¹ Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates Vol 8, 10967 (1902); quoted in Bennett, Keystone of the Federal Arch (1980) iii.

² Official Report of the National Australasian Convention Debates, Adelaide, March 22 - May 5, 1897 (1897) 169.

³ Menzies, , Central Power in the Australian Commonwealth: An Examination of the Growth of Commonwealth Power in the Austraian Federation (1967) 2-3Google Scholar.

⁴ Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (10th ed 1960) 175. References to Dicey's use of the term “legalism” are legion in writings on Australian Constitutional Law. Eg Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (2nd ed 1987) ix; Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia (4th ed 1970) 3; Else-Mitchell (ed), Essays on the Australian Constitution (2nd ed 1961) xxix; Bailey, “The Working of the Australian Constitution Since Federation” in Portus (ed), Studies in the Australian Constitution (1933) Ch II; Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law (2nd ed 1905) 5; Clark, “The Supremacy of the Judiciary under the Constitution of the United States, and under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia” (1903) 17 Harv L Rev I. The other part of Dicey's definition of “legalism”, “the prevalence of a spirit of legality among the people”, has always been of doubtful applicability to Australia. The Constitutional Commission has commented that the “level of awareness of our Constitution among Australians has been abysmally low”: Constitutional Commission Media Release December 31 1987.

⁵ See Galligan, Politics of the High Court (1987); Galligan, “The 'Dams' Case: A Political Analysis” in Sornarajah (ed), The South West Dam Dispute: the Legal and Political Issues (1983) !02; Galligan, “Legitimating Judicial Review: The Politics of Legalism” (1981) 8 Journal of Australian Studies 33.

⁶ Eg Constitution, s SJ (xx) (corporations power); Actors & Announcers Equity v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169; Fencott v Muller (1983) 142 CLR 570; Commonwealth v Tasmania (the Tasmanian Dam case) (1983) 158 CLR 1; Richardson v The Forestry Commission (1988) 77 ALR 237; Constitution. s 51 (xxix) (external affairs power); Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168; the Tasmanian Dam case. Constitutions 51 (xxxv) (conciliation and arbitration power); Reg v Coldham: ex parte Australian Social Welfare Union (1983) 153 CLR 297; Reg v Ludeke; ex parte Queensland Electricity Commission (1985) 159 CLR 178; Re Lee; ex parte Harper (1986) 160 CLR 430. The cases on s SJ (xxi) (marriage power) and (xxii) (divorce and matrimonial causes power) constitute an exception to this trend: In the Marriage of Cormick (1984) 156 CLR 170; Reg v Cook; ex parte C (1985) 156 CLR 249; Re F; ex parte F (1986) 161 CLR 438.

⁷ Constitution s 92: “On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the states ... shall be absolutely free.” See especially, David Miller v TCN Channel Nine (1986) 161 CLR 556, 570-571, 617-618. See now Cole v Whitfield (1988) 78 ALR 42, decided after the preparation of the text of this article.

⁸ The pioneering work was Partridge, “The Politics of Federalism” in Sawer (ed), Federalism: An Australian Jubilee Study (1952) 174. See now: Scott, “Australian Federalism Renewed” in Patience and Scott (eds), Australian Federalism: Future Tense (1983) 1-1 1; Sharman, “The Australian Senate as a States House” in Jaensch (ed) The Politics of “New Federalism” (1977) 64-75; Holmes and Sharman, The Australian Federal System (1977); Holmes “The Australian Federal Process” in Mayer and Nelson (eds), Australian Politics: A Fourth Reader (1976) 327-346. In a speech at the dinner to mark the publication of Volume 14 Nos 3 and 4 of the Federal Law Review in Canberra on April 24 1985, the Secretary of the Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department, Mr Pat Brazil, said: “I believe that the 'federal balance' under the Australian Constitution will continue to be, as it has always been, heavily dependent upon the political processes and forces within Australia at the relevant time.”•

⁹ See generally: Head, “The Political Crisis of Australian Federalism” in Patience and Scott (eds), supra n 8, 75-79, 81-82. Maddox, , “The Federal Environment of Australian Politics” in Hanley and Cooper (eds) Man and the Austraian Environment (1982) 295-301Google Scholar. For the survey of the literature on arguments for and against the maintenance of the federal system in Australia, see McMillan, Evans and Storey (eds), Australia's Constitution: Time for Change? (1983) 138-140.

