¹ For ease of reference, this article will refer in general to Prime Ministers and Governors-General, but the same principles apply also to Premiers and Governors.

² It is customary for Ministers to resign when requested to do so by the Prime Minister. In rare cases, however, a Minister's commission has been terminated on the advice of the Prime Minister or Premier. See, eg, Geoffrey, Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1929 (Melbourne University Press, 1956) 161Google Scholar; R P, Roulston, ‘Dismissal of Ministers of the Crown — A Tasmanian Precedent’ (1959) 1 Tasmanian University Law Review 280Google Scholar; John, Kerr, Matters for Judgment (Macmillan, 1978) 241-4Google Scholar; R D, Lumb, The Constitutions of the Australian States (University of Queensland Press, 5th ed, 1991) 78Google Scholar; Richard, McGarvie, Democracy (Melbourne University Press, 1999) 55Google Scholar; and Stewart v Ronalds (2009) 76 NSWLR 99. In Canada, the formal resignation of a Minister is not required. It is sufficient that the Prime Minister recommends a Minister's replacement, as a Minister holds office ‘during pleasure': Canada, Privy Council Office, Manual of Official Procedure of the Government of Canada (Ottawa, 1968) 338, <http://jameswjbowden.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/manual-of-official-procedure-of-the-goc.pdf>. In the UK dismissal is usually regarded as an implied resignation: I, Jennings, Cabinet Government (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 1961) 83Google Scholar.

³ George, Winterton, ‘The Constitutional Position of Australian State Governors’ in H P, Lee and G, Winterton (eds), Australian Constitutional Perspectives (Law Book, 1992) 274, 303Google Scholar. See also United Kingdom Cabinet Office, The Cabinet Manual (United Kingdom Government, 1st ed, October 2011)Google Scholar para 3.4.

⁴ See in relation to Canada: Canada, Privy Council Office, Guide to Canadian Ministries since Confederation: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/mgm/index.asp?lang=eng#fN_2_>; Adam, Dodek, ‘Rediscovering Constitutional Law: Succession Upon the Death of the Prime Minister’ (2000) 49 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 33, 36Google Scholar; A, Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions — The Marriage of Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, 1991) 49Google Scholar; J R, Mallory, The Structure of Canadian Government (Gage Educational, revised ed, 1984) 93Google Scholar; and John, Saywell, The Office of Lieutenant-Governor (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1957) 94Google Scholar. See in relation to the UK: Alpheus Todd, Parliamentary Government in England (Sampson Low, Marston, Revised ed, 1892) Vol II, 21; and A B, Keith, The British Cabinet System 1830-1938 (Stevens & Sons, 1939) 63Google Scholar.

⁵ Privy Council Office, above n 2, 77 and 463.

⁶ For a discussion of the circumstances in which a resignation is ‘personal', see Stanley, de Smith and Rodney, Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Penguin Books, 7th ed, 1994) 175Google Scholar.

⁷ See in relation to Canada: Peter, Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Thomson Carswell, 2004)Google Scholar [9.6(b)] (but see [9.3(a)]). See in relation to the UK: Jennings, above n 2, 84-5; United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 10 July 1935, vol 304, col 360 (Mr Stanley Baldwin, Prime Minister); and Rodney, Brazier, Constitutional Practice (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 1999) 52-3, 310Google Scholar.

⁸ See the discussion in Canada of cases where this had occurred prior to 1920. The practice was then changed so that the Prime Minister's resignation would not be given ‘formal effect until his successor is ready to take over': Privy Council Office, above n 2, 453-5. See also Mallory, above n 4, 83.

⁹ Anthony, Seldon and Guy, Lodge, Brown at No 10 (Biteback Publishing, 2010) 460Google Scholar. Cf The Cabinet Manual of the United Kingdom which records at [2.10] that it remains a matter for the Prime Minister ‘to judge the appropriate time at which to resign’ but that recent examples ‘suggest that previous Prime Ministers have not offered their resignations until there was a situation in which clear advice could be given to the Sovereign on who should be asked to form a government'. The Manual notes that it ‘remains to be seen whether or not these examples will be regarded in future as having established a constitutional convention.': United Kingdom Cabinet Office, above n 3.

¹⁰ Letter from Kevin Rudd to the Governor-General, 24 June 2010.

¹¹ Datuk (Datu) Amir Kahar bin Tun Datu Haji Mustapha v Tun Mohd Said bin Keruak Yang di-Pertua Negeri Sabah [1995] 1 MLJ 169, 190.

