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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 January 2025
What is the influence of the Australian Constitution ('Constitution') on the common law of Australia? In Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, a unanimous High Court stated:
Of necessity, the common law must conform with the Constitution. The development of the common law in Australia cannot run counter to constitutional imperatives. The common law and the requirements of the Constitution cannot be at odds.
Applying this principle, Lange developed the common law of defamation consistently with the implied freedom of political communication. Subsequently, in John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson, the High Court held that the common law of choice of law in tort 'should be developed to take into account various matters arising from the Australian constitutional text and structure.'
I would like to thank Jim Thomson for his advice, observations and assistance. Thanks are also due to Robert Meadows QC, Joshua Thomson, Rossana Panetta, Jamie Edelman, Grant Donaldson and the referee for their helpful comments and suggestions.
1 In this article 'common law' refers to judge-made law and includes equitable principles. In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2002) 208 CLR 199 ('ABC v Lenah Game Meats'), Kirby J considered equitable principles must conform to the Constitution: ibid 280 [192]. Other members of the Court found it unnecessary to consider this issue.
2 (1997) 189 CLR 520 ('Lange').
3 Ibid 566 (footnote omitted).
4 The phrase 'the Lange principle' will be used to refer to the holding in Lange that the common law must conform to the Constitution. Although Lange stated that the common law must conform 'with' the Constitution, the use of 'to' is grammatically correct and does not alter the legal effect of the phrase. See, eg, ABC v Lenah Game Meats (2002) 208 CLR 199, 219 [20] (Gleeson CJ).
5 (2000) 203 CLR 503 ('Pfeiffer').
6 Ibid 534 [67] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
7 See generally Stone, Adrienne, 'The Common Law and the Constitution: A Reply' (2002) 26Google Scholar Melbourne University Law Review 646; Greg Taylor, 'Why the Common Law Should be only Indirectly Affected by Constitutional Guarantees: A Comment on Stone' (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 623; Bradley Selway, 'The Principle Behind Common Law Judicial Review of Administrative Action―The Search Continues' (2002) 30 Federal Law Review 217, 232; Michael Sexton, 'Constitutional Intersections: The Common Law and the Constitution' (Paper delivered at the Annual Public Law Weekend, ANU, 2 November 2001) (copy on file with the author) 13, 19‐23.
8 Stone, above n 7, 648. Stone describes this mode as the 'mandatory effect' model.
9 Ibid 648. Stone describes this mode as the 'guidance' or 'mere influence' model.
10 But see Jeremy Kirk, 'Conflicts and Choice of Law Within the Australian Constitutional Context' (Paper delivered at the Annual Public Law Weekend, ANU, 2 November 2001) (copy on file with the author) 53. Kirk emphasises the significance of Lipohar v The Queen (1999) 200 CLR 485 ('Lipohar')— rather than Lange— in establishing the existence of one common law of Australia. Kirk's contention is made on the basis that it was not until Lipohar that the concept of a unified common law of Australia had 'a direct, material application in a High Court decision': ibid 56 – 7. However, in Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 201 CLR 49 ('Esso v FCT'), Lange rather than Lipohar is cited as authority for the proposition that there exists an Australian common law: ibid 61–
11 Division on this question is evident in R v Kidman (1915) 20 CLR 425, 435 ― 6 (Griffith CJ),444―136 (Isaacs J), 454 (Higgins J). See also R v Snow (1915) 20 CLR 315, 325 (Griffith CJ); R v Sharkey (1949) 79 CLR 121, 163 (Webb J); Skelton v Collins (1966) 115 CLR 94, 134 ― 5 (Windeyer J); Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367, 370 (Walsh J during argument). See also the discussion in Lipohar (1999) 200 CLR 485, 507 ― 8 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), where it is emphasised that the common law of Australia is different from the notion of a federal common law. See generally Leslie Zines, The Common Law in Australia: Its Nature and Constitutional Significance (Law and Policy Paper No 13, Centre for International and Public Law, ANU, 1999); Justice L J Priestley, 'A Federal Common Law in Australia?' (1995) 6 Public Law Review 221; P H Lane, The Australian Federal System (2nd ed, 1979) 511 ― 12, 586 n 21, 866 n 4; W Anstey Wynes, Legislative, Executive and Judicial Powers in Australia (5th ed, 1976) 58― 60; A Inglis Clark, Studies in Australian Constitutional Law (1901, reprinted 1997) 192; John Quick and Robert Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth (1901, reprinted 1995) 785.
12 See, eg, Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 15 (Mason CJ and McHugh J); Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 297 ― 8 (Mason CJ and McHugh J); Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 477, 556 (McHugh J);Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd (1994) 179 CLR 520, 556 ― 7 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ);Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, 176 (Gummow J);Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 112 (McHugh J), 138 (Gummow J) ('Kable').
