¹ [1963] S.A.S.R. 24; (1963) 4 F.L.R. 216. Supreme Court of South Australia; Napier C.J., Chamberlain and Hogarth JJ. The Court delivered a written judgment.

² This ground is based upon the ground in s. 15 (j) of the Matrimonial Causes and Personal Status Code 1948-1957 (W.A.). There was a somewhat similar ground in s. 6 (k) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1929-1941 (S.A.).

³ Vol. H. of R. 23, 2231.

⁴ Grosser v. Grosser (1961) 2 F.L.R. 152-SupremeCourt of Tasmania: Burbury C.J.; Taylor v. Taylor (No.2) (1961) 2 F.L.R 371-Supreme Court of New South Wales: Nield J.; Judd v Judd (1962) 3 F.L.R. 207; [1962] V.R. 112-Supreme Court of Victoria: Monahan J.; Painter v. Painter (1962) 3 F.L.R. 370; [1963] S.A.S.R. 12 Supreme Court of South Australia: Mayo J.; Baily v. Baily (1962) 3 F.L.R. 476 Supreme Court of Tasmania: Gibson J.; Painter v. Painter [1963] S.A.S.R. 12 Supreme Court ofSouth Australia: Full Court; Kearns v. Kearns [1963] Qd.R. 102 Queensland Supreme Court: Full Court; McDonald v. McDonald (1963) 4 F.L.R. 76-Supreme Court of New South Wales: Dovey J.; Lamrock v. Lamrock (1963) 4 F.L.R. 81-Supreme Court of New South Wales: Wallace J.

⁵ [1963] S.A.S.R. 24.

⁶ [1963] S.A.S.R. 12; (1962) 3 F.L.R. 370.

⁷ (1961) 2 F.L.R. 371. Nield J. came to the conclusion that where an innocent respondent opposed the decree, was opposed to the separation and sought recon ciliation and where divorce was contrary to her religious convictions, it would be both harsh and oppressive to the respondent and contrary to the public interest to pronounce a decree in the petitioner's favour. His Honour arrived at this conclusion notwithstanding the New Zealand decisions of Lodder v. Lodder r19211 N.Z.L.R. 876 and Mason v. Mason [1921] N.Z.L.R. 955 which emphasised the policy reasons behind a similar provision and held that, prima facie, a decree should be made notwith standing that the respondent was blameless and opposed the decree.

⁸ [1962] V.R. 112. Monahan J. held that to grant a decree in favour of the petitioner would be harsh and oppressive to the respondent and in so finding he took into account the fact that the respondent was an innocent party, the petitioner's failure to maintain his wife and children, the petitioner's adulterous relationships with other women, the respondent's opposition to the decree on religious grounds and that in all the circum stances of the case the granting of a decree in favour of the petitioner would be a ‘crowning indignity’ to the respondent.

⁹ [1963] S.A.S.R. 24, 27. This is a clear rejection of the approach taken by Nield J. in Taylor v. Taylor (No.2) (1961) 2 F.L.R. 371 whose decision has not been followed by subsequent courts. The views expressed in Judd v. Judd (1962) 3 F.L.R. 207 can be reconciled with the wider interpretation.

¹⁰ Cf the approach of Nield J. in Taylor v. Taylor (No.2) (1961) 2 F.L.R. 371.

¹¹ Cf the approach of Nield J. in Taylor v. Taylor (No.2) (1961) 2 F.L.R. 371.

¹² McDonald v. McDonald (1963) 4 F.L.R. 76; Lamrockv. Lamrock(1963)4 F.L.R.81.

¹³ [1963] S.A.S.R. 24, 28.

¹⁴ (1961) 2 F.L.R. 371, 373.

¹⁵ In Lamrock v. Lamrock (1963) 4 F.L.R. 81 Wallace J. expressly denied thatsuch alleged considerations affected to the application of s. 37 (1).

¹⁶ (1963) 4 F.L.R. 81, 83.

¹⁷ (1962) 3 F.L.R. 370; [19631 S.A.S.R. 12.

¹⁸ (1963) 4 F.L.R. 76.

¹⁹ (1961) 2 F.L.R. 371.

²⁰ (1962) 3 F.L.R. 370; [1963] S.A.S.R. 12.

²¹ (1963) 4 F.L.R. 76.

²² (1963) 4 F.L.R. 81.

²³ (1963) 4 F.L.R. 76.

²⁴ (1963) 4 F.L.R. 81.