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In A Fix: Fixed-Term Parliaments in the Australian States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Peter Congdon*
Affiliation:
Constitutional Law, University of Western Australia

Abstract

Constitutional systems of Westminster heritage are increasingly moving towards fixed-term parliaments to, amongst other things, prevent the Premier or Prime Minister opportunistically calling a ‘snap election’. Amongst the Australian states, qualified fixed-term parliaments currently exist in New South Wales, South Australia and Victoria. Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia have also deliberated over whether to establish similar fixed-term parliaments. However, manner and form provisions in those states' constitutions entrench the Parliament's duration, Governor's Office and dissolution power. In Western Australia and Queensland, unlike Tasmania, such provisions are doubly entrenched. This article considers whether these entrenching provisions present legal obstacles to constitutional amendments establishing fixed-term parliaments in those two states. This involves examining whether laws fixing parliamentary terms fall within section 6 of the Australia Acts 1986 (Cth) & (UK). The article concludes by examining recent amendments to the Electoral Act 1907 (WA) designed to enable fixed election dates in Western Australia without requiring a successful referendum.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

I would like to thank the anonymous referee, Dr James Thomson SC, Associate Professor Sarah Murray, Mr Greg Calcutt AM SC and Mr Nicholas Tiverios for their invaluable thoughts and comments on earlier versions of this article. Any errors or omissions, of course, remain my own.

References

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3 Constitution (Duration of Parliament) Act 1984 (Vic); Constitution Act Amendment Act 1985 (SA); Constitution (Parliamentary Reform) Act 2003 (Vic). Section 24B of the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) was inserted following a state referendum in 1995 at which the electorate approved the Constitution (Fixed Term Parliaments) Act 1993 (NSW).

4 Constitution Act 1889 (WA) ('WA Constitution Act’) ss 3, 50, 73(2)(a),(e).

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65 Constitution Acts Amendment Act 1899 (WA) s 43(3).

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81 Bignold v Dickson (1991) 23 NSWLR 683, 686 (Kirby P). See Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General, above n 34, 212–3.

82 Of course, it may be that other refusals have occurred but this fact has not been made public: Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales, above n 33, 648. In 1904, 1905 and 1909 the Governor-General refused requests from the Prime Minister to dissolve the House of Representatives.

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91 Keith, AB, The Sovereignty of the British Dominions (MacMillan, 1929) 247.Google Scholar It is unclear whether Keith was referring to legal or political compulsion. As a matter of political convention, this is the accepted position. Otherwise, a government could use a series of repeated dissolutions to ultimately defeat the electors’ will: Evatt, H V, The King and His Dominion Governors (Oxford University Press, 1936) 109.Google Scholar

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106 (1839) 112 ER 1112, 1128.

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108 See Forsey, The Royal Power of Dissolution of Parliament in the British Commonwealth, above n 11, 7; Winterton, ‘The Constitutional Position of Australian State Governors', above n 1, 294.

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111 Constitution Act Amendment Act 1934 (Qld) s 4.

112 The Assembly's duration has been altered several times: Constitution Act 1889 (WA) s 14; Constitution Acts Amendment Act 1899 (WA) s 21(1); Legislative Assembly Duration Act 1919 (WA); Acts Amendment (Electoral Reform) Act 1987 (WA) s 12.

113 Nicholas v Western Australia [1972] WAR 168, 173 (Jackson CJ).

114 (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 181, 209 (emphasis added).

115 [1943] OR 501.

116 [1943] OR 319, 329 affd R (ex rel Tolfree) v Clark [1943] OR 501. Hope J noted that a Lieutenant-Governor may also refuse assent to a bill prolonging Parliament's duration: [1943] OR 319, 328. In Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales, Kirby J raised the possibility that the Governor may refuse assent to a law that clearly offends basic constitutional norms: (2001) 205 CLR 399, 432 n 215 (Kirby J). If such a reserve power exists it may provide an alternative to the Governor dissolving Parliament if Parliament attempted to extend its duration. But see Winterton, ‘The Constitutional Position of Australian State Governors', above n 1, 294 (suggesting there is no reserve power to refuse assent to bills).