¹² Ibid 189.

¹³ Ibid 190.

¹⁴ See the controversy surrounding the dismissal of Tony Stewart as a Minister in New South Wales, including litigation and claims concerning the need for procedural fairness: Stewart v Ronalds (2009) 76 NSWLR 99. Note that Allsop J held at [45] (Hodgson JA and Handley AJA agreeing) that advice to the Lieutenant-Governor on dismissal was a political matter and could not be scrutinised by the courts. The same conclusion has been reached by the Rajasthan High Court: Dalapt Raj Bhandari v President of India AIR 1993 Raj 194, [9], [13].

¹⁵ Proceedings of the Australian Constitutional Convention, Brisbane, 1985, Vol 1, 416, Practice H ('Proceedings’).

¹⁶ Prior to 1940 Prime Ministers generally resigned when defeated, either at an election (Deakin, Fisher, Cook and Bruce), in the House of Representatives (Deakin, Watson, Reid, Fisher and Scullin), or at a referendum (Hughes — who resigned but was reappointed in the absence of another viable government). Barton and Fisher resigned upon retirement to take up other posts. Ministries would continue through elections, as long as the government won and the Prime Minister stayed in office. Note that on 17 August 1904, Deakin was chastised by the Governor-General for failing to send a formal resignation letter when he lost office in April that year and was made to sign a back-dated one. In 1909 Andrew Fisher was required by the Governor-General to rewrite his letter of resignation as it was not in the ‘proper form': Files of the Australian Constitutional Convention, ACC9 Item 6, Finemore Collection, University of Melbourne Law School ('ACC Files’).

¹⁷ Menzies appeared to start this practice with his resignation and re-commissioning in October 1940, after the September election. Curtin continued the practice and apart from an aberration in 1961 when only specific Ministers resigned after the election — not Menzies — the practice of incumbent Prime Ministers resigning after winning an election and being reappointed with a new ministry has continued through to Howard and Gillard. See, eg, Commonwealth, Gazette: Special, No S 426, 26 October 2004 (re resignation and re-appointment of John Howard as Prime Minister after the 2004 election); and Commonwealth, Gazette: Special, No S 160 and Commonwealth, Gazette: Special, No S 161, 16 September 2010 (re resignation and re-appointment of Julia Gillard as Prime Minister after the 2010 election).

¹⁸ See, eg, the resignation and re-commissioning of Billy Hughes on 14 November 1916 and 17 February 1917, Joseph Lyons on 9 November 1934 and 7 November 1938 and Robert Menzies on 14 March 1940.

¹⁹ Prime Minister Lyons died on 7 April 1939. On 8 April 1939 the Government Gazette stated that Sir Earle Page had accepted the position of Prime Minister and set out a full new ministry: Commonwealth, Gazette, No 21, 8 April 1939.

²⁰ Prime Minister Curtin died on 5 July 1945. On 6 July 1945 the Government Gazette stated that Francis Forde had accepted the position of Prime Minister and set out a full new ministry: Commonwealth Gazette, No 133, 6 July 1945.

²¹ On 17 December 1967, Prime Minister Holt went missing. On 19 December 1967 it was notified in the Government Gazette that the Governor-General had ‘determined’ (ie terminated) the appointment of Harold Holt as Prime Minister and appointed John McEwen to hold the office of Prime Minister: Commonwealth, Gazette, No 107A, 19 December 1967. The following day the Governor-General appointed a full ministry: Commonwealth, Gazette, No 109, 20 December 1967.

²² Note also at the State level that upon the death of the Queensland Premier, Edward Hanlon, in March 1946, the Governor, Sir John Laverack, took the view that the government had ceased to exist and asked Vince Gair to form a new one: Brian, Costar, ‘Vincent Clair Gair — Labor's Loser’ in D, Murphy et al (eds), The Premiers of Queensland (University of Queensland Press, revised ed, 2003) 268, 272Google Scholar.

²³ Hughes might also be placed in this category, but he lost the support of his coalition partner, rather than his party, causing his resignation in February 1923. The interim Prime Ministers of Page, Forde and McEwen have not been included in this category as their appointments were always intended to be temporary.

²⁴ Commonwealth, Gazette, No 175, 1 September 1941, referring to appointments made on 29 August 1941.