13 Zines, above n 11, 8 ― 10.
14 (1963) 111 CLR 610.
15 The Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975 (Cth) removed the right to appeal from the High Court to the Privy Council on non-constitutional matters, such as matters of common law or concerning state laws. Its validity was upheld by the High Court in Attorney-General (Cth) v T & G Mutual Life Society Ltd (1978) 144 CLR 161. The 1975 Act was preceded by the Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Act 1968 (Cth), which removed the right to appeal from the High Court to the Privy Council in matters involving the Constitution or federal laws. Its validity was upheld by the Privy Council in Kitano v Commonwealth (1975) 132 CLR 231. See generally Anne Twomey, 'Sue v Hill―the Evolution of Australian Independence' in Adrienne Stone and George Williams (eds), The High Court at the Crossroads ― Essays in Constitutional Law (2000) 77, 105 ― 7.
16 Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88. There remains the theoretical possibility of the High Court granting a certificate under s 74 of the Constitution. However, in Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises Pty Ltd (No 2) (1985) 159 CLR 461 the High Court stated that the jurisdiction to grant a s 74 certificate was 'obsolete': ibid 465 (the Court). Appeals from state Supreme Courts to the Privy Council on non-federal matters were abolished by s 11 of the Australia Act 1986 (UK) c 2 and s 11 of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth).
17 This was accepted by the Privy Council in Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Uren (1967) 117 CLR 221 and Geelong Harbour Trust Commissioners v Gibbs Bright and Co (1974) 129 CLR 576.
18 (1996) 189 CLR 51.
19 Through the enactment of the Australia Act 1986 (UK) c 2 and the Australia Act 1986 (Cth).
20 (1996) 189 CLR 51, 113 (McHugh J), 138 (Gummow J).
21 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563.
22 Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 514 [2], 518 [15] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471, 492 ― 3 (Brennan CJ), 523 ― 6(Gaudron JJ); Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 574 [110] (Gummow and Hayne JJ); Lipohar (1999) 200 CLR 485, 505, 509 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 551 ― 2 (Kirby J); Esso v FCT (1999) 201 CLR 49, 61 ― 2 [23] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). It should be noted that in Lipohar Callinan J maintained that there exists a distinct common law of each state: ibid 574 – 6. However, in Mobil Oil v Victoria (2002) 189 ALR 161, Callinan J accepted 'it is now settled that there is only one common law for the whole of Australia': ibid 212 [187].
23 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563.
24 (1996) 189 CLR 51, 114 (McHugh J), 138 (Gummow J).
25 (1999) 200 CLR 485, 505 – 6 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
26 Ibid 505 [45] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 574 [110] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).
27 (1996) 189 CLR 51, 114 (McHugh J).
28 (1999) 200 CLR 485, 505 – 6 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
29 (1996) 189 CLR 51, 113– 4 (McHugh J), 137 ―9 (Gummow J). This approach is consistent with the reasoning of members of the Court who advocated the existence of an Australian common law prior to Lange. See, eg, Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 29 (Brennan J) (Mason CJ and McHugh J agreeing).
30 (1994) 182 CLR 104 ('Theophanous').
31 (1994) 182 CLR 211 ('Stephens').
32 Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1 ('Nationwide News');Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 ('ACTV').
33 In both cases the majority consisted of a joint judgment by Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ and a separate judgment from Deane J. In both cases the minority judges were Brennan, Dawson and McHugh JJ.
34 (1994) 182 CLR 104, 126 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
35 Ibid 140 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
36 See, eg, Adrienne Stone, 'Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of the Freedom of Political Communication' (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 374, 405; Zines, above n 11, 23; Geoffrey Kennett, 'The Freedom Ride: Where to Now?' (1998) 9 Public Law Review 111, 112. It should be noted, however, that the judgment is unclear in establishing the way in which the defence operated: see Tony Blackshield and George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law & Theory — Commentary and Materials (3rd ed, 2002) 1205.
37 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 140 – 1 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
38 Thereby making it difficult to identify a ratio in Theophanous.
39 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 126 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
40 Ibid 173 – 4 (Deane J). See also Blackshield and Williams, above n 36, 1206.
41 Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 185 (Deane J). See also Michael Tilbury, 'Uniformity, The Constitution and Australian Defamation Law at the Turn of the Century' in Nicholas J Mullany and Allen M Linden (eds), Torts Tomorrow: A Tribute to John Fleming (1998) 259 – 60 n 121.
42 (1994) 182 CLR 104, 163 (Brennan J), 194 (Dawson J), 207 (McHugh J).
43 Ibid 153 (Brennan J).
44 (1994) 182 CLR 211, 229 – 31 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). The freedom of political communication relied upon by the defendant was said to arise under both the Australian Constitution and the Constitution Act 1889 (WA).