117 [1955] 1 FCR 155 quoted in SirJennings, Ivor, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan (Greenwood Press, 1957) 86.Google Scholar

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122 Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) s 24B.

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124 Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) s 8A.

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131 Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales, above n 33, 659.

132 Hasluck J's reference to ‘substantive constitutional reality’ in Glew v Governor of Western Australia (2009) 222 FLR 417 was in the context of changes in legislation's terminology from ‘Queen’ and ‘Governor’ to ‘State of Western Australia'. Similarly, Queensland's Crown Solicitor advised the Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee, regarding a provision similar to s 73(2) in the Constitution Act 1867 (Qld), that for an Act to ‘affect’ any of the entrenched sections it would have to change its meaning in some way. Accordingly, substituting the word ‘State’ for ‘colony’ would not affect the entrenched sections: Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee, Parliament of Queensland, Consolidation of the Queensland Constitution: Final Report (1999) 12.

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135 Ibid.

136 Constitution Act 1889 (WA) ss 50(2), 73(2)(a), (e); Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) ss 11A(2), 53.

137 Sharples v Arnison [2002] 2 Qd R 444, 454 (McPherson JA).

138 Sharples v Arnison (2001) 160 FLR 194, 207 (Ambrose J).

139 Sharples v Arnison (2001) 160 FLR 194, 206 (Ambrose J); Sharples v Arnison [2002] 2 Qd R 444, 454 (McPherson JA).

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141 Constitution Act 1867 (Imp) 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(1); Constitution Act 1982, s 45.

142 [1987] 2 SCR 2, 46. See also Forsey, ‘Extension of the Life of Legislatures', above n 109, 609.

143 Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424, 494 (Kirby J); Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199, 281–2 (Kirby J). See Commonwealth Constitution, ss 12, 15, 21, 84, 110.

144 (1913) 16 CLR 404, 458 (emphasis added). See also McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 292 (Gummow J).

145 Spigelman, Chief Justice, ‘Public Law and the Executive’ (2010) 34 Australian Bar Review 10, 22.Google Scholar

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147 (2001) 207 CLR 391, 460.

148 Clayton v Heffron [1961] SR (NSW) 768, 830 (Herron J).

149 Commonwealth Aluminium Company v A-G (Qld) [1976] Qd R 231, 248 (Hoare J). See also Taylor, The Constitution of Victoria, above n 10, 493.

150 Professor Twomey suggests that laws respecting the Governor are unrelated to Parliament: Twomey, Anne, ‘Manner and Form Limitations on the Power to Amend State Constitutions’ (2004) 15 Public Law Review 182, 184.Google Scholar

151 Westco Lagan Ltd v A-G (NZ) [2001] 1 NZLR 40, 69 (McGechan J).

152 Australia Acts 1986 (Cth) & (UK) ss 3(2), 5(b), 6, 8, 16(2).

153 Cf R (Jackson) v A-G [2006] 1 AC 261, 296.

154 Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, ‘Manner and Form in the Australian States’ (1987) 16 Melbourne University Law Review 403, 412.Google Scholar See also Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986, above n 14, 244.

155 Cf A-G (NSW) v Rennie [1896] AC 376, 379: ‘according to the ordinary use of the term “Legislative Assembly” it means the Assembly created by the Constitution Act'.

156 A State Parliament's ability to alter the definition of ‘Parliament’ in the Constitution Act may be limited by the existence of a valid and binding manner and form provision entrenching the definition provision. See, eg, Constitution Act 1889 (WA) ss 2(2), 73(2)(e); Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) ss 2A, 53.