²⁵ Letter from Mr W McMahon to the Governor-General, 10 March 1971.

²⁶ Commonwealth, Gazette, No 32, 22 March 1971.

²⁷ Commonwealth, Gazette: Special, No S 367, 24 December 1991, recording the change of leadership on 19 December 1991.

²⁸ Letter from Mr R J L Hawke to the Governor-General, 19 December 1991.

²⁹ Commonwealth, Gazette: Special, No S 369, 31 December 1991.

³⁰ Letter from Mr K Rudd to the Governor-General, 24 June 2010. The only other change in the wording is that ‘continue in office’ in the Hawke letter is changed to ‘remain in office’ in the Rudd letter. Clearly the letter was drafted by a public servant copying from the earlier precedent, rather than one personally dictated by the Prime Minister.

³¹ Commonwealth, Gazette: Special, No S 104, 30 June 2010, regarding the appointment made on 24 June 2010.

³² Commonwealth, Gazette: Special, No S 105, 30 June 2010, regarding appointments made on 28 June 2010.

³³ See, eg, New South Wales, Gazette, No 62, 2 April 2003 regarding Bob Carr's resignation after the 2003 election ‘which action involves the resignation of his colleagues’ from their respective offices and as Members of the Executive Council, and his reappointment as Premier with a full ministry.

³⁴ See, eg, New South Wales, Gazette, No 32, 28 March 2011, regarding Kristina Keneally's resignation after the 2011 election ‘which action includes the resignations of her colleagues from their respective offices and as Members of the Executive Council'.

³⁵ See, eg, New South Wales, Gazette, No 105, 4 July 1986 (regarding Neville Wran's resignation); and New South Wales, Gazette, No 97, 3 August 2005 (regarding Bob Carr's resignation), both of which also expressly included the resignation of the full ministry.

³⁶ See, eg, New South Wales, Gazette, No 74, 24 June 1992, regarding Nick Greiner's resignation, which included the resignation of the full ministry.

³⁷ New South Wales, Gazette, No 113, 5 September 2008.

³⁸ New South Wales, Gazette, No 192, 4 December 2009.

³⁹ Letter from Morris Iemma to the Governor, 5 September 2008 and Letter from Nathan Rees to the Governor, 4 December 2009.

⁴⁰ New South Wales, Gazette, No 115, 8 September 2008 (regarding full Rees ministry); and New South Wales, Gazette, No 197, 8 December 2009 (regarding full Keneally ministry).

⁴¹ Note that Eric Roozendaal was appointed as Treasurer one day before the rest of the Keneally ministry, as the Treasurer was needed to attend an inter-governmental meeting: New South Wales, Gazette, No 196, 7 December 2009. Note also that Barry O'Farrell and Andrew Stoner held all ministries between them from 28 March 2011 until the appointment of a full ministry on 3 April 2011 — New South Wales, Gazette, No 34, 3 April 2011.

⁴² Bradley, Selway, The Constitution of South Australia (Federation Press, 1997) 44Google Scholar.

⁴³ See, eg, the ‘withdrawal’ of the commission of Dale Baker as Minister for Mines and Energy and Minister for Primary Industries: South Australia, Gazette, No 149, 22 December 1995, 1831.

⁴⁴ See generally Parliament of South Australia, Statistical Record of the Legislature 1836-2007 (2007).

⁴⁵ South Australia Gazette, No 137, 22 October 2001, 4677-8. See also the resignation of Don Dunstan and his replacement by James Corcoran (South Australia, Gazette, No 7, 15 February 1979) and the resignation of Dean Brown after being challenged in the party room by John Olsen (South Australia, Gazette, No 140, 28 November 1996).

⁴⁶ South Australia, Gazette, No 74, 21 October 2011, 4286-8.

⁴⁷ See, eg, Russell Wortley, who retained the portfolio of Industrial Relations and therefore did not resign and was not reappointed.

⁴⁸ See, eg, Queensland, Gazette, No 39, 22 February 2001; Queensland, Gazette, No 14, 13 September 2006; and Queensland, Gazette, No 71, 26 March 2009.

⁴⁹ See, eg, Victoria, Gazette, No S 315, 1 December 2006; Victoria, Gazette, No S 231, 5 December 2002; and Victoria, Gazette, No S 33, 3 April 1996. Note, however, that after the 1985 and 1988 elections, while the Cain ministry resigned and was reappointed, it appears that the Premier himself did not resign as Premier and seek reappointment: Victoria, Gazette, No S 84, 13 October 1988; and Victoria, Gazette, No 18, 15 March 1985, 691.