45 Stephens (1994) 182 CLR 211, 234 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). The circumstances were: if the defendant was unaware of the falsity of the material published and did not publish the material recklessly; and if the publications were reasonable in the circumstances.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Blackshield and Williams, above n 36, 1212 – 15. See also Greg Taylor, 'Public Law, Private Rights: A Comparative View of the Theory Behind Recent Changes in Defamation Law to Make It Reflect Constitutional Values' (2000) 11 Public Law Review 274, 278.
49 (1994) 182 CLR 211, 257.
50 Ibid 236, 256 (Brennan J), 258 (Dawson J), 259, 270 (McHugh J).
51 Ibid 255 – 6 (Brennan J), 258 (Dawson J), 265 — 7 (McHugh J). See also Blackshield and Williams, above n 36, 1214.
52 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 550 – 1.
53 Ibid 539 (summary of argument).
54 Ibid 556.
55 Kennett, above n 36, 113.
56 Sexton, above n 7, 16. See also Theophanous (1994) 182 CLR 104, 126 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
57 Lipohar (1999) 200 CLR 485, 526 [103] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See alsoR v White (Chief Collector of Taxes of the Territory of Papua New Guinea); Ex parte T A Field Pty Ltd (1975) 133 CLR 113, 117 (Barwick CJ) (Gibbs and Jacobs JJ agreeing).
58 Lipohar (1999) 200 CLR 485, 526 [103] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
59 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 556.
60 Contra Zines, above n 11, 24.
61 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563 – 4. See also Stone, above n 36, 404 — 5; Sexton, above n 7, 18; Kennett,above n 36, 115.
62 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 566.
63 As pointed out by Kennett, this can be attributed partly to the fact that the Court considered it arguable that Theophanous did not contain a binding statement of constitutional principle: above n 36, 112.
64 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563.
65 New York Times Co v Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964);Gertz v Robert Welch Inc 418 US 323 (1974). The United States Constitution's First Amendment free speech clause applies to the states via the 14th Amendment's due process clause: Gilbert v Minnesota 254 US 325 (1920); Gitlow v New York 268 US 652 (1925); Fiske v Kansas 274 US 380 (1927). Although the United States Supreme Court rejected full incorporation of the Bill of Rights, most of the Bill of Rights provisions have been held to be applicable to the states: see Alpheus T Mason and Donald G Stephenson Jr, American Constitutional Law: Introductory Essays and Selected Cases (12th ed, 1999) 443; Malcolm Feeley and Samuel Krislov, Constitutional Law (2nd ed, 1990) 375 – 7.
66 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563 (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the United States position,see Adrienne Stone, 'Freedom of Political Communication, the Constitution and the Common Law' (1998) 26 Federal Law Review 219, 221 – 3.
67 Sexton, above n 7, 18; Stone, above n 36, 411 – 2.
68 Lange refers to the distinction as 'important for the present case': (1997) 189 CLR 520, 563. In Lipohar a majority stated that the distinction was 'essential' to the rejection of a constitutional defence: (1999) 200 CLR 485, 509 – 10 [57] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
69 Erie Railway Co v Tompkins 304 US 64 (1938). See also Stone, above n 66, 222.
70 See, eg, Blackshield and Williams, above n 36, 1230.
71 See, eg, Stone, above n 36, 404; Sexton, above n 7, 18.
72 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560-71. See also ABC v Lenah Game Meats (2002) 208 CLR 199, 219 [20] (Gleeson CJ).
73 Greg Taylor, 'The Effect of the Constitution on the Common Law as Revealed by John Pfeiffer v Rogerson' (2002) 30Federal Law Review 69, 79; Sexton, above n 7, 18; Kennett, above n 36, 115; Tilbury, above n 41, 263–4. But see Leslie Zines, 'Judicial Activism and the Rule of Law in Australia' in Tom Campbell and Jeffrey Goldsworthy (eds)Judicial Power, Democracy and Legal Positivism (2000) 391, 401; Zines above n 11.
74 On why the distinction is important, see Taylor, above n 7, 625-6; Tilbury, above n 41, 264 – 7.
75 Adrienne Stone and Greg Taylor take opposing positions on this issue. See, eg, Stone,above n 36, 406 – 17; Stone, above n 7; Taylor, above n 7.
76 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 564 (footnotes omitted). See also Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471, 546 (Gummow and Kirby JJ).
77 For an earlier view of the Australian legal system as unitary, see Sir Owen Dixon, 'Sources of Legal Authority' reprinted in Jesting Pilate and Other Papers and Addresses (1965) 198.
78 (2001) 185 ALR 183.
79 Ibid 207 [113].
80 (1994) 182 CLR 104, 153 (Brennan J).
81 Ibid. See also James v Commonwealth (1939) 62 CLR 339, 362 (Dixon J); Brown v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 171, 208 (Dawson J); Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 46 (Brennan CJ), 61 (Dawson J); Taylor, above n 48, 278 – 9.
