشريعية؟ وتختتم الورقة بتوصيات للحفاظ على نزاهة نظام العدالة الجنائية وضمان حماية قوية للحق في الصمت وافتراض البراءة.

Information

Type
Article
Copyright
© International Society of Criminology, 2025

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Ashworth, A. 2006. “Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence.” International Journal of Evidence & Proof 10(4):241–79.10.1350/ijep.10.4.241CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baxi, U. 1982. The Crisis of the Indian Legal System. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.Google Scholar
Bhatia, G. 2015. “Guest Post: Admissibility of Confessions to the Police: Normalising a State of Exception – II.” Indian Constitutional Law and Philosophy, 8 July 2015, retrieved 24 July 2023 (https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2015/06/08/guest-post-admissibility-of-confessions-to-the-police-normalising-a-state-of-exception-ii/).Google Scholar
Gautam, K. 2021. “The Right against Self-Incrimination under Indian Constitution & the Admissibility of Custodial Statements under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.” Journal of Indian Law and Society 3:7285.Google Scholar
Hariharan, E. and Tharika, S.. 2019. “Compulsion, Confession and Article 20(3).” International Journal of Law, Management and Humanities 2(1) retrieved 3 April 2025 (https://ijlmh.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Compulsion-Confession-and-Article-203.pdf).Google Scholar
Jaiswal, J. 2012. “Right of an Accused to be Protected against Self-Incrimination – Its Availability and Emerging Judicial Dimensions under Criminal Law.” Indian Journal of Law and Justice 3(1):7289.Google Scholar
Justia. 2024. “The Right to Silence for Criminal Suspects under the Law.” Retrieved 19 May 2024 (https://www.justia.com/criminal/procedure/miranda-rights/right-to-silence/).Google Scholar
Kalhan, A. 2006. “Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Antiterrorism, and Security Laws in India.” Columbia Journal of Asian Law 20:93–6.Google Scholar
Kumar Pandey, P. and Raza, A.. 2015. “Protection against Self-Incrimination as a Fundamental Right in India: A Critical Appraisal.” Indian Bar Review 42(4):133–59.Google Scholar
Landsman, S. 1983. “A Brief Survey on the Development of the Adversary System.” Ohio State Law Journal 44:713–39.Google Scholar
Law Commission of India. 2002. “One Hundred Eightieth Report on Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and the Right to Silence.” 9 May 2002, retrieved 24 July 2023 (https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s3ca0daec69b5adc880fb464895726dbdf/uploads/2022/08/2022081051.pdf).Google Scholar
Legislative Department of India. 2024. “Constitution of India”. Retrieved 19 May 2024 (https://legislative.gov.in/constitution-of-india/).Google Scholar
Mishra, A. and Rasheed, M. H.. 2022. “Right against Self-Incrimination: A Constitutional Privilege.” Journal of Global Research & Analysis 5:164.Google Scholar
Narrain, S. 2008. “Counterterrorism and Human Rights: The Case of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.” Socio-Legal Review 4:38.Google Scholar
Press Trust of India. 2020. “‘Real Rights Are a Result of Performance of Duty’: CJI Bobde.” Hindustan Times, 22 February 2020, retrieved 24 July 2023 (https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/real-rights-are-a-result-of-performance-of-duty-cji-bobde/story-4FDr95kfKjhkTn0RJ51NbL.html).Google Scholar
Riley, A. R. 2016. “Crime and Governance in Indian Country.” UCLA Law Review 63:1564.Google Scholar
Sekhri, A. 2020. “Due Process Denied: A Study of Criminal Procedure in India.” Economic and Political Weekly 55:43–4.Google Scholar
Shankar, S. 2009. Scaling Justice: India’s Supreme Court, Social Rights, and Civil Liberties. Delhi: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195693201.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Singh, P. 2023. “Determination of Sentences in India: Policy and Practice.” International Annals of Criminology 61(3–4):314–27.10.1017/cri.2023.20CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Singh, P. 2024. “Social Justice and Judicial Working of Bail Decisions in India: A Review by Advocate Parth Singh on the Legacy of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar.” Law Review & Legal Publication, 6 April 2024, retrieved 3 April 2025 (https://ssrn.com/abstract=4786218).Google Scholar
Thomas, S. S. 2022. “Critical Analysis on the Evidentiary Value of Hostile Witness.” Journal of Legal Studies 10(2):200–25.Google Scholar
Yadav, V. 2023a. “Tackling Non-Consensual Dissemination of Intimate Images in India’s Contemporary Legal Framework.” International Annals of Criminology 61(3–4):355–83.10.1017/cri.2023.30CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yadav, V. 2023b. “The Sedition Conundrum in India: A Critical Examination of its Historical Evolution, Current Application and Constitutional Validity.” International Annals of Criminology 61(2):188222.Google Scholar