⁵⁰ Western Australia, Gazette, No 15, 10 March 1977; Western Australia, Gazette, No 18, 5 March 1980; Western Australia, Gazette, No 23, 26 February 1986; Western Australia, Gazette, No 21, 2 March 1989; Western Australia, Gazette, No 42, 10 March 2005.

⁵¹ See, eg, Letter from Paul Lennon to the Tasmanian Governor, 5 April 2006. Note that this ‘advice’ is not formal constitutional advice, as the appointment of a Premier is a reserve power, as discussed below.

⁵² Victoria, Gazette, No 76, 24 August 1972; Victoria, Gazette, No 50, 5 June 1981.

⁵³ Victoria, Gazette, No 32, 15 August 1990, 2512-3.

⁵⁴ Victoria, Gazette, No S 181, 30 July 2007.

⁵⁵ Victoria, Gazette, No S 184, 3 August 2007.

⁵⁶ Western Australia, Gazette, No 5, 25 January 1982.

⁵⁷ Western Australia, Gazette, No 20, 26 February 1988.

⁵⁸ Western Australia, Gazette, No 14, 13 February 1990.

⁵⁹ Western Australia, Gazette, No 21, 25 January 2006.

⁶⁰ A, Lawrence Lowell, The Government of England (Macmillan, 1926) Vol 1, 34Google Scholar; Eugene, Forsey ‘The Present Position of the Reserve Powers of the Crown’ in Evatt and Forsey on the Reserve Powers (Legal Books, Sydney, 1990)Google Scholar lxvii; Mallory, above n 2, 80.

⁶¹ Eugene, Forsey, ‘The Courts and The Conventions of The Constitution’ (1984) 33 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 11, 20Google Scholar. See also Ian, Killey, Constitutional Conventions in Australia (Australian Scholarly Publishing, 2009) 133, 137Google Scholar.

⁶² Geoffrey, Marshall and Graeme, Moodie, Some Problems of the Constitution (Hutchinson, 4th ed 1967) 50-1Google Scholar.

⁶³ David, Butler, Governing Without A Majority (Macmillan Press, 2nd ed, 1983) 80Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Jorgen, Rasmussen, ‘Constitutional Aspects of Government Formation in a Hung Parliament’ (1987) Parliamentary Affairs 139, 142Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Note also Brazier's concern that if the Prime Minister gets the order of his or her statements wrong and resigns before advising the Queen on his or her successor, then such advice is not formal ministerial advice: Brazier, above n 7, 14. See also Butler, above n 63, 91.

⁶⁶ Mahabir Prasad Sharma v Prafulla Chandra Ghose, AIR 1969 Cal 198, [43].

⁶⁷ Rodney, Brazier, ‘Choosing a Prime Minister’ [1982] Public Law 395, 398Google Scholar. See also United Kingdom Cabinet Office, above n 3, [2.9], which states that the Prime Minister, at the time of his or her resignation, ‘may also be asked by the Sovereign for a recommendation on who can best command the confidence of the House of Commons in his or her place'.

⁶⁸ Selway, above n 42, 43.

⁶⁹ Privy Council Office, above n 2, 145.

⁷⁰ Republic Advisory Committee, An Australian Republic — The Options, Vol 2, Appendix 6, (1993) 250 ('RAC’).

⁷¹ Ibid 254.

⁷² Marshall and Moodie, above n 62, 49; George, Winterton, Monarchy to Republic: Australian Republican Government (Oxford University Press, 1994 reprint) 32Google Scholar.

⁷³ When Prime Minister Lyons was dying the Governor-General apparently asked his doctors whether Lyons could advise on a successor but they replied that he was not sufficiently lucid: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 20 April 1939, 15.

⁷⁴ The Governor-General, after consultation with the Deputy Prime Minister, John McEwen, ‘determined’ the commission of Harold Holt as Prime Minister on 19 December 1967, two days after he went missing: Commonwealth, Gazette, No 107A, 19 December 1967.