157 Goldsworthy, above n 154, 413.

158 Ibid; See also Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986, above n 14, 243. Similar suggestions existed regarding the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp): Taylor v A-G (Qld) (1917) 23 CLR 457, 468 (Barton J), 474 (Isaacs J), 477 (Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ), 481 (Powers J). Conversely, O'Brien opined that the Australia Acts abolished a constitutional guarantee of a minimum requirement of democratic government at the State level by repealing the Colonial Laws Validity Act and its reference to a ‘representative legislature': O'Brien, Bernard, ‘The Australia Acts’ in Ellinghaus, MP, Bradbrook, AJ and Duggan, AJ (eds), The Emergence of Australian Law (Butterworths, 1989) 337, 350.Google Scholar

159 See Craven, Gregory, ‘A Few Fragments of State Constitutional Law’ (1990) 20 University of Western Australia Law Review 353, 364Google Scholar; Gageler, Stephen and Leeming, Mark, ‘An Australian Republic: Is a Referendum Enough?’ (1996) 7 Public Law Review 143, 153.Google Scholar CfWinterton, George, ‘An Australian Republic’ (1988) 16 Melbourne University Law Review 467, 479.Google Scholar

160 Re Scully (1937) 32 Tas LR 3, 37 (Clark J); Eastgate v Rozzoli (1990) 20 NSWLR 188, 193 (Kirby P).

161 Constitution Act 1934 (SA) s 4. See Gilbertson v South Australia (1976) 15 SASR 66, 114 (Zelling J); West Lakes Ltd v South Australia (1980) 25 SASR 389, 415 (Zelling J); Campbell, Enid, ‘Royal Assent to Bills’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 9, 10Google Scholar; Lindell, Geoffrey, ‘Royal Assent to South Australian Legislation’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 137, 137–9Google Scholar; Anne Twomey, ‘The Refusal or Deferral of Royal Assent’ [2006] Public Law 580, 586.

162 Carney, Gerard, ‘Republicanism and State Constitutions’ in Stephenson, MA and Turner, Clive (eds), Republic or Monarchy?: Legal and Constitutional Issues (University of Queensland Press, 1994) 183, 199Google Scholar; Williams, George, ‘The Australian States and an Australian Republic’ (1996) 70 Australian Law Journal 890, 895–6Google Scholar; Twomey, Anne, ‘State Constitutions in an Australian Republic’ (1997) 23(2) Monash University Law Review 312, 313–4Google Scholar; Fetter, Joel, ‘Unilateral State Republicanism: Can Victoria Independently Sever Its Link with the Crown?’ (2000) 4 Macarthur Law Review 87, 92–3Google Scholar; Twomey, Anne, ‘One In, All In — The Simultaneous Implementation of a Republic at Commonwealth and State Levels’ in Murray, Sarah (ed), Constitutional Perspectives on an Australian Republic (Federation Press, 2010) 20, 22–3.Google Scholar CfWinterton, George, ‘The States and a Republic: A Constitutional Accord?’ (1995) 6 Public Law Review 107, 121.Google Scholar

163 Selway, The Constitution of South Australia, above n 125, 46.

164 Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp), s 1; Re Scully (1937) 32 Tas LR 3, 37–8 (Clark J).

165 See, eg, Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211, 232–3 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); A-G (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545, 572 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ).

166 Re Scully (1937) 32 Tas LR 3, 33 (Clark J); Taylor, The Constitution of Victoria, above n 10, 199. See also Todd, Alpheus, Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies (Longmans, Green & Co, 1880) 460–4.Google Scholar

167 Hearn, William, The Government of England: Its Structure and Its Development (Longmans, Green & Co, 2nd ed, 1886) 134.Google Scholar

168 Taylor v A-G (Qld) (1917) 23 CLR 457, 473 (Isaacs J). See also Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales, above n 33, 164.

169 (1917) 23 CLR 457, 473 (Isaacs J), 481 (Powers J agreeing).

170 Lumb, RD, ‘Fundamental Law and Constitutional Change’ (1978) 9 Federal Law Review 148, 173.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

171 (1917) 23 CLR 457, 474 (Isaacs J).

