Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message

Login Alert

Cancel
Log in
×
×
Register
Log In
(0) Cart
Logo for Cambridge Core from Cambridge University Press. Click to return to homepage.
Logo for Cambridge Core from Cambridge University Press. Click to return to homepage.
Cited by
  • Crossref logo 10
  • Google Scholar logo
Crossref Citations
Crossref logo
This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by Crossref.
Grasswick, Heidi 2018. Understanding Epistemic Trust Injustices and Their Harms. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol. 84, Issue. , p. 69.
  • CrossRef
  • Google Scholar
Liveriero, Federica 2020. Epistemic Injustice in the Political Domain: Powerless Citizens and Institutional Reform. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 23, Issue. 5, p. 797.
  • CrossRef
  • Google Scholar
El Kassar, Nadja 2020. The Place of Intellectual Self‐Trust in Theories of Epistemic Advantages. Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 51, Issue. 1, p. 7.
  • CrossRef
  • Google Scholar
Chen, Melvin 2021. Trust and Trust-Engineering in Artificial Intelligence Research: Theory and Praxis. Philosophy & Technology, Vol. 34, Issue. 4, p. 1429.
  • CrossRef
  • Google Scholar
Townsend, Leo and Lupin, Dina 2021. Representation and Epistemic Violence. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. 29, Issue. 4, p. 577.
  • CrossRef
  • Google Scholar
DiMarco, Marina 2023. Cooperative Epistemic Trustworthiness. Philosophy of Science, Vol. 90, Issue. 5, p. 1100.
  • CrossRef
  • Google Scholar
Levy, Neil 2023. Intellectual Virtue Signaling. American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 60, Issue. 3, p. 311.
  • CrossRef
  • Google Scholar
Afroogh, Saleh 2023. A probabilistic theory of trust concerning artificial intelligence: can intelligent robots trust humans?. AI and Ethics, Vol. 3, Issue. 2, p. 469.
  • CrossRef
  • Google Scholar
Liveriero, Federica 2023. Relational Liberalism. Vol. 24, Issue. , p. 211.
  • CrossRef
  • Google Scholar
Porter, Tyler 2024. Manufacturing the Illusion of Epistemic Trustworthiness. Episteme, p. 1.
  • CrossRef
  • Google Scholar
Google Scholar Citations

View all Google Scholar citations for this article.

×
Cambridge University Press

Our Site

  • Accessibility
  • Contact & Help
  • Legal Notices

Our Platforms

  • Cambridge Core
  • Cambridge Open Engage
  • Cambridge Higher Education

Our Products

  • Journals
  • Books
  • Elements
  • Textbooks
  • Courseware

Join us online

Please choose a valid location.

  • Rights & Permissions
  • Copyright
  • Privacy Notice
  • Terms of Use
  • Cookies Policy
Cambridge University Press 2025

Cancel
Confirm
×

Save article to Kindle

To send this article to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Imposters, Tricksters, and Trustworthiness as an Epistemic Virtue
  • Volume 29, Issue 4
  • Karen Frost‐Arnold
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12107
Please provide your Kindle email.
Available formats Please select a format to save.
×

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Imposters, Tricksters, and Trustworthiness as an Epistemic Virtue
  • Volume 29, Issue 4
  • Karen Frost‐Arnold
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12107
Available formats Please select a format to save.
×

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Imposters, Tricksters, and Trustworthiness as an Epistemic Virtue
  • Volume 29, Issue 4
  • Karen Frost‐Arnold
  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12107
Available formats Please select a format to save.
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Contents help
Close Contents help

- No HTML tags allowed
- Web page URLs will display as text only
- Lines and paragraphs break automatically
- Attachments, images or tables are not permitted

Please enter your response.

Your details

Email help
Close Email help

Your email address will be used in order to notify you when your comment has been reviewed by the moderator and in case the author(s) of the article or the moderator need to contact you directly.

Please enter a valid email address.
You have entered the maximum number of contributors

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? * Conflicting interests help

Close Conflicting interests help

Please list any fees and grants from, employment by, consultancy for, shared ownership in or any close relationship with, at any time over the preceding 36 months, any organisation whose interests may be affected by the publication of the response. Please also list any non-financial associations or interests (personal, professional, political, institutional, religious or other) that a reasonable reader would want to know about in relation to the submitted work. This pertains to all the authors of the piece, their spouses or partners.