82 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 564.
83 Ibid 566.
84 (1999) 200 CLR 485, 557 [180] (footnotes omitted).
85 (2003) 194 ALR 161, [102], see also [65] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ), [144], [160](Kirby J).
86 See, eg, Lipohar (1999) 200 CLR 485, 509 [57] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also ABC v Lenah Game Meats (2002) 208 CLR 199, 280 [194] (Kirby J).
87 Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 535 [70] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
88 Ibid. See also Adrienne Stone, 'Choice of Law Rules, the Constitution and the Common Law' (2001) 12 Public Law Review 9, 10.
89 See, eg, Chief Justice Gleeson, Murray, 'Judicial Legitimacy' (2001) 20 Australian Bar Review 4, 9Google Scholar.
90 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 566 — 7.
91 (1996) 186 CLR 140, 168 (Brennan CJ), 182 — 3 (Dawson J), 231 (McHugh J), 284 – 5(Gummow J) ('McGinty').
92 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567. See also Kennett, above n 36, 114.
93 Particularly ss 7, 24, 64 and 128 of the Constitution: Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567.
94 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 565. See also Kennett, above n 36, 115.
95 (1992) 177 CLR 1, 42 – 5 (Brennan J), 69 – 73 (Deane and Toohey JJ).
96 (1992) 177 CLR 106, 168 – 9 (Deane and Toohey JJ), 208 – 15 (Gaudron J).
97 (1994) 182 CLR 104, 121, 130 (Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).
98 See, eg, ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 210 – 11 (Gaudron J). See also Catherine Penhallurick,'Commonwealth Immunity as a Constitutional Implication' (2001) 29 Federal Law Review 151, 161 – 2; Kennett, above n 36, 113.
99 Leslie Zines, 'The Present State of Constitutional Interpretation' in Stone and Williams, above n 15, 227.
100 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 566 – 7 (footnote omitted).
101 Zines, above n 99, 227–8. See also Adrienne Stone, 'The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication' (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 668, 698 — 9.
102 Zines, above n 99, 228. See Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 559 – 60. The scholar was A H Birch,Representative and Responsible Government: an essay on the British Constitution (1964).
103 (1997) 190 CLR 1.
104 Ibid 154 (footnote omitted). It should be noted that the 'legal equality' argument referred to by Gummow J concerned the question of whether the Constitution itself assumes certain common law doctrines (such as legal equality). Sometimes referred to as 'the common law of the Constitution', this question is different from the question of whether the Constitution influences the development of the common law.
105 See generally Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 566 – 75.
106 Ibid 567 (footnotes omitted). The Court made clear that the test applied to both statute law and common law: ibid 567. It should be noted that in Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579 a number of the judgments appeared to qualify the Lange test: ibid 619 (Gaudron J), 645 (Kirby J), 614 (Toohey and Gummow JJ). However, in Roberts v Bass (2003) 194 ALR 161, the formulation of the test expressed in Lange was applied by those judges who found it necessary to address the issue: ibid [66]–[70] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ), [162]–[163] (Kirby J).
107 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 568.
108 Argument in Lange was conducted on the basis that the plaintiff's action was to be determined by reference to the defamation law of NSW. Thus, a statutory defence of qualified privilege was open to the defendant under s 22 of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW): ibid 569.
109 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 569—70 (footnotes omitted).
110 Ibid 571—2.
111 Ibid 573. The Court in Lange emphasised that 'reasonableness of conduct is imported as an element only when the extended category of qualified privilege is invoked to protect a publication that would otherwise be held to have been made to too wide an audience.' at 573. See also Roberts v Bass (2003) 194 ALR 161 [68] (Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ),[161] (Kirby J), [222] (Hayne J).
112 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 574. In the context of the implied freedom, this meant a publication not made for the purpose of communicating governmental or political matters, but for an improper purpose. Although Lange did not explain the meaning of 'improper', the Court did state that the motive of causing political damage to a plaintiff or his or her political party could not be considered improper in this context. See also Roberts v Bass (2003) 194 ALR 161, in which the High Court further considered the kind of malice that defeats a defence of qualified privilege at common law, and the relationship between the common law defence of qualified privilege and the extended Lange defence.
113 (1997) 189 CLR 520, 571. The Court gave the example of discussion of matters concerning the United Nations or other countries.
114 Ibid 566.
115 But see Roberts v Bass (2003) 194 ALR 161, 203 [160] (Kirby J). In discussing the requirement that common law rules adapt to the Constitution, Kirby J stated that 'any narrower, or other, common law rule cannot survive' (emphasis added).
116 Keeping in mind Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ's observation in Roberts v Bass (2003) 194 ALR 161, 179 [73], that '[i]t would be a serious mistake to think that Lange exhaustively defined the constitutional freedom's impact on the law of defamation'.