172 A-G (NSW) v Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 394, 432 (Dixon J); Moore, W Harrison, ‘The Powers of Colonial Legislatures’ (1922) 4 Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law 11, 21–2.Google Scholar

173 Taylor v A-G (Qld) (1917) 23 CLR 457, 474 (Isaacs J); Re Scully (1937) 32 Tas LR 3, 40 (Clark J); Clayton v Heffron (1960) 105 CLR 214, 251 (Dixon CJ, McTiernan, Taylor and Windeyer JJ).

174 (1937) 32 Tas LR 3, 40, 43 (Clark J).

175 Ibid, 38, 43. See Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp) s 1.

176 See Peter Johnston and Stanley Hotop, ‘Patches on an Old Garment or New Wineskins for New Wine (Constitutional Reform in Western Australia - Evolution or Revolution?) (1990) 20 University of Western Australia Law Review 428, 437: ‘Lord Knutsford commented on the removal of the word “Parliament” from the draft Bill, adding that “it is not strictly accurate to describe [the two Houses], without the Queen, as constituting the Parliament of the Colony“'.

177 See for an affirmative answer: Carney, Gerard, ‘An Overview of Manner and Form in Australia’ (1989) 5 Queensland University of Technology Law Journal 69, 78.Google Scholar But see Twomey, ‘The Entrenchment of the Queen and Governor in the Queensland Constitution', above n 69, 209: ‘[It is arguable that] it is the Queen who is the constituent part of Parliament. A law that alters the office of her representative … would not appear to amount to a law respecting the constitution, powers or procedure of the Parliament'. See also Wilsmore v Western Australia [1981] WAR 159, 171 (Smith J).

178 (1937) 32 Tas LR 3, 38.

179 Constitution Act 1934 (Tas) s 10.

180 Re Scully (1937) 32 Tas LR 3, 38. See also Re Initiative & Referendum Act [1919] AC 935, 943.

181 Australia Acts 1986 (Cth) & (UK) s 9. But see Twomey, The Australia Acts 1986, above n 14, 294 (discussing the possibility of Her Majesty assenting to a Bill, whilst present in a state, which the Governor has reserved for assent pursuant to s 7(2) of the Australia Acts).

182 A-G (NSW) v Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 394, 429 (Dixon J); Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Ltd v A-G (Qld) [1976] Qd R 231, 237 (Wanstall SPJ), 260 (Dunn J); West Lakes Ltd v South Australia (1980) SASR 389, 420 (Matheson J).

183 Twomey, Anne, ‘Keeping the Queen in Queensland — How Effective is the Entrenchment of the Queen and Governor in the Queensland Constitution?’ (2009) 28 University of Queensland Law Journal 81, 95.Google Scholar

184 Taylor, The Constitution of Victoria, above n 10, 475.

185 See above n 160-1 and accompanying text. See also Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No 1) (1985) 159 CLR 351, 455 (Dawson J); Lindell, Geoffrey, ‘Assent or Refusal to Assent to Legislation — On Whose Advice?’ (2009) 11(3) Constitutional Law and Policy Review 126, 130.Google Scholar

186 Cormack v Cope (1974) 131 CLR 432, 454 (Barwick CJ); Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 226 (Heydon J). See also Marquet, ‘The Law and Custom of the Parliament of Western Australia', above n 25, 351.

187 This is the position in the United Kingdom: Simpson v A-G (NZ) [1955] NZLR 271, 282 (Stanton and Hutchison JJ); Western Australia v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 201, 238 (Gibbs J), 254 (Stephen J); A-G (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545, 575 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 583–4 (Kirby J), 637 (Callinan J). See also West Lakes Ltd v South Australia (1980) 25 SASR 389, 415 (Zelling J).

188 A-G (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545, 574–6 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ), 583–6 (Kirby J), 637–8 (Callinan J).

189 Purushothaman v State of Kerala [1962] AIR 694, 759: ‘what is said about the result of prorogation is a fortiori true about the result of dissolution'. See also Simpson v A-G (NZ) [1955] NZLR 271, 283 (Stanton and Hutchison JJ).

190 Cf Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) s 22F; Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales, above n 33, 280.