⁷⁵ The first record of a Prime Minister advising on his or her successor appears to be on 2 February 1923 when Prime Minister Hughes advised the Governor-General to call upon Mr Bruce to form a government. While such advice may have been given orally on other occasions, there is documentary evidence, usually in resignation letters, that Prime Ministers Hughes, Bruce, Menzies, Forde, Chifley, McEwen, Gorton, McMahon, Fraser, Hawke, Keating, Howard and Rudd advising the Governor-General as to their successors. For early resignation letters see: ACC Files, above n 16. In terms of the order of advice given, the Prime Minister's resignation is usually contained in the first paragraph, but stated to take effect only upon the appointment of the new Prime Minister. Thus advice in the next paragraph as to whom to appoint as Prime Minister is still given by the outgoing Prime Minister before his or her resignation takes effect.

⁷⁶ In NSW, Premier Carr, in his resignation letter, recommended that the Governor request Morris Iemma to form a Government: Letter from R Carr to the Governor, 3 August 2005. However, neither Morris Iemma nor Nathan Rees advised the Governor in their respective resignation letters as to whom to appoint as their successor: Letter from M Iemma to the Governor, 5 September 2008; and Letter from N Rees to the Governor, 4 December 2009. In South Australia, it is the practice for outgoing Premiers to advise the Governor on their successor.

⁷⁷ Killey makes the point that just because advice has routinely been given does not mean that it is relied upon or that the decision-maker considered himself or herself bound to seek and accept it: Killey, above n 61, 138.

⁷⁸ Proceedings, above n 15, 416, Practice E. See also: Vol II, Structure of Government Sub-Committee Report, August 1984, [2.21]-[2.26].

⁷⁹ For criticism of these proposed practices, see Killey, above n 61, 137-8. For a critical analysis of the authority of the Australian Constitutional Convention to seek to codify such practices, see: Charles, Sampford, ‘“Recognize and Declare“: An Australian Experiment in Codifying Constitutional Conventions’ (1987) 7(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 369Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ Constitutional Commission, Advisory Committee on Executive Government, Executive Government (June 1987) 41.

⁸¹ RAC, above n 70, 256.

⁸² Geoffrey Sawer, ‘Queensland Joker Raises Knotty Points of Law', The Canberra Times (Canberra), 26 November 1987, 2.

⁸³ Harold, Edward Renfree, The Executive Power of the Commonwealth of Australia (Legal Books, 1984) 169Google Scholar; Winterton, above n 72, 44; Killey, above n 61, 137.

⁸⁴ Winterton, above n 72, 45–6; Killey, above n 61, 142.

⁸⁵ B S, Markesinis, The Theory and Practice of Dissolution of Parliament (Cambridge University Press, 1972) 95Google Scholar.

⁸⁶ [1963] AC 614.

⁸⁷ The Queen declined to act upon his petition on the ground that as he was no longer Premier he could not advise her to remove the Governor. See further: Larry, Jay Diamond, Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria — The Failure of the First Republic (Syracuse University Press, 1988) 101Google Scholar; and James, O'Connell, ‘Politics, Law and Constitutionalism: The 1962 Western Region Crisis in Nigeria’ in Donald, Anthony Low (ed), Constitutional Heads and Political Crises (Macmillan Press, 1988) 77Google Scholar.

⁸⁸ Akintola v Adermi [1962] 1 All NLR 442.

⁸⁹ Adegbenro v Akintola [1963] AC 614, 629.

⁹⁰ Ibid 630-1. Note that Chief Akintola received two substantial votes of confidence in the House shortly before the Privy Council decided the case, suggesting that the Governor may have been incorrect in his assessment of confidence in the House. Moreover, the Parliament of Western Nigeria reversed the effect of the Privy Council's decision by amending the Constitution, with retrospective effect, so that the Governor could only remove the Premier if there had been a vote of no confidence in the Premier in the House of Assembly. See further: Chijioke, Ogwurike, ‘The Governor's Power to Remove a Premier from Office in Western Nigeria’ (1963) 7 Journal of African Law 95Google Scholar; and Benjamin Nwabueze, A Constitutional History of Nigeria (C Hurst, 1982) 102–3.

⁹¹ Stephen Kalong Ningkan v Tun Abang Haji Openg and Tawi Sli [1966] 2 MLJ 187, 193. See also: H P, Lee, Constitutional Conflicts in Contemporary Malaysia (Oxofrd University Press, 1995), 11-13Google Scholar.