¹⁰ Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (the Engineers'case) (1920) 28 CLR 129.

¹¹ Saunders, Howard, “The Blocking of the Budget and Dismissal of the Government” in Evans (ed) Labor and the Constitution 1972-1975 (1977) 251-287Google Scholar. The authors state:

The fundamental cause of the constitutional troubles which came upon Australia in 1975 lies in the self-contradictory character of our machinery of government. The framers of the Australian Constitution wished both to create a federal structure and to preserve parliamentary government of the British kind. These two aims were, and are, incompatible.

See also Thompson, “The 'Washminster' Mutation” in Weller and Jaensch (eds), Responsible Government in Australia (1980) 32-40; Mallory, “Politics by Other Means: the Courts and the Westminster Model in Australia” (1979) 17 The Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics

3.On a more general level see Moffat, “Philosophical Foundations of the Australian Constitutional Tradition” (1965-1967) 5 Syd UL Rev 59. Contrast Reg v Kirby: ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 275.

¹² See generally Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 (1969); Mcllwain, Constitutionalism and the Changing World (1939) 245-6.

¹³ Madison and Jay, Hamilton, The Federalist Papers (New American Library ed, 1961) 77-84CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ Ibid 77-78.

¹⁵ Ibid 78, 80.

¹⁶ See generally, Wood, supra n 12; Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the Ameican Revolution (1967); Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) Ch VI.

¹⁷ United States' Constitution, Preamble and Art VI.

¹⁸ Madison, Federalist No 1O, supra n 13, 81-82.

¹⁹ Ibid 82.

²⁰ Ibid 83-84.

²¹ Hamilton, Madison and Jay, supra n 13, 320-325.

²² Ibid 322.

²³ Id.

²⁴ Hofstadter, “The Founding Fathers: An Age of Realism” in Horwitz (ed), The Moral Foundations of the American Republic (2nd ed 1979) 62-74, 67. But compare recent scholarship attempting to emphasise the more deliberative aspects of the federalist scheme: Sunstein, “Interest Groups in American Public Law” (1985) 38 Stan L Rev 29; Michelman, “Foreword: Traces of Self-Govemment” (1986) 100 Harv L Rev 4.

²⁵ Hamilton, Madison and Jay, supra n 13, 323.

²⁶ Ibid 322.

²⁷ United States' Constitution, Art I, s 2.

²⁸ Ibid, Art I, s 3.

²⁹ Ibid, Art II.

³⁰ 1 Cranch 137 (1803).

³¹ Levy, , Judgments: Essays on American Constitutional History (1972) 26Google Scholar. See generally, Wood, supra n 12; Bailyn, supra n 16; Corwin, “The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law” (1928) 42 Harv L Rev 149, 365; Currie, “The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835” (1982) 49 Univ Chicago L Rev 646.

³² Hamilton, Madison and Jay, supra n 13, 464-472.

³³ Ibid 467.

³⁴ Ibid 465.

³⁵ Ibid 467.

³⁶ Quoted in Dixon, , Jesting Pilate (1965) 44CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁷ See generally, McMinn, A Constitutional History of Australia (1979) Ch V; La Nauze, The Making of the Australian Constitution (1972) Ch I; Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (2nd ed 1910) Ch II.

³⁸ Bryce, The American Commonwealth (1888). According to La Nauze, supra n 37, 18-19, 273, Bryce's book lay “on the Table” throughout the proceedings of the 1897-1898 National Australasian Convention and had a profound influence on the delegates to both that convention and the 1891 Convention.

³⁹ Dixon, Supra n 36.

