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Terms of Convenience: Examining Constitutional Overrulings by the High Court

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Gian Boeddu  and
Richard Haigh
Gian Boeddu
Affiliation:
Mallesons Stephen Jaques (Melbourne)
Richard Haigh
Affiliation:
Osgoode Hall Law School (2002-04) and Osgoode Hall Professional Development Centre
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Extract

Imagine this scenario. A court composed of an even number of judges is deciding the constitutionality of national legislation critical to the efficient administration of justice in a federal state. In argument, the chief law officers of all representative governments ask that the legislation be upheld as it was reached through a lengthy negotiated compromise of all the parties. By virtue of an equal split of opinion between the six judges hearing the case, a legislative 'sleight of hand' is triggered and the scheme is found to be constitutional. Twelve months on, the same court agrees to reconsider its previous decision. Things are generally unchanged, the same arguments are presented. The matter, however, is heard by a differently-composed, odd-numbered bench. If ever the combined desire of all governments was that a court should heed the ancient maxim 'stare decisis et non quieta movere–stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm'–it would be now. Instead, a majority finds that the same scheme is unconstitutional; it therefore collapses.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , March 2003 , pp. 167 - 194
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

*

This paper is based on a thesis submitted for the requirements of an LLB (Honours) at Deakin University, 2000.

References

1 Transcript of Proceedings, Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (High Court of Australia, Gummow J, 2 December 1998), <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/hca/transcripts/1998/S74/4.html> (Copy on file with authors).

2 James Rehnquist, 'The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court' (1986) 66 Boston University Law Review 345, 347.

3 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 595 (Kirby J).

4 (1998) 193 CLR 346 ('Gould').

5 (1999) 198 CLR 511 ('Re Wakim').

6 (1997) 189 CLR 465 ('Ha').

7 See Australian Agricultural Co v Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261, 278 (Isaacs J).

8 An excellent and thorough description of the different conceptions of stare decisis can be found in Stephen Perry, 'Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law' (1987) 7 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 215. Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (1975) and Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) are perhaps the best of a long line of philosophical tracts considering these issues.

9 See Raz, above n 8, ch 4‐5 (first mode of practical reason corresponds to the strict view of stare decisis), and Dworkin, above n 8, 24, who uses the term 'strict' precedent where judges are obliged to follow earlier decisions even if they believe them wrong and 'relaxed' precedent which requires judges to give weight to past decisions and follow them unless they believe them to be wrong enough so that the initial presumption in their favour is displaced.

10 See also Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977). Dworkin in Law's Empire, above n 8, 453, notes that judges will often signpost reversals through hints and dicta. This may be true, but for our discussion, we are more interested in constitutional cases where little or no warning is given.

11 Horrigan, Bryan, 'Towards a Jurisprudence of High Court Overruling' (1992) 66 Australian Law Journal 199, 216‐7Google Scholar.

12 (1989) 166 CLR 417.

13 Ibid 439.

14 For quite a comprehensive analysis see Patrick Keyzer, 'When is an issue of “Vital Constitutional Importance"? Principles which Guide the Reconsideration of Constitutional Decisions in the High Court of Australia' (1999) 2 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 13.

15 See, eg, Arnold Bennett, 'The Territories Representation Case―Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases' (1978) 52 Australian Law Journal 664; Alastair MacAdam and John Pyke, Judicial Reasoning and the Doctrine of Precedent in Australia (1998) [8.35]‐[8.37]; Michael Zander, The Law-Making Process (4th ed, 1994) 235.

16 See, eg, Zines, Leslie, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 433‐44Google Scholar.

17 As argued throughout in Keyzer, above n 14.

18 (1913) 17 CLR 261, 278 ('Australian Agricultural').

19 A point noted by Zines, above n 16, 434.

20 See Henry Monaghan, 'Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication' (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review 723, 770.

21 (1953) 87 CLR 49 ('Hughes').

22 Ibid 85.

23 (1977) 139 CLR 585 ('Second Territorial Senators Case').

24 Ibid 625.

25 See Australian Agricultural (1913) 17 CLR 261, 278, 279 (Isaacs J).

26 (1968) 117 CLR 390, 396 ('Damjanovic').

27 (1996) 186 CLR 140, 235 ('McGinty').

28 (1997) 189 CLR 520 ('Lange').

29 Ibid 554 (citations excluded).

30 Bennett, above n 15, especially at 669‐71.

31 Keyzer, above n 14, 15.

32 Ibid 17.

33 (1989) 168 CLR 461 ('Street').

34 Section 117 of the Australian Constitution provides that '[a] subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject in any other State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State.'

35 (1904) 2 CLR 29.

36 (1973) 128 CLR 482.

37 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 489.

38 Ibid 518‐9.

39 (1997) 190 CLR 513 ('Newcrest').

40 Ibid 613.

41 (1969) 119 CLR 564 ('Teori Tau').

42 (1989) 168 CLR 461, 519.

43 (1982) 150 CLR 49 ('Hospital Contribution Fund (No 1)').