⁹² See, Datuk (Datu) Amir Kahar bin Tun Datu Haji Mustapha v Tun Mohd Said bin Keruak, Yang di-Pertua Negeri Sabah [1995] 1 MLJ 169, 187; and the recent judgment of the Malaysian Federal Court in the 2009-10 Perak constitutional crisis: Dato’ Seri Ir Haji Mohammad Nizar Bin Jamaluddin v Dato’ Seri Dr Zambry bin Abdul Kadir (Federal Court, 9 February 2010), at [48].

⁹³ See also Ronald, Cheffins, ‘The Royal Prerogative and the Office of Lieutenant Governor', (2000) 23 Canadian Parliamentary Review 14, 17Google Scholar; Peter, Boyce, The Queen's Other Realms: the Crown and its Legacy in Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Federation Press, 2008) 106Google Scholar; and V Palmer, ‘Yes, a caucus can dump an unpopular Premier', Vancouver Sun (Vancouver) 24 November 2010.

⁹⁴ See the criticism of Sir Philip Game on this ground, despite the relevant illegality being relatively clear cut and not denied: H V, Evatt, The King and His Dominion Governors (Frank Cass & Co, 2nd ed 1967) 173–4Google Scholar; and Winterton, above n 72, 46. Vander Zalm was charged with a criminal breach of trust but later acquitted.

⁹⁵ See Taylor's view that ‘dismissal should not occur until the opinion of the lower House has actually been expressed and an opportunity to resign has been given to the Premier': Greg, Taylor, The Constitution of Victoria (Federation Press, 2006) 140–1Google Scholar.

⁹⁶ See also Michael, Hogan, ‘The 1917 Election’ in Michael, Hogan and David, Clune (eds), The People's Choice — Electoral Politics in 20th Century New South Wales (Federation Press, 2001) 164–8Google Scholar.

⁹⁷ See also David, Clune and Gareth, Griffith, Decision and Deliberation — The Parliament of New South Wales 1856-2003 (Federation Press, 2006) 222Google Scholar.

⁹⁸ New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 8 November 1916, 2493–4.

⁹⁹ Ibid 2483-4.

¹⁰⁰ Evatt, above n 94, 147.

¹⁰¹ ‘Sensational Political Development — Governor Dismisses Premier', Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) 11 November 1916, 13.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Letter from Mr Holman (Premier NSW) to the NSW Agent-General 14 November 1916: UK Public Records Office ('PRO’): CO 881/15/6.

¹⁰⁴ Despatch from NSW Governor to Colonial Secretary, 14 November 1916: PRO: CO 881/15/11.

¹⁰⁵ Memorandum from NSW Governor to the NSW Premier, 15 November 1916: ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Memorandum from NSW Attorney-General, Mr Hall, to Mr Holman, 15 November 1916: PRO: CO 418/4247/148.

¹⁰⁷ New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 15 November 1916, 2734.

¹⁰⁸ Despatch from Colonial Secretary to NSW Governor, 12 January 1917: PRO: CO 881/15/6.

¹⁰⁹ Despatch from Colonial Secretary to NSW Governor, 23 January 1917: ibid.

¹¹⁰ See further: Sawer, above n 2, 133–4. See also the resignation and re-appointment of Prime Minister Lyons on 9 November 1934 in order to form a coalition ministry with the Country Party.

¹¹¹ Brian, Costar, ‘Vincent Clair Gair — Labor's Loser’ in Denis, Murphy et al (eds), The Premiers of Queensland (University of Queensland Press, revised ed, 2003) 268Google Scholar.

¹¹² Jennings, above n 2, 207, 419. See also: Lloyd, Barnett, The Constitutional Law of Jamaica (Oxford University Press, 1977) 91, 94Google Scholar.

¹¹³ Gerard, Carney, The Constitutional Systems of the Australian States and Territories, (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 301Google Scholar; Taylor, above n 95, 142.

¹¹⁴ See, eg, Carney's view that the Premier's capacity to advise upon the dismissal of Ministers is dependent upon the Premier holding the confidence of the lower House and his or her ministry and political party: Carney, above n 113, 283 and 301.

¹¹⁵ De Smith and Brazier, above n 6, 129, referring to the South African position in 1939. Brazier also noted at 130: ‘A fortiori, a Prime Minister who has actually been repudiated by his own parliamentary party in favour of one of his colleagues can claim no constitutional right at all to demand a dissolution.’ Note that the Queen no longer has a role in the dissolution of Parliament — Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 (UK).

¹¹⁶ Jennings, above n 2, 86.