⁴⁰ Winterton, Parliament. The Executive and the Govenor-General (1983) 2:

Essentially . . . while the core of the British principle of responsible government is clear, the edges are fuzzy and ill-defined. Clearly, ... when the (executive] government loses a vote of confidence in the House of Commons it must advise a general election or resign. But as one moves from that core ... the position becomes steadily less clear.

See also Parker, “Responsible Government in Australia” in Weller and Jaensch (eds) supra n 11, 11- 22; Archer, “The Theory of Responsible Government in Britain and Australia” in Weller and Jaensch (eds), supra n II, 23-31; Birch, Representative and Responsible Government (1964) Ch I.

⁴¹ Lucas (ed), Lord Durham's Report on the Affairs of British North America (1912). See also, Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions (2nd ed 1927) Vol 1, 11-14.

⁴² Ibid Vol II 79, 84.

⁴³ Cf Birch, osupra n 40, 17-21.

⁴⁴ Lucas (ed), supra n 41, Vol II, 81.

⁴⁵ Ibid 82.

⁴⁶ Ibid 277.

⁴⁷ Ibid 276-277.

⁴⁸ McMinn, supra n 37, Chs III and IV; Melbourne, “The Establishment of Responsible Government” in Rose, Newton and Benians (eds), The Cambridge History of the British Empire (1933) Vol VII, Pt I, Ch X.

⁴⁹ Bagehot, , The English Constitution (1964) 65Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Dicey, supra n 4, Ch I.

⁵¹ Ibid73. See generally, Birch, supra n 40, 72-78. Cf MacKinnon, The Crown in Canada (1976) Ch 1.

⁵² Mcllwain, Constitutionalism Ancient and Modern (revised ed 1947) 21. Cf James (ed), The Constitutional Challenge: Essays on the Australian Constitution, Constitutionalism and Parliamentary Practice (1982) 3.

⁵³ See generally: Zines, “The Growth of Australian Nationhood and its Effect on the Powers of the Commonwealth” in Zines (ed), Commentaries on the Australian Constitution (1977) Ch I, 1-15.

⁵⁴ McMinn, supra n 37, Ch IV. This is not to deny the existence of significant local variations: See Finn, Law and Government in Colonial Australia (1987).

⁵⁵ Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (UK), ss 2,3. See generally, Campbell, “Colonial Legislation and the Laws of England” (1964-1967) 2 Tas UL Rev 148.

⁵⁶ Reg v Burah (1878) 3 AC 889; Hodge v The Queen (1883) 9 AC 117; Powell v Apollo Candle Company (1885) 10 AC 282.

⁵⁷ Macleod v Attorney-Genera/for New South Wales [1891] AC 455. It had been earlier held in the Supreme Court of Victoria that even a plainly unconstitutional law should be administered by local courts: Reg v Call; ex parte Murphy (1881) 7 VLR 113. See also Salmond, “The Limitations of Colonial Legislative Power” (1917) 33 LQR 117.

⁵⁸ Allin, , The Early Federation Movement in Australia (1907); cf Mcllwain, The High Court of Parliament and its Supremacy (1910) 390-392Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Official Report, supra n 2, 17.

⁶⁰ Id.

⁶¹ Garran, “The Federation Movement and the Founding of the Commonwealth” in Rose, Newton and Benians (eds) supra n 48, Ch XV, 455.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Wise, The Commonwealth of Australia (1909) 51. See also Pearson, , National Life and Character (2nd ed 1894) 18-19Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Oblique reference is also made in s 44 and possibly s 62.

⁶⁵ Garran, The Coming Commonwealth (1897).

⁶⁶ Ibid 149. See also Garran, “The Development of the Australian Constitution” (1924) 40 LQR 202, 217.

⁶⁷ Convention Debates, Adelaide (1897) 913.

⁶⁸ See generally, McMinn, supra n 37; La Nauze, supra n 37, Ch IX; Galligan, “The Founders' Design and Intentions Regarding Responsible Government” in Weller and Jaensch (eds) supra n 11, 1-10.