44 (1975) 134 CLR 201 ('First Territorial Senators Case').

45 As noted by Jeremy Kirk, the High Court has been motivated by constitutional protections of human rights‐see 'Constitutional Implications from Representative Democracy' (1995) 23 Federal Law Review 37.

46 (1997) 190 CLR 513, 576.

47 (1989) 168 CLR 461, 588.

48 (1975) 134 CLR 201.

49 (1977) 139 CLR 585.

50 Ibid 593.

51 Ibid 604.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid 600.

54 Ibid 603.

55 Ibid 604.

56 Herbert Broom, Broom's Legal Maxims (10th ed, 1939) 90.

57 (1982) 150 CLR 49.

58 Ibid 57‐8.

59 Monaghan, above n 20, 749.

60 (1960) 104 CLR 529 ('Dennis Hotels').

61 (1974) 130 CLR 177 ('Dickenson's Arcade').

62 See Denis James, Federal and State Taxation: A Comparison of the Australian, German and Canadian Systems (1997) Parliamentary Library, Australian Parliament,<http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/1997‐98/98cib05.htm> at 31 March 2003 (Copy on file with authors).

63 (1977) 136 CLR 475 ('H C Sleigh').

64 Ibid 513; see also 501 (Mason J).

65 Ibid 501‐2, 513.

66 (1984) 154 CLR 311 ('Evda').

67 Ibid 316.

68 (1985) 155 CLR 368 ('Gosford Meats').

69 Ibid 379‐80.

70 See, eg, Philip Morris Ltd v Commissioner of Business Franchises (1989) 167 CLR 399, 481(Toohey and Gaudron JJ).

71 (1989) 167 CLR 399 ('Philip Morris').

72 Ibid 438.

73 Ibid 439.

74 Ibid 420.

75 (1993) 178 CLR 561 ('Capital Duplicators (No 2)').

76 Ibid 591.

77 Ibid 591‐2.

78 (1997) 189 CLR 465, 503.

79 Ibid.

80 Ibid 501.

81 (1942) 65 CLR 373 ('First Uniform Tax Case').

82 (1957) 99 CLR 575 ('Second Uniform Tax Case').

83 Ibid 609.

84 Ibid 611.

85 Ibid. Crucially, Fullagar J, with whom Williams J was in complete agreement, was more explicit than Dixon CJ. His Honour pointed out that the questions being reconsidered had been litigated in the original decision, and asserted that 'if ever there was a case for the application of the rule of stare decisis, this …' [was] that case' (at 655).

86 Examples of cases that have discussed this concept include Hospital Contribution Fund (No), John v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1989) 166 CLR 417 and Street (1989) 168 CLR 461.

87 Second Uniform Tax Case (1957) 99 CLR 575, 601.

88 Ibid 616.

89 Ibid 601 (also confirmed by Fullagar J at 657).

90 (1947) 74 CLR 508 ('Uther').

91 (1962) 108 CLR 372 ('Cigamatic').

92 Ibid 389.

93 Ibid 380‐1.

94 Ibid 385.

95 (1997) 190 CLR 513, 646‐7.

96 Ibid 651.

97 (1953) 87 CLR 49, 76.

98 (1982) 150 CLR 49, 58; see also 73 (Wilson J).

99 Ibid 614 (emphasis added).

100 See Kirk, above n 45, 70 and Horrigan, above n 11, 211‐12.

101 (1994) 181 CLR 18 ('Re Tyler').

102 Ibid 38.

103 See Payne v Tennessee, 501 US 808, 828 (1991).

104 For an overview of this debate, see Tony Blackshield and Williams, George, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory (3rd ed, 2002) ch 30Google Scholar. For this argument in the United States context, see Frank Easterbrook, 'Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions' (1988) 73 Cornell Law Review 422, 430.

105 See Horrigan, above n 11, 212, who sets this out as one of ten considerations the Court has formulated for overruling all cases, not specifically constitutional ones. He makes the point that the factors are 'defeasible in nature and do not amount to definite rules… '[or an] indubitable formula', 211.

106 (1974) 130 CLR 177, 212.

107 See, generally, Keyzer, above n 14.

108 (1999) 198 CLR 511, 602‐3.

109 (1982) 150 CLR 49, 57.

110 See, eg, Attorney General for Ontario v Canada Temperance Federation [1946] AC 193, 206.

111 See Laskin, Bora, 'The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians' (1951) 29 Canadian Bar Review 1038, 1070Google Scholar.

112 (1977) 139 CLR 585, 600. To some extent this is even more true today, given the plethora of constitutional judgments exceeding 100 pages that tax even the most ardent lawyer or law scholar.

113 (1994) 181 CLR 18, 39‐40.

114 (1982) 150 CLR 49, 72.

115 (1999) 198 CLR 511, 598‐9.

116 Ibid 572.

117 [1998] 1 SCR 493 ('Vriend').

118 Ibid [133].

119 [1995] 2 SCR 206 ('Burlingham').