117 [2001] 2 AC 127 ('Reynolds').
118 Ibid 204 (Lord Nicholls), 210–11 (Lord Steyn), 218–19 (Lord Cooke), 235 (Lord Hope), 239 (Lord Hobhouse).
119 [1998] 3 NZLR 424.
120 Ibid 468 (Richardson P, Henry, Keith and Blanchard JJ), 475 (Tipping J).
121 Ibid 469-70 (Richardson P, Henry, Keith and Blanchard JJ), 477 (Tipping J). It should be noted that Tipping J considered that reasonableness could be relevant to whether the defendant has taken improper advantage of the occasion of publication: ibid 477. Lange v Atkinson was delivered just six weeks prior to Reynolds. On appeal, the Privy Council held that the New Zealand Court of Appeal should have the opportunity of considering Reynolds when formulating the common law of New Zealand and remitted the appeal to the Court of Appeal for rehearing: Lange v Atkinson [2000] 1 NZLR 257, 263-4 (Lord Nicholls gave the judgment of the Board). Upon rehearing, the Court of Appeal confirmed the approach taken in its earlier decision: Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385, 399-400 (Richardson P, Henry, Keith, Blanchard and Tipping JJ).
122 The concept of 'Constitution' used in this context appears to extend beyond the orthodox view that 'Constitution' means the text of the Constitution or necessary implications arising from it. In this context, 'Constitution' may include broader concepts such as constitutional 'values', 'principles' or 'matters'. This issue is discussed in more detail in Part II(C).
123 Sexton, above n 7, 19-20.
124 (2000) 203 CLR 503. Choice of law was a somewhat unusual context for the question of the common law's interaction with the Constitution to be raised. In other countries, the question of constitutional influence on the common law more commonly arises in the context of constitutional 'rights': Stone, above n 88, 9. It should be noted that the use of the phrase 'constitutional rights' is not favoured in Australian constitutional jurisprudence. The High Court prefers expressions such as 'freedoms' or 'limitations on legislative and executive power', rather than 'rights': Blackshield and Williams, above n 36, 1092-3. See, eg, Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560.
125 Part 5 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) limited the amount of damages that could be awarded for non-economic loss. No such limit was imposed under ACT law.
126 Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 544 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ),564 [164] (Kirby J), 575-6 [200] (Callinan J).
127 (1991) 174 CLR 1 ('McKain v Miller').
128 Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 540 [87] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 562-3 [157] (Kirby J).
129 Ibid 575-6 (Callinan J).
130 Sexton, above n 7, 22.
131 Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 534 [67] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
132 Ibid 535 [67] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
133 Ibid 535 [68] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) (emphasis added).
134 Ibid 535 [70] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
135 Stone, above n 88, 11.
136 Ibid. Arguably, Stone could draw support from ABC v Lenah Game Meats (2002) 208 CLR 199, 219 [20] (Gleeson CJ). But see Taylor, above n 73, 70-1.
137 Stone, above n 7, 650.
138 [1995] 2 SCR 1130.
139 Ibid 1169. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ('the Charter') is Part 1 of the Constitution Act 1982.
140 See also Taylor, above n 73, 75-6. For an overview of the Canadian position, see Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (4th ed, 1997), 853-8.
141 [1986] 2 SCR 573.
142 Ibid 598-9.
143 Ibid 603. See also R v Salituro [1991] 3 SCR 654; Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation [1994] 3 SCR 835.
144 [1995] 2 SCR 1130, 1171 [97] (Cory J, on behalf of La Forest, Gonthier, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ).
145 (2000) 203 CLR 503, 534 [67] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
146 Sexton, above n 7, 21-2.
147 The majority considered three possibilities - lex fori,lex loci delicti and proper law of the tort.The Court also had to decide whether the resulting rule would be subject to a flexible exception: Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 535 [72] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
148 Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 536 [74] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
149 Ibid 536-7 [75] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
150 Ibid 541 [91] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), see also 551 [123](Kirby J).
151 See, eg, Taylor, above n 73, 83.
152 Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 535 [70] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
153 See, eg, Taylor, above n 73, 83.
154 Selway, above n 7, 232 (footnotes omitted). See also Sexton, above n 7, 22.
155 The Constitution is no longer considered 'merely' a statute: see, eg, Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory (1992) 177 CLR 248, 274 (Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ); ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 137-8 (Mason CJ). See also Justice William Gummow, Change and Continuity: Statute, Equity and Federalism (1999), 74-5; Stephen Donaghue, 'The Clamour of Silent Constitutional Principles' (1996) 24 Federal Law Review 133, 144-6.