⁶⁹ Garran, supra n 61, 343.

⁷⁰ Eg, Official Report, supra n 2, 28. See generally: La Nauze, supra n 37, 41-42, Ch IX; Galligan, supra n 68, 4.

⁷¹ Australian Constitution, s 53.

⁷² Australian Constitution, s 57.

⁷³ Cf Ackerman, , “The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution” (1984) 93 Yale LJ 1013CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁴ La Nauze, supra n 37. 35.

⁷⁵ Ibid 130-131; see generally Thomson, “Constitutional Authority for Judicial Review: A Contribution from the Framers of the Australian Constitution” in Craven (ed).The Convention Debates 1891-1898: Commentaries Indices and Guide (1986) 173-202.

⁷⁶ Lindell, “Why is Australia's Constitution Binding?-The Reasons in 1900 and Now, and the Effect of Independence” (1986) 16 FL Rev 29, 30--33.

⁷⁷ Sawer, “The Record of Judicial Review” in Sawer (ed) supra n 8, 211; Galligan, “Judicial Review in the Australian Federal System: Its Origin and Function” (1979) 10 FLRev 367.

⁷⁸ There is, moreover, evidence that the provisions of the Australian Constitution dealing with the control of inland waters were cast in deliberately broad language in the expectation that their detailed appliction would be worked out in the Courts: Galligan, supra n 74, 388-392.

⁷⁹ I Cranch 137 (1803).

⁸⁰ Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR I, 262-263; Victoria v Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338, 379.

⁸¹ Bryce, supra n 38, 323.

⁸² Record of the Debates of the Australian Federal Convention, 20 January • 17 March, 1898 (1898) 283.

⁸³ La Nauze, supra n 37, 286--287.

⁸⁴ Id.

⁸⁵ See generally, Crisp, Australian National Government (1983) Ch 2. Cf Machiavelli, The Prince (Penguin ed 1961) 51: “... there is nothing more difficult to handle, more doubtful of success, and more dangerous to carry through than initiating changes in a state's constitution.”

⁸⁶ Dixon, “Address upon taking the oath of office in Sydney as Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia on 21st April, 1952”, reprinted in Dixon, supra n 36, 245-249, 247. Cf United States v Butler, 297 US I, 62-63 (1936).

⁸⁷ Eg, Attorney-General (Cth); ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR l, 17; Barwick, Book Review (1981) 4 UNSW LJ 131, 134; Barwick, “Foreword” in Bennett, supra n l, vi-vii.

⁸⁸ Dicey, supra n 4, 175. See also Reg v Kirby; exparte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 267-268: “The conception of independent governments existing in the one area and exercising powers in different fields of action carefully defined by law could not be carried into practical effect unless the ultimate responsibility of deciding upon the limits of the respective powers of the governments were placed in the federal judicature.”

⁸⁹ Supra text at nn 30-35, 77.

⁹⁰ See generally, Zines, supra n 4, 341-348; Cooray, , Conventions, The Australian Constitution and the Future (1979) 1-10Google Scholar.

⁹¹ Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth (the State Banking case) (1947) 74 CLR 31, 82.

⁹² Amalgamated Society of Engineers' v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (the Engineers' case) (1920) 28 CLR 129.

⁹³ See especially, McCulloch v Maryland 4 Wheat 316 (1819) as interpreted in Collector v Day 11 Wall 113 (1870); United States v EC Knight Co 156 US 1 (1895).

⁹⁴ See generally, Zines, supra n 4, 1-7.

⁹⁵ Eg D'Emden v Pedder (1904) I CLR 91; Deakin v Webb (1904) I CLR 585; Federated Amalgamated Government Railway and Tramway Service Association v New South Wales Railway Traffic Employees Association (the Railway Servants' case) (1906) 4 CLR 488.

⁹⁶ Eg Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Brewery Employees Union of New South Wales (the Union Label case) (1908) 6 CLR 469.