¹¹⁷ Winterton, above n 3, 302.

¹¹⁸ Winterton, above n 72, 41.

¹¹⁹ Ibid 41–2.

¹²⁰ Lumb, above n 2, 78.

¹²¹ Killey, above n 61, 183.

¹²² Note, however, that in some political circumstances delay is not advisable, eg, if it were likely to result in revolution or violence.

¹²³ John, Thomas Lang, The Turbulent Years (Alpha Books, 1970) 67Google Scholar.

¹²⁴ Michael, Hogan, ‘John Thomas Lang’ in David, Clune and Ken, Turner (eds), The Premiers of New South Wales 1856-2005 (Federation Press, 2006) Vol 2, 179Google Scholar, 190.

¹²⁵ Letter from Sir Philip Street to Sir Dudley de Chair, 26 April 1927: Imperial War Museum Archives ('IWM’) DEC/5.

¹²⁶ Letter from Sir Philip Street to Sir Dudley de Chair, 25 May 1927: IWM DEC/5.

¹²⁷ Dudley De Chair, Memoirs, Vol VI, IWM, 98–9. See also Telegram from Sir Dudley de Chair to the Secretary of State, 27 May 1927, advising him of what had occurred: IWM DEC/5.

¹²⁸ The following account is largely derived from Geoff Barlow and Jim F Corkery, ‘Sir Walter Campbell: Queensland Governor and his role in Premier Joh Bjelke-Petersen's resignation, 1987’ Owen Dixon Society eJournal, Bond University, March 2007: <http://epublications.bond.edu.au/odsej/5/>. See also: John, Wanna and Tracey, Arklay, The Ayes Have It — The History of the Queensland Parliament 1957-1989 (ANU e-Press, July 2010) Ch 15Google Scholar; and Brian, Galligan, ‘Australia', in David, Butler and Donald, Anthony Low (eds), Sovereigns and Surrogates — Constitutional Heads of State in the Commonwealth (St Martin's Press, 1991) 61, 85Google Scholar.

¹²⁹ Letter from Sir Walter Campbell, Qld Governor to Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen, 25 November 1987 in Galligan, above n 128, 86.

¹³⁰ Winterton, above n 3, 303. See also Sawer, above n 82.

¹³¹ Galligan, above n 128, 88–91.

¹³² Barlow and Corkery, above n 128, 22. See also Galligan, above n 128, 89.

¹³³ Barlow and Corkery, above n 128, 22.

¹³⁴ Marian Hudson, ‘Governor leaves Queensland in chaos: State leaderless as Joh refuses to go', Daily Sun (Brisbane), 27 November 1987, 1 and Michael Quirk, ‘Joh must be sacked for State's good', Editorial, Daily Sun (Brisbane), 1 December 1987 in Barlow and Corkery, above n 128, 23 and 25.

¹³⁵ Barlow and Corkery, above n 128, 28; Galligan, above n 128, 89; Winterton, above n 3, 303; Carney, above n 113, 286; and Taylor, above n 95, 142.

¹³⁶ Galligan, above n 128, 89.

¹³⁷ Ahern and his Deputy, Bill Gunn, were initially sworn in as sharing all ministries between them until a new ministry was decided upon.

¹³⁸ G N, Hawker, The Parliament of New South Wales 1856-1965 (NSW Government Printer, 1971) 63Google Scholar; Graham, Freudenberg, ‘William Lygon, Earl Beauchamp’ in David, Clune and Ken, Turner, The Governors of New South Wales 1788-2010 (Federation Press, 2009) 381, 385–6Google Scholar.

¹³⁹ Freudenberg, above n 138, 386 (quoting from Beauchamp's diary).

¹⁴⁰ See also Clune and Griffith, above n 97, 214–6; H V, Evatt, William Holman — Australian Labor Leader (Angus & Robertson, 1979) 211–2Google Scholar; William, Holman, ‘My Political Life', reprinted in: Michael, Hogan (ed), The First New South Wales Labor Government 1910-1916 (UNSW Press, 2005) 37Google Scholar; and Anne, Twomey, ‘How to succeed in a hung parliament', 2000 54(11) Quadrant 36, 39Google Scholar.

¹⁴¹ Anne, Twomey, The Chameleon Crown — The Queen and Her Australian Governors (Federation Press, 2006) 78Google Scholar.

¹⁴² Taylor, above n 95, 131.