191 (1980) 25 SASR 389, 417.

192 (1931) 44 CLR 394, 430.

193 Lumb, RD, ‘Manner and Form in the Australian Constitutional System Post Australia Acts’ (1991) 12 Queensland Lawyer 177, 181Google Scholar; Selway, The Constitution of South Australia, above n 125, 65–6; Evans, Carolyn, ‘Entrenching Constitutional Reform in Victoria’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 133, 135.Google Scholar

194 (2002) 26 WAR 201, 263 (Steytler and Parker JJ) citing Selway, The Constitution of South Australia, above n 125, 65–6.

195 (2003) 217 CLR 545, 572 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). See also A-G (NSW) v Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 394, 429 (Dixon J).

196 (2003) 217 CLR 545, 573 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ).

197 A-G (Cth) ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1, 57 (Stephen J).

198 (1996) 186 CLR 140, 169 (Brennan CJ), 182–3 (Dawson J), 245 (McHugh J), 269–70 (Gummow J). See also Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567 (per curiam).

199 (1996) 186 CLR 140, 269–70 (Gummow J).

200 MacLean, Iain, ‘Forms of Representation and Systems of Voting', in Held, David (ed), Political Theory Today (Polity Press, 1991) 172, 173–4.Google Scholar

201 Ibid.

202 McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 249–50 (McHugh J). See also Pendal, Phillip, Black, David and Phillips, Harry, Parliament: Mirror of the People? (Parliament of Western Australia, 2007) 71, 149.Google Scholar

203 Taylor, Greg, ‘Two Refusals of Royal Assent in Victoria’ (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 85, 127.Google Scholar See also Taylor, The Constitution of Victoria, above n 10, 493.

204 (2003) 217 CLR 545, 573 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ) referring to Clydesdale v Hughes (1934) 51 CLR 518, 528.

205 See McDonald v Cain [1953] VLR 411, 441, 444 (O'Brien J); Wilsmore v Western Australia [1981] WAR 159, 163–4 (Wickham J), 177 (Smith J); Western Australia v Wilsmore (1982) 149 CLR 79, 83 (Gibbs CJ), 85 (Mason J), 102 (Wilson J).

206 (2003) 217 CLR 545, 573 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ) citing Western Australia v Wilsmore (1982) 149 CLR 79, 102.

207 Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales, above n 33, 279, 342; Twomey, ‘Manner and Form Limitations on the Power to Amend State Constitutions’ above n 150, 185; Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and Territories, above n 46, 169.

208 Congdon, Peter, ‘The History, Scope and Prospects of Section 73 of the Constitution Act 1889 (WA)’ (2013) 36(2) University of Western Australia Law Review 83, 106-11.Google Scholar

209 Wilsmore v Western Australia (Unreported, Supreme Court of Western Australia, Brinsden J, 15 February 1980) 23. See also Anonymous, , ‘Review of Legislation’ (1957) 4 University of Western Australia Annual Law Review 452, 455–6Google Scholar; Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales, above n 33, 330; Taylor, The Constitution of Victoria, above n 10, 473, 475.

210 Kenny v Chapman (1861) W & W 93, 100 (Stawell CJ).

211 See Marquet, Clerk of the Parliaments (WA) v A-G (WA) (2002) 26 WAR 201, 221 (Malcolm CJ), 262 (Steytler and Parker JJ).

212 Taylor, ‘Two Refusals of Royal Assent in Victoria', above n 203, 124.

213 (1861) W&W 93, 103.

214 Regarding the Legislative Assembly Continuation Act 1916 (NSW), see Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales, above n 33, 280. Regarding An Act to Shorten the Duration of the Legislative Assembly 1859 (Vic), see Kenny v Chapman (1861) W & W 93, 101 (Stawell CJ); Taylor, ‘Two Refusals of Royal Assent in Victoria', above n 203, 120–30.

215 (2003) 217 CLR 545, 562 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). On the other hand, their Honours considered it ‘necessary to give due weight to the learning that evolved about the operation of the Colonial Laws Validity Act': (2003) 217 CLR 545, 572.