⁹⁷ Eg Attorney-General (New South Wales) v Collector of Customs (the Steel Rails case) (1908) 5 CLR 818.

⁹⁸ Supra n 10.

⁹⁹ Ibid 142.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid 145.

¹⁰¹ Ibid 142.

¹⁰² Ibid 151.

¹⁰³ Id.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid 154.

¹⁰⁵ Id.

¹⁰⁶ Eg Zines, supra n 4, Ch 2.

¹⁰⁷ Eg Reg v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; ex parte Association of Professional Engineers ( 1959) 107 CLR 208, 267.

¹⁰⁸ The Jumbunna Coal Mine, No Liability v The Victorian Coal Miners' Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 367-368; Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 29, 81; Reg v Coldham; ex parte Australian Social Welfare Union, supra n 6, 581.

¹⁰⁹ R v Brislan; ex parte Williams (1935) 54 CLR 262.

¹¹⁰ Zines, supra n 4, 17-18.

¹¹¹ Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 1;Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Commonwealth (1966) 115 CLR 418.

¹¹² Eg Marcus Clarke & Co Ltd v The Commonwealth (1952) 87 CLR 177, 215-216; the Tasmanian Dam case, supra n 6, 545.

¹¹³ Eg, Airlines of New South Wales Pty Ltd v New South Wales [No 2] (1965) 113 CLR 54.

¹¹⁴ Eg, Herald & Weekly Times Ltd v Commonwealth, supra n 9, 437; the Tasmanian Dam case, supra n 6, 488.

¹¹⁵ Zines, , “The State of Constitutional Interpretation” (1984) 14 FL Rev 277Google Scholar. See also, Coper, , “The High Court and the World of Policy” (1984) 14 FL Rev 294Google Scholar.

¹¹⁶ See generally, Davis, The Federal Principle (1978). For a general discussion within the Canadian context see Monahan “At Doctrine's Twilight: The Structure of Canadian Federalism” (1984) 34 University of Toronto Law Journal 47.

¹¹⁷ Supra n I 15, 284.

¹¹⁸ Supra n 91. See Queensland Electricity Commission v Commonwealth of Australia (1985) 59 AUR 694.

¹¹⁹ State Banking case, Supra n 91, 83.

¹²⁰ Cohen, (ed), The Legal Conscience - Selected Papers of Felix S Cohen (1960), 25-26Google Scholar.

¹²¹ Amalgamated Society of Engineers' v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129.

¹²² Eg Zines supra n 4, 7-9; Cooray and Ratnapala, “The High Court and the Constitution - Literalism and Beyond” in Craven (ed), supra n 76, 210--211.

¹²³ Victoria v The Commonwealth (1971) 122 CLR 353, 396. See also, Queensland Electricity Commission v Commonwealth of Australia (1985) 61 ALR 1, 40; Zines, supra n 4, 15; Windeyer, , Some Aspects of Australian Constitutional Law (1972) 36-39Google Scholar.

¹²⁴ Sawer, , Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929 (1956) 329Google Scholar.

¹²⁵ Deakin v Webb (1904) I CLR 585, 592-600.

¹²⁶ See generally, Cowen, Isaac Isaacs (1967), Ch VII.

¹²⁷ Sawer, , Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967) 130Google Scholar.

¹²⁸ Zines, supra n 4, 10.

¹²⁹ The Engineers' case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 155.

¹³⁰ Moore, “The Constitution and its Working” in Rose, Newton and Benians (eds), supra n 48, Ch XVI.

¹³¹ Ibid 480-481 .

¹³² Ibid 482.

¹³³ Dixon, supra n 36, 11 117. At 171: “We are next exhorted by the judges to bear in mind two cardinal features of our political system, namely the unity of the Crown and the principle of responsible government, and these are said radically to distinguish it from the American Constitution. And so of course they do; but in no relevant aspect.”