156 See, eg, Gummow, above n 155, 1― 37 Jack Beatson, 'Has the Common Law a Future? ' (1997) 56 Cambridge Law Journal 291; Justice Robert French, 'Statutory Modelling of Torts' in Nicholas Mullany (ed) Torts in the Nineties (1997), 211; Paul Finn, 'Statutes and the Common Law' (1992) 22 University of Western Australia Law Review 7; PS Atiyah, 'Common Law and Statute Law' (1985) 48 Modern Law Review 1; John Burrows, 'Common Law and Statute' [1980] New Zealand Law Journal 98.
157 Cohen v Cohen (1929) 42 CLR 91, 99-100 (Dixon J);Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [No 2] (1984) 156 CLR 414, 445 (Deane J) (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ agreeing); Public Service Board of New South Wales v Osmond (1986) 159 CLR 656, 669 (Gibbs CJ) (Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ agreeing); Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1, 11 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ);R v L (1992) 174 CLR 379, 389-390 (Mason CJ, Deane and Toohey JJ);Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, 247 (Gummow J);Esso v FCT (1999) 201 CLR 49, 61-3 [23]-[25] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ), 83 [91] (Kirby J).
158 The possible utility of comparing the Constitution's influence on the common law to that of an ordinary statute is recognised by Sexton: above n 7, 23-4 n 60. Although not considered here, it may also prove useful to draw a comparison with the High Court's use of international treaties as an influence on the common law. See generally Kristen Walker, 'Treaties and the Internationalisation of Australian Law' in Cheryl Saunders (ed) Courts of Final Jurisdiction: The Mason Court in Australia (1996) 212-8.
159 Lamb v Cotogno (1987) 164 CLR 1, 11 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ).
160 French, above n 156, 215-6.
161 [1979] AC 731, 743. The English Court of Appeal applied Lord Diplock's principle in Attorney-General v Blake [1998] Ch 439, 463 (Lord Woolf MR, for the Court).
162 (1987) 164 CLR 1, 11 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ).
163 (1986) 159 CLR 656, 669 (Gibbs CJ) (Wilson, Brennan and Dawson JJ agreeing) ('Osmond').However, French notes that it is unclear whether Osmond rejected the use of analogical reasoning or the use of analogical reasoning from statutes in one jurisdiction to another: above n 156, 225. See also David St Leger Kelly, 'The Osmond Case: Common Law and Statute Law' (1986) 60 Australian Law Journal 513.
164 Cohen v Cohen (1929) 42 CLR 91, 99-100 (Dixon J);Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd [No 2] (1984) 156 CLR 414, 445 (Deane J) (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ agreeing);Bankstown Foundry Pty Ltd v Braistina (1986) 160 CLR 301, 309 (Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ);R v L (1992) 174 CLR 379, 390 (Mason CJ, Deane and Toohey JJ);Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, 247 (Gummow J).
165 (1984) 156 CLR 414.
166 Ibid 445 (Deane J) (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ agreeing).
167 (1999) 201 CLR 49.
168 The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) test was whether the communication was made, or the document was prepared, for the dominant purpose of the lawyer providing legal advice or legal services. The common law test, since Grant v Downs (1976) 135 CLR 674, was that privilege would only attach to a confidential communication made for the sole purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice or assistance or of use in legal proceedings: ibid 54 [2] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ).
169 (1999) 201 CLR 49, 58 [13] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). The appellant made three alternative contentions, of which the second was that the common law should be treated as modified to accord with the statutory test.
170 Ibid 61-2 [23] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ), 83 [91] (Kirby J).
171 Ibid 61-3 [23]-[28] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). Justice Kirby accepted that statute can and does influence the common law, although he did not expressly refer to the doctrine of analogy: ibid 83 [91]. Justice Callinan disagreed on this issue, stating that the United States 'modification' theory had not yet received any acceptance in the High Court: ibid 99 [144]. Justice McHugh did not explain his reasons for rejecting the appellant's contention in this regard. See generally Michael Legg, 'Legal Professional Privilege After Esso- Applying a Dominant Purpose Test' (2000) 20 Australian Bar Review 40, 43.
172 Lange (1997) 189 CLR 520, 566.
173 (2002) 208 CLR 199, 219 [20] (Gleeson CJ).
174 Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 535 [70] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also Zines, above n 11, 24 n 91.
175 Esso v FCT (1999) 201 CLR 49, 62 [25] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ).
176 See the authorities cited in Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Interpretation and a Theory of Evolutionary Originalism' (1999) 27 Federal Law Review 323, 325; Jeffrey Goldsworthy,'Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation' (1997) 25 Federal Law Review 1, 12-15. See also Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997), 17-22.
177 Eastman v The Queen (2000) 203 CLR 1, 41 [132] (McHugh J). See also Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 400 [132] (Kirby J).
178 See, eg, Kartinyeri v Commonwealth (1998) 195 CLR 337, 400 [132] (Kirby J). See also Goldsworthy, above n 176, 28-35.