120 Ibid [72‐4].

121 C Schmitz, quoting Bastarache J, 'Justice: Top Court Goes “Too Far"' Ottawa Citizen,(Canada), 13 Jan 2001, A7.

122 Some knowledge of the sociological theory of 'tipping points' might be useful to Justices placed in this position. For a good popular overview of this phenomenon, see Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point (2000).

123 (1957) 99 CLR 575, 655.

124 Moragne v States Marine Lines, 398 US 375, 403 (1970).

125 (1989) 166 CLR 417.

126 Ibid 451.

127 Note, 'Constitutional Stare Decisis' (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 1344, 1350.

128 See William Twining and David Miers, How to do Things with Rules (2nd ed, 1982) 275.

129 Gareth Evans, 'The Most Dangerous Branch? The High Court and the Constitution in a Changing Society' in AD Hambly and JD Goldring (eds), Australian Lawyers and Social Change (1976) 13, 74.

130 See, eg, Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 489 (Mason CJ) and 518―19 (Brennan J); Newcrest (1997)190 CLR 513, 613 (Gummow J); Cigamatic (1962) 108 CLR 372, 389 (Menzies J).

131 (1996) 186 CLR 140, 235.

132 Bauerman v Radenius (1798) 101 ER 1186, 1189 (Lord Kenyon).

133 See Dennis Rose, 'Judicial Reasonings and Responsibilities in Constitutional Cases' (1994)20 Monash University Law Review 195, 212, quoting D F Dugdale, 'A Polite Response to Mr Justice Thomas' (1993) 23 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 125, 128.

134 See Dworkin, above n 10, 40.

135 (1968) 117 CLR 390, 407‐8.

136 (1977) 139 CLR 585, 602 (emphasis added).

137 Monaghan, above n 20, 752.

138 See Dworkin, Law's Empire, above n 8, viii‐ix, and Taking Rights Seriously, above n 10, 40.

139 (1982) 150 CLR 49, 70.

140 Henry Monaghan, 'Our Perfect Constitution' (1981) 56 New York University Law Review 353,390.

141 Dworkin, above n 8, ch 4, especially pages 127‐29.

142 Ibid ch 7.

143 Re Wakim (1999) 198 CLR 511, 598.

144 (1977) 139 CLR 585, 600.

145 South Carolina v Gathers, 490 US 805, 824 (1989).

146 See Amy Padden, 'Overruling Decisions in the Supreme Court: The Role of a Decision's Vote, Age and Subject Matter in the Application of Stare Decisis After Payne v. Tennessee' (1994) 82 Georgetown Law Journal 1689, 1719.

147 (1999) 198 CLR 511, 597, quoting Craies, Treatise on Statute Law (7th ed, 1971).

148 (1977) 139 CLR 585, 594.

149 Bennett, above n 15, 676.

150 Margaret Kniffin, 'Overruling Supreme Court Precedents: Anticipatory Action by United States Courts of Appeals' (1982) 51 Fordham Law Review 53, 66.

151 A situation that seems to happen with great frequency in Australia, compared with say, the US, Canada or New Zealand. A proper determination of this impressionistic assessment is outside the scope of this paper, but would be worthy of further study.

152 For an overview of these decisions, see Justice John Lockhart, 'The Doctrine of Precedent‐ Today and Tomorrow' (1987) 3 Australian Bar Review 1, 15.

153 (1976) 133 CLR 526 ('Milne').

154 Ibid 533.

155 (1981) 146 CLR 336 ('St Helens Farms').

156 Ibid 354‐5.

157 Ibid 388.

158 The High Court is not the only constitutional court to have taken this view. The United States Supreme Court has also repeatedly held that its equally divided decisions will only bind the parties to the case‐for an overview see Kniffin, above n 150, 71.

159 Transcript of proceedings, Re Wakim, above n 1 (Gaudron J).

160 Ibid.

161 Ibid.

162 (1999) 198 CLR 511, 565.

163 (1976) 133 CLR 526, 533.

164 D F Jackson, 'The Lawmaking Role of the High Court' (1994) 11 Australian Bar Review 197, 208.

165 (1984) 154 CLR 311, 316.

166 Ibid.

167 (1989) 168 CLR 461, 489.

168 Ibid 588 (emphasis added).

169 See Dworkin, above n 8, ch 2.

170 (1977) 139 CLR 585, 604.

171 Ibid.

172 (2001) 207 CLR 278, 290-291 ('Brownlee').

173 Ibid 315.

174 (1977) 139 CLR 585, 630.

175 (1985) 155 CLR 368, 385.

176 (1977) 136 CLR 475, 514. An interesting decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on this point, where the technique of distinguishing was used in a situation crying out for overruling, was the recent case of United States of America v. Burns [2001] 1 SCR 283―see also Richard Haigh, 'A Kindler, Gentler Supreme Court? The Case of Burns and the Need For a Principled Approach to Overruling' (2001) 14 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 139.

177 (1989) 167 CLR 399, 438. See also Haigh, above n 176.

178 Zines, above n 16, 443.

179 (1977) 139 CLR 585, 610.

180 (1913) 17 CLR 261, 279.