¹³⁴ Latham, , “Interpretation of the Constitution” in Else-Mitchell (ed) Essays on the Australian Constitution (2nd ed 1961) Ch 1Google Scholar.

¹³⁵ Ibid 28-29.

¹³⁶ Sawer, , “State Statutes and the Commonwealth” (1962) 1 Tas UL Rev 580Google Scholar.

¹³⁷ Ibid 585.

¹³⁸ In a later work, Professor Sawer appears to have recanted:

... the reason given for disregarding U.S. decisions is irrelevant. Neither the existence of responsible government nor the supposed indivisibility of the Crown affect the basic similarity between the Australian and U.S. documents on the point which is relevant to the general argument - namely the distribution of powers between centre and states. There are plenty of reasons for disregarding U.S. decisions but Engineers' stated only bad ones.

Sawer, Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967) I98. The suggestions in Sawers' 1962 article (supra n 136) have been dismissed by a number of writers: eg Zines, supra n 4, 10-11; Sackville 'The Doctrine of Immunity of Instrumentalities in the United States and Australia: A Comparative Analysis” (1969) 7 Melb UL Rev 15, 41-42. Professor Cowen has quoted part of the passage set out in the text accompanying note 137 with the comment: “If Isaacs meant this when he spoke of responsible government, his point was quite comprehensible, but he would have done better to phrase it differently”. Cowen, supra n 126, 162.

¹³⁹ Supra text at nn 130-132.

¹⁴⁰ I am concerned here only with the principal constructive reasoning in the judgment. The critical aspects of the judgment are dealt with in Part 2. The more technical aspects of the judgment are not material to my discussion.

¹⁴¹ The Engineers' case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 142.

¹⁴² Ibid quoting Vacher & Sons Ltd v London Society of Compositors [1913] AC 107, I 18. In context, these words are much more a statement of judicial deference to legislative will than they are a statement of a strict or literal method of statutory construction. The words were uttered by Lord Macnaghten in the course of a speech in the House of Lords holding that a provision of the Trade Disputes Act 1906 (UK) withdrawing from the jurisdiction of any Court “an action against a trade union . . . in respect of any tortious act alleged to have been committed by or on behalf of the trade union” (s 4(1)) was general in its application and should not be limited to tortious acts committed in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. In the same paragraph of his speech, Lord Macnaghten said:

Some people may think the policy of the Act unwise and even dangerous to the community. Some may think it at variance with principles which have long been held sacred . . . that may be a matter for private judgment. . . . It is, I apprehend, as unwise as it is unprofitable to cavil at the policy of an Act of Parliament, or to pass a covert censure on the Legislature.

¹⁴³ Supra n 141, 142.

¹⁴⁴ The Engineers' case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 146-147.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid 147.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid 148-152.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid 149, quoting R v Burah (1878) 3 AC 889, 904-905.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid 150-151.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid 151.

¹⁵⁰ Id.

¹⁵¹ Ibid 151-152.

¹⁵² Ibid 153.

¹⁵³ Id.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid 154.

¹⁵⁵ Id.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid 142.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid 153.

¹⁵⁸ (1926) 37 CLR 393.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid413.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid 411.

¹⁶¹ Commonwealth v Colonial Combing and Weaving Co Ltd (the Wooltops case) ( 1922) 31 CLR 421.

¹⁶² Ibid 446.

¹⁶³ Id.

¹⁶⁴ (1920) 28 CLR 456.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ (1926) 38 CLR 153.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid 178.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid 180. This statement was specifically approved by the Privy Council: Shell Company of Australia Ltd v The Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1930) 44 CLR 530, 545. See also The Queen v Quinn; ex parte Consolidated Foods Corporation (1977) 138 CLR 1, 8.

¹⁶⁹ Id.

¹⁷⁰ Id.

¹⁷¹ Supra n 133.

¹⁷² Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro (1926) 38 CLR 153, 180.

¹⁷³ Sir Isaac Isaacs served as Chief Justice from March 31, 1930 to January 21, 1931.