216 Kenny v Chapman (1861) W&W 93, 101 (Stawell CJ).

217 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 557 (per curiam). See also McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, 271 (Gummow J); Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 186 (Gummow, Kirby and Crennan JJ).

218 Commonwealth Constitution, s 5 relevantly provides that: ‘The Governor-General may … from time to time, by Proclamation or otherwise … dissolve the House of Representatives'. In Lange, section 5 was not listed amongst the sections of the Constitution giving effect to representative government: (1997) 189 CLR 520, 558.

219 See Lindell, Geoffrey, ‘Fixed Term Parliaments: The Proposed Demise of the Early Federal Election’ (1981) 53(1) Australian Quarterly 15, 24CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ratnapala, Suri, Australian Constitutional Law: Foundations and Theory (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2007) 44–5.Google Scholar

220 See Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162, 225–6 (Heydon J).

221 Kenny v Chapman (1861) W & W 93, 101.

222 Forsey, The Royal Power of Dissolution of Parliament in the British Commonwealth, above n 11, 41.

223 Stone, Bruce, ‘Constitutional Design, Accountability and Western Australian Government: Thinking with and against the “WA Inc” Royal Commission’ (1994) 24 University of Western Australia Law Review 51, 63.Google Scholar

224 Mezey, Michael, ‘Classifying Legislatures’ in Norton, Philip (ed), Legislatures (Oxford University Press, 1990) 149, 153.Google Scholar

225 Lijphart, Arend, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (Oxford University Press, 1992) 13.Google Scholar

226 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 14 April 2011, 3062 (Norman Moore, Minister for Electoral Affairs).

227 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 14 April 2011, 3065.

228 Western Australia v Wilsmore (1982) 149 CLR 79, 83–4 (Gibbs CJ), 91–2 (Aickin J), 102 (Wilson J). Cf A-G (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545, 562–4, 566 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ); Johnston, Peter, ‘Attorney General (WA) v Marquet: Ramifications for the Western Australian Parliament’ (2005) 20(1) Australasian Parliamentary Review 117, 122.Google Scholar

229 Electoral Act 1907 (WA) s 64(1), as amended by Electoral and Constitution Amendment Act 2011 (WA) s 5.

230 Electoral Act 1907 (WA) s 4, as amended by Electoral and Constitution Amendment Act 2011 (WA) s 4.

231 Constitution Acts Amendment Act 1899 (WA) s 21(1).

232 Electoral Act 1907 (WA) s 64(1), as amended by Electoral and Constitution Amendment Act 2011 (WA) s 5.

233 Burt, above n 15, 5. Winterton suggested s 74 of the WA Constitution Act confers a legal power on the Governor to dismiss ministers ‘at pleasure’ when read in the context of Australian constitutionalism and the common law: Winterton, ‘The Constitutional Position of Australian State Governors', above n 1, 286.

234 See A-G (Ontario) v OPSEU [1987] 2 SCR 2, 46; Sharples v Arnison (2001) 160 FLR 194, 206 (Ambrose J).

235 (2002) 26 WAR 201, 281.

236 Ibid.

237 Johnston, Peter, ‘Method or Madness: Constitutional Perturbations and Marquet's Case’ (2004) 7(2) Constitutional Law and Policy Review 25, 33.Google Scholar

238 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 14 November 1991, 6730–1.

239 Ibid.

240 Ibid.

241 Denis O'Brien, above n 10, 73; Richardson, JE, ‘The Executive Power of the Commonwealth’ in Zines, Leslie (ed), Commentaries on the Australian Constitution (Butterworths, 1977) 50, 52 n 4.Google Scholar Richardson argues that at the Commonwealth level, if the Governor-General forcibly dissolved the House of Representatives under s 5 of the Commonwealth Constitution, the Governor-General could legally issue electoral writs without advice notwithstanding s 32 of the Commonwealth Constitution vesting the power to issue writs in the Governor-General in Council.