179 In Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, Brennan CJ described federation as the 'leading object' of the Constitution: ibid 42.
180 See, eg, Taylor above n 73, 79. Taylor contends that Lange leaves the common law 'largely autonomous of the constitutional guarantee'. In contrast, Stone suggests that the common law rule developed in Lange is constitutionally entrenched: above n 7, 648-9.
181 Kirk, above n 10, 64. See also Stone, above n 88, 11.
182 Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 535 [70] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). See also Stone, above n 7, 648.
183 Compare the position taken by Michael J Detmold, 'Australian Law Areas: the Status of Laws and Jurisdictions' (2001) 12 Public Law Review 185, 198 with that taken by Taylor, above n 73, 82-95.
184 Stone, above n 88, 11.
185 (2000) 203 CLR 503, 534-5 [67] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
186 (1999) 199 CLR 462.
187 Ibid 488-90 [53]-[58] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 526-8 [168]-[173] (Gaudron J).See also Zines, above n 99, 229.
188 Zines, above n 99, 229.
189 Taylor, above n 73, 86.
190 See, eg, Gleeson, above n 89, 9-10.
191 Stone, above n 88, 10.
192 For example, compare the different conclusions said to result from the nature of federation in Breavington v Godleman (1988) 169 CLR 41, 121 (Deane J) ('Breavington') with McKain v Miller (1991) 174 CLR 1, 36 (Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ)
193 (2002) 76 ALJR 551 ('Zhang').
194 Ibid 565 [75] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 574-5 [123](Kirby J).
195 See, eg, Graeme Hill, 'Revisiting Wakim and Hughes: The Distinct Demands of Federalism' (2002) 13 Public Law Review 205, 225 n 168.
196 (1998) 195 CLR 337.
197 Ibid 400.
198 Greg Taylor, 'The Horizontal Effect of Human Rights Provisions, the German Model and its Applicability to Common-Law Jurisdictions' (2002) 13 King's College Law Journal 187, 214. Taylor draws a distinction between common law rules which regulate private relationships, and common law rules of a public law nature or involving the criminal law, above n 7, 627.
199 In relation to common law contempt, Sexton refers to John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v AG (NSW) (2000) 181 ALR 694, although this case involved the validity of legislation: above n 7, 26. See also ABC v Lenah Game Meats (2002) 208 CLR 199, which raised two questions of relevant interest: first, the impact of the implied freedom on the granting of equitable remedies which constitute a burden on the implied freedom; and second, how an action to protect privacy, if recognised, would give effect to the implied freedom. See generally Sexton, above n 7, 26-7.
200 See generally Selway, above n 7; Stephen Gageler, 'The Underpinnings of Judicial Review of Administrative Action: Common Law or Constitution?' (2000) 28 Federal Law Review 303.
201 See generally Patrick Keyzer, 'Pfeiffer, Lange, the Common Law of the Constitution and the Constitutional Right to Natural Justice' (2000) 20 Australian Bar Review 87.
202 Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471, 550-52 (Gummow and Kirby JJ) (Brennan CJ agreeing). See, eg, Bradley Selway, 'The Source and Nature of the Liability in Tort of Australian Governments' (2002) 10 Tort Law Review 14.
203 See, eg, Egan v Willis (1998) 195 CLR 424. See also Hon Duncan Kerr MP, 'Mr Egan and the Legislative Council: Federal Implications' (1999) 19 Australian Bar Review 67.
204 Croft v Dunphy [1933] AC 156; Bonser v La Macchia (1969) 122 CLR 177, 189 (Barwick CJ),224-5 (Windeyer J); R v Bull (1974) 131 CLR 203, 263 (Gibbs J), 270-1 (Stephen J), 280-2 (Mason J); New South Wales v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 337, 468-9 (Mason J), 494-5(Jacobs J); Pearce v Florenca (1976) 135 CLR 507, 514-20 (Gibbs J), 522 (Stephen J); Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ld v King (1988) 166 CLR 1, 12 ('Union Steamship').
205 In Union Steamship, the Court observed that s 2(1) of the Australia Act 1986 (UK) c2 and s 2(1) of the Australia Act 1986 (Cth) 'may do no more than recognise what has already been achieved in the course of judicial decisions': (1988) 166 CLR 1, 14.
206 (1976) 135 CLR 507, 518; cited in Union Steamship (1988) 166 CLR 1, 14. See also Lipohar (1999) 200 CLR 485, 524 [97] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); Mobil Oil v Victoria (2002) 189 ALR 161, 165 [9] (Gleeson CJ), 174-5 [48] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 195 [123] (Kirby J).