¹⁷⁴ South Australia v Commonwealth (the First Uniform Tax case) (1942) 65 CLR 373.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid 429.

¹⁷⁶ Id. Sir Owen Dixon was absent from the bench at the time as ambassador to Washington. Although upholding the essentials of the scheme in Victoria v Commonwealth (the Second Uniform Tax case) (1957) 99 CLR 575, Sir Owen hinted that had the matter been before the Court afresh, he would have inclined to a narrower view of Commonwealth power: Ibid 609.

¹⁷⁷ Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR I; Actors and Announcers Equity Association of Australia v Fontana Films Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 169.

¹⁷⁸ Australian Constitution, s 80 (trial by jury) R v Federal Court of Bankruptcy; ex parte Lowenstein (1938) 59 CLR 556; Kingswell v R (1985) CLR 264, s 116 (freedom of religion) A-G (Vic) ex rel Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559.

¹⁷⁹ Attorney-General (Cth); ex re McKinlay v Commonwealth, (1975) 135 CLR 1, 23-24.

¹⁸⁰ Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 543; Davids Holdings Pty Ltd v Byrnes (1987) 71 ALR 251. It may further be consistent with the argument of Murphy J for the existence of a presumption of constitutionality; the Tasmanian Dam case (1983) 158 CLR I, 502-504. (See generally Burmester, “The Presumption of Constitutionality” (1983) 13 FL Rev 277) and the occasional suggestions by Brennan J that some issues of characterization should beregarded as “political questions” eg Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 137-139.

¹⁸¹ Eg North Eastern Dairy Co Ltd v Dairy Industry Authority of New South Wales (1975) I 34 CLR 559; Permewan Wright Consolidated Pty Ltd v Trewhitt (1979) 145 CLR I. See now Cole v Whitfield (1988) 78 ALR 42, decided after the preparation of the text of this article.

¹⁸² Corwin, The Commerce Power versus States' Rights (1936); Mccurdy, “Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government - Business Relations: Some Parameters of Laissez Faire Constitutionalism 1863-1897” in Friedman and Scheiber (eds) American Law and the Constitutional Order (1978), 246-265.

¹⁸³ Eg Freund, , “Umpiring the Federal System” (1954) 54 Columbia L Rev 561CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸⁴ 17 US 159 (1819). Unfortunately, McCulloch v Marylandhas received a very bad press in Australia because of its association with pre-Engineers' case doctrines; egHiggins, “McCulloch v Maryland in Australia” (1905) 18 Harv L Rev 559. However, the case as interpreted in Collector v Day, supra n 89, is very different from the case as now interpreted; eg Stone, Seidman, Sunstein and Tushnet, Constitutional Law (1986), 58-61.

¹⁸⁵ 9 Wheat 1 (1824).

¹⁸⁶ Supra n 30.

¹⁸⁷ McCulloch v Maryland 17 US 159 202-207 (1819); Gibbons v Ogden 9 Wheat 1 187-191 (1824).

¹⁸⁸ McCulloch v Maryland 17 US 159 198-199, 209-211 (1819).

¹⁸⁹ Ibid 209-211.

¹⁹⁰ 317 US 111 (1942).

¹⁹¹ United States' Constitution, Art 1, s 8.

¹⁹² 317 US 111 120 (1942).

¹⁹³ US 241 (1964).

¹⁹⁴ Ibid 258-259. See also Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association 452 US 264 (1981).

¹⁹⁵ Eg Philadelphia v New Jersey 437 US 617 (1978); Hunt v Washington Apple Advertising Commission 432 US 333 (1977).

¹⁹⁶ United States' Constitution, Art IV, s 2. Eg Supreme Court of New Hampshire v Piper 470 US 274 (1985).

¹⁹⁷ 470 us 274 (1985).

¹⁹⁸ (1893) 7 Harv L Rev 129.

¹⁹⁹ Quoted in Levy, (ed), Judicial Review and the Supreme Court (1967) 43Google Scholar.