¹⁴³ Andrew, Heard, ‘The Governor-General's Decision to Prorogue Parliament: A Chronology and Assessment’ (2009) 18 Constitutional Forum 1, 5Google Scholar; Eric, Adams, ‘The Constitutionality of Prorogation’ (2009) 18 Constitutional Forum 17Google Scholar; Peter, Hogg, ‘Prorogation and the Power of the Governor General’ (2009) 27 National Journal of Constitutional Law 193, 196–9Google Scholar; C E S, Franks, ‘To Prorogue or Not to Prorogue: Did the Governor General Make the Right Decision?’ in Peter, Russell and Lorne, Sossin (eds), Parliamentary Democracy in Crisis (University of Toronto Press, 2009) 33, 44Google Scholar. Cf McWhinney's view that ‘the grant of Prorogation is non-discretionary, on request': Edward McWhinney, ‘The Role of the Governor General: Some Lessons from Australia and the Commonwealth’ (Winter 2010) Canadian Parliamentary Review 11, 12 and Privy Council Office, above n 2, 150.

¹⁴⁴ See, eg: Heard, above n 143, 8–9.

¹⁴⁵ See, eg: Adams, above n 143, 19; Hogg, above n 143, 199–201; Franks, above n 143, 46.

¹⁴⁶ This was the case in Canada in 2009 when the Parliament was prorogued with the effect of shutting down a parliamentary committee inquiring into a scandal concerning Afghan prisoners. Hogg argued that the Governor-General had no discretion to refuse to prorogue in such circumstances: Hogg, above n 143, 201. See also the prorogation of the NSW Parliament in December 2010 and the South Australian Parliament in December 2005.

¹⁴⁷ Hogg, above n 143, 197–8 and 201. See also the prorogation of the Sri Lankan Parliament in July 2001 to avoid a vote of no confidence.

¹⁴⁸ The results of the referendum on 12 December 1981 were: Gordon-below-Franklin — 54.72%; Gordon-above-Olga — 9.78%; Informal (most of which were marked ‘No Dams’) — 35.5%. Note, however, that there were arguments about what amounted to a formal vote and a recount that lowered the vote approving the damming of the Gordon-below-Franklin to 47.2%: ‘Political Chronicles — Tasmania', (1982) 28(1) Australian Journal of Politics and History 83, 106, 110.

¹⁴⁹ For a more detailed analysis of the political situation, see: Scott, Bennett, ‘The Fall of a Labor Government: 1979-1982’ (1983) 45 Labour History 80, 88Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁰ Letter from Mr Holgate to Sir Stanley Burbury, 14 December 1981.

¹⁵¹ Letter from Sir Stanley Burbury to Mr James Guest MLC, 12 March 1984 in Proceedings, above n 15, Vol II, Structure of Government Sub-Committee Report, August 1984, Appendix H, 72–3.

¹⁵² Letter from Robin Gray et al to Sir Stanley Burbury, 22 February 1982 in Proceedings, above n 15, Vol II, Structure of Government Sub-Committee Report, August 1984, Appendix H, 80.

¹⁵³ Letter from Sir Stanley Burbury to Mr Robin Gray, 24 February 1982 in Proceedings, above n 15, Vol II, Structure of Government Sub-Committee Report, August 1984, Appendix H, 81.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Winterton, above n 3, 274, 297.

¹⁵⁶ Taylor, above n 95, 131 and 141. See also: Lumb, above n 2, 78, where Lumb appears to contemplate such a use of the reserve powers.

¹⁵⁷ Killey, above n 61, 181.

¹⁵⁸ Winterton, above n 72, 41–2.

¹⁵⁹ Forsey, above n 61, 23; and Selway, above n 42, 43.

¹⁶⁰ AIR 1969 Cal 198.

¹⁶¹ Ibid [41].

¹⁶² Ibid [47].

¹⁶³ As far back as 1871, the Queensland Governor, the Marquis of Normanby stated: ‘I shall always be found ready to pay the greatest deference to the opinion of parliament, but that opinion must be expressed by the majority of the Assembly in their legislative capacity, and not by a majority without the walls of the House of Assembly'. Quoted in: Peter M McDermott, ‘Queensland Revisited', [1988] (Spring) Public Law 31–2.

¹⁶⁴ Eugene, Forsey, ‘Professor Angus on the British Columbia Election: A Comment’ (1953) XIX Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 226, 230Google Scholar.