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Dowal v. Murray and Another

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Abstract

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Type
Case Note
Copyright
Copyright © 1979 The Australian National University

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Footnotes

1

(1979) 22 A.L.R. 577.

References

2 The sex of the child in question remains undetermined. The facts of the case were stated by Gibbs A-C.J., Jacobs J. and Aickin J. The Acting Chief Justice refers to the child as female (id. 579); to Jacobs J. the child is male (id. 587) and Aickin J. avoids specification of the gender of the child by recourse to the definite article (id. 591).

3 These issues had previously been considered by the Full Court of the Family Court in Marriage of Robertson (1977) 15 A.L.R. 145.

4 (1979) FLC 90-645.

5 See infra p. 422.

6 (1979) A.LR. 577, 579 per Gibbs A-C.J. and 597 per Aickin J.

7 Id. 590-591.

8 Id. 591. Relevant international treaties are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (entered into force 3 January 1976 and ratified by Australia) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (entered into force 23 March 1976 and ratified by Australia).

9 (1976) 134 C.L.R. 495. “Majority” here refers to the judgment of Mason J. with which Stephen J. agreed in relation to the extent of legislative power conferred by para. (xxi) and (xxii) of s. 51 of the Constitution. Jacobs J. took a wider view of the Commonwealth's legislative power than did Mason J., while Barwick C.J. and Gibbs J. construed this power more narrowly than the rest of the Court. The order of the Court was, therefore, given in accordance with the judgment of Mason J. The “narrow” view of Barwick C.J. and Gibbs J., referred to above, was that the presence and terms of s. 51(xxii) limited the context and ambit of s. 51(xxi). Subsequently, however, Barwick C.J. in Re Demack; ex parte Plummer (1977) 137 C.L.R. 40, 43 and Gibbs A-C.J. in Dowal v. Murray (1979) 22 A.LR. 577, 581-582 have applied the view of s. 51(xxi) taken by the majority in Russell v. Russell.

10 (1976) 134 C.L.R. 495, 541.

11 (1976) 137 C.L.R. 40, 52-53 per Mason J. and 57 per Murphy J.

12 (1979) 22 A.L.R. 577, 582 (italics added).

13 Id. 583 (italics added).

14 Id. 586-581.

15 Id. 595.

16 Id. 589.

17 Id. 590.

18 In effect from 5 April 1979.

19 (1979) 22 A.L.R. 577, 589.

20 Id. 590.

21 (1976) 134 C.L.R. 495, 541.

22 (1979) 22 A.L.R. 577, 580. Clarke v. Mcinnes has now been reported at (1978) FLC 90-517.

23 (1979) 22 A.L.R. 577, 588-589.

24 Id. 587.

25 (1979) FLC 90-645; 26 A.L.R. 376.

26 Id. (78,396-398).

27 (1979) 22 A.LR. 577, 588.

28 See Pawley, S.J. in E & E (No. 2) (1979) PLC 90-645 (78,378-379)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 Id. (78,377).

30 (1979) 22 A.L.R. 577, 582-583.

31 Id. 580.

32 Id. 583.