²⁰⁰ Thayer, JB, “The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law “(1893) 7 Harv L Rev 129, 143-144Google Scholar.

²⁰¹ Ibid 144, 150.

²⁰² (1926) 38 CLR 153.

²⁰³ Ibid 180.

²⁰⁴ The Engineers' case (1920) 28 CLR 129, 154. Isaacs J appears to have been well aware of developments inthe United States and at times referred to those developments in support of his own views: egthe Engineers' case, 28 CLR 129, 146; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Munro (1926) 38 CLR 153, 180.

²⁰⁵ (1954) 54 Columbia L Rev 543.

²⁰⁶ Ibid 559.

²⁰⁷ 469 US 528 (1985).

²⁰⁸ Ibid 546.

²⁰⁹ Ibid See National League of Cities v Usery 426 US 833 (1976).

²¹⁰ Ibid 544.

²¹¹ Ibid 546.

²¹² Ibid 552.

²¹³ Ibid 556.

²¹⁴ Ibid 554.

²¹⁵ Rapaczynski, , “From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after Garcia” (1985) 8 The Supreme Court Review 341, 346-359Google Scholar.

²¹⁶ Eg Garcia v San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority 469 US 528 (1985), 550-551; Wechsler, “The Political Safeguards of Federalism” (1954) 54 Columbia L Rev 543, 558.

²¹⁷ United States' Constituion, especially Amendments XVII, XIX, XXIV. Cf Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980) 98--99.

²¹⁸ Commencing with Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954). The problem of reconciling this judicial activism with democratic traditions (Alexander Bickel's “countermajoritarian difficulty”) is the starting point for modern constitutional theory: Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (2nd ed 1968) 16. For two recent influential attempts at reconciliation, see, Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980) 98-99 (arguing for a representation reinforcing model of judicial review) and Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (1982) (seeking to cast the Supreme Court in the role of the high priesthood of a form of civil religion). See generally, Thomson, “An Endless but Productive Dialogue: Some Reflections on Efforts to Legitimize Judicial Review” (1982) 61 Texas Law Review 743. For a critique despairing of any solution see Brest, “The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship” (1981) 90 Yale LJ 1063.

²¹⁹ I am aware of the argument that the existence of responsible government and a strong party system in Australia may result in the political system affording less protection to state interests than in the United States, thereby making judicial review more necessary in Australia (eg Zines, supra n 4, 384-385; Barrett, “A Parliamentary System of Government in a Federation; The Australian Expeience” (1985) 19 UC Davis L Rev 153). To some extent, the argument rests on assumptions I am seeking to attack: that the Australian federal system follows that of the United States in seeking to provide a check on political power and that there is an “appropriate” federal balance which the judiciary can discern and enforce. Beyond that, the argument assumes that the legislative outcomes of individual representatives and senators acting relatively independently in the Congressional deliberative process will better reflect stateconcerns than will those of a cohesive Parliamentary party sensitive to regional electoral responses.

²²⁰ Evans, , “The Most Dangerous Branch? The High Court and the Constitution in a Changing Society” in Hambly and Goldring (eds) Australian Lawyers and Social Change (1976) 13-76Google Scholar.

²²¹ Mason, , “The Role of a Constitutional Court in a Federation: A Comparison of the Australian and the United States Experience” (1986) 16 FL Rev 1Google Scholar.

²²² Ibid 28.

²²³ Wechsler, , “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law” in Wechsler, Principles, Politics and Fundamental Law (1961) 3-48Google Scholar.

²²⁴ Ibid 21.

²²⁵ Mason, supra n 221, 28.

²²⁶ Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (2nd ed 1968) 55.

²²⁷ Mason, supra n 221, 28.

²²⁸ Eg Section 90 (making Commonwealth power over customs, excise and bounties exclusive); s 92 (requiring trade, commerce and intercourse among the States to be “absolutely free”); s 99 (prohibiting certain preferential Commonwealth laws, see infra 231); and s 117 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of State residence).

²²⁹ Supra text at on 199-200.