207 State Authorities Superannuation Board v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1996) 189 CLR 235, 286 (McHugh and Gummow JJ) ('SASB'). See also Australian Law Reform Commission Choice of Law, Report No 58 (1992) 17 [3.6]; Kirk, above n 10, 67. However, it is useful to note Kirby J's observation in Mobil Oil v Victoria that, despite the logical possibility of conflict, in practice such conflicts are rare: (2002) 189 ALR 161, 189 [108].
208 Justice William Gummow, 'Full Faith and Credit in Three Federations' (1995) 46 South Carolina Law Review 979, 986. See also Port MacDonnell Professional Fisherman's Association Inc v South Australia (1989) 168 CLR 340, 374 ('Port MacDonnell').
209 Port MacDonnell (1989) 168 CLR 340, 374. See also SASB (1996) 189 CLR 235, 285 n 126(McHugh and Gummow JJ); Pfeiffer (2000) 203 CLR 503, 527 [43] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). For a discussion of the concept of statutory inconsistency, see University of Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 463-4 (Mason J). In the context of inconsistency between a federal and state law (resolved by s 109 of the Constitution), two types of inconsistency are recognised: 'direct' and 'covering the field' inconsistency. However, there are important differences between Commonwealth-state conflicts and state-state conflicts that must be taken into account in applying s 109 case law to the interstate context. See generally Mobil Oil v Victoria (2002) 189 ALR 161, 197-8 (Kirby J). See also Kirk, above n 10, 85-6.
210 Kirk, above n 10, 67.
211 Conflicts between Commonwealth laws and laws of a self-governing territory are resolved through the application of a rule analogous to s 109: University of Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 464 (Mason J); Northern Territory v GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553, 630 (Kirby J); Lipohar (1999) 200 CLR 485, 553 (Kirby J).
212 In relation to the absence of a s 109 equivalent dealing with interstate statutory conflict, see Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 128 (Deane J);Mobil Oil v Victoria (2002) 189 ALR 161, 189 [108] (Kirby J).
213 See, eg, Mark Leeming 'Resolving Conflicts Between State Criminal Laws' (1994) 12 Australian Bar Review 107, 117.
214 See, eg, Jumbunna Coal Mine NL v Victorian Coal Miners' Association (1908) 6 CLR 309, 363 (O'Connor J); R v Foster; Ex parte Eastern and Australian Steamship Co Ltd (1959) 103 CLR 256, 275 (Dixon CJ). It should be noted that the application of this presumption in the federal context has been called into question: Dempster v National Companies and Securities Commission (1993) 10 ACSR 297, 320-21 (Malcolm CJ). See also D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory Interpretation in Australia (5th ed, 2001) 133.
215 See the discussion in Pearce and Geddes, above n 214, 133-5.
216 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513, 558 (Dawson J). But see Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 124-8 (Deane J) and McKain v Miller (1991) 174 CLR 1, 53 (Deane J).
217 Lipohar (1999) 200 CLR 485, 553 (Kirby J).
218 But see, Kirk, above n 10, 85-97 who advocates a 'closer connection' test to resolve inconsistencies between state statutes. Kirk's test is briefly considered below, text accompanying n 277-9.
219 (1988) 169 CLR 41.
220 Ibid 129. See also Thompson v The Queen (1989) 169 CLR 1, 35 (Deane J).
221 Section 106 provides:
The Constitution of each State of the Commonwealth shall, subject to this Constitution, continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission of the State, as the case may be, until altered in accordance with the Constitution of the State.
Section 107 provides:
Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes a State, shall, unless it is by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the State, continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the State, as the case may be.
222 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 128.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid. Emphasis added. Section 108 provides:
Every law in force in a Colony which has become or becomes a State, and relating to any matter within the powers of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, shall, subject to this Constitution, continue in force in the State; and, until provision is made in that behalf by the Parliament of the Commonwealth, the Parliament of the State shall have such powers of alteration and of repeal in respect of any such law as the Parliament of the Colony had until the Colony became a State.
225 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 129.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
228 (2002) 189 ALR 161.
229 Section 13 of the Courts and Tribunals (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act 2000 (Vic), which inserted Part 4A into the Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic).
230 (2002) 189 ALR 161, 185 [94] (Kirby J).
231 Ibid 168 [16]. Chief Justice Gleeson's discussion was directed to an implication prohibiting
extraterritorial state legislation that would affect the relationship between another State and its residents or would determine the legal consequences of actions in another State. By expressing the view that such a proposition was 'far too broad', Gleeson CJ left open the possibility that the Constitution might impose a less restrictive territorial limit on State legislative power.
232 (2002) 189 ALR 161, 174-5 [47]-[48].
233 Ibid 199-200 [140]-[142].
234 Ibid 200 [141].
235 Ibid 197 [133].
236 Ibid 197 [130].
237 Ibid 210-11 [184], 214 [191].
238 Ibid 210 [181]. See also Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399, 433 [79] (Callinan J).
239 See above Part I (D)(