242 It has been suggested the requirement to issue electoral writs on 11 November 1975 in order to have an election prior to Christmas affected the timing of Sir John Kerr's dismissal of Prime Minister Whitlam and the forced double dissolution in 1975: Whitlam, above n 120, 139. But see Kerr, above n 87, 357–8.

243 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 22 March 1978, 308 (Sir Charles Court, Premier).

244 Legal, Constitutional and Administrative Review Committee, Parliament of Queensland, Consolidation of the Queensland Constitution: Final Report (1999) 12.

245 Constitution Act 1889 (WA) ss 4, 73(2)(e).

246 Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 354 (Brennan CJ and McHugh J); A-G (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545, 568 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ).

247 McCawley v The King [1920] AC 691, 704.

248 [1955] NZLR 271, 275 (Barrowclough CJ), 281 (Stanton and Hutchison JJ agreeing). The High Court of Australia has criticised this distinction: Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, 374 (Brennan CJ), 390 (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ).

249 Cf Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales, above n 33, 338; Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) s 11A; Parliamentary Electorates and Election Act 1912 (NSW) s 68.

250 Wilsmore v Western Australia [1981] WAR 159, 171.

251 Sharples v Arnison (2001) 160 FLR 194, 206 (Ambrose J); Sharples v Arnison [2002] 2 Qd R 444, 454 (McPherson JA).

252 Sharples v Arnison (2001) 160 FLR 194, 206 (Ambrose J); Sharples v Arnison [2002] 2 Qd R 444, 454 (McPherson JA); A-G (Ontario) v OPSEU [1987] 2 SCR 2, 46.

253 Sharples v Arnison (2001) 160 FLR 194, 206 (Ambrose J).

254 A-G (Cth) ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1, 50 (Gibbs J); Orr, Graeme, ‘The Voting Rights Ratchet: Rowe v Electoral Commissioner’ (2011) 22 Public Law Review 83, 84.Google Scholar

255 Bernard O'Brien, above n 158, 348–9. See also R v Governor of South Australia (1907) 4 CLR 1497, 1511.

256 R v Governor of South Australia (1907) 4 CLR 1497, 1511.

257 Vardon v O'Loghlin (1907) 5 CLR 201, 209 (Griffith CJ).

258 In Wilsmore v Western Australia, Smith J held that ss 12 and 46 of the WA Constitution Act ‘provi[de] for the establishment of the bicameral parliament': [1981] WAR 159, 171.

259 Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales, above n 33, 302, 311, 339. See also Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and Territories, above n 46, 196.

260 A-G (NSW) v Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 394, 429 (Dixon J); Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and Territories, above n 46, 165.

261 See A-G (NSW) v Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 394, 430 (Dixon J).

262 Ualesi v Ministry of Transport [1980] 1 NZLR 575, 579 (Quilliam J). See also Johnston, Peter, ‘The Legal Personality of the Western Australian Parliament’ (1990) 20 University of Western Australia Law Review 323, 331.Google Scholar Governors may be able to assent to bills that have passed through both houses, following the Assembly's dissolution: see above n 187–9 and accompanying text.

263 If the EACAA was not validly enacted, the EACAA amendments to s 64 of the Electoral Act would be of no effect. Section 64(1) of the Electoral Act would continue operating, unaffected by the EACAA amendments.

264 A-G (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545, 574 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ).

265 See Western Australia v Wilsmore [1981] WAR 179, 184 (Burt CJ). See also Boath v Wyvill (1989) 85 ALR 621, 636. Regarding Bribery Commissioner v Ranasinghe [1965] AC 172, 197, see Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 81, 164 (Gibbs J).

266 A-G (WA) v Marquet (2003) 217 CLR 545, 572 (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). For articulation of this argument, see Commonwealth Aluminium Company v A-G (Qld) [1976] Qd R 231, 248 (Hoare J dissenting); Smith v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 338, 352–3 (Deane J).

267 Twomey, The Constitution of New South Wales, above n 33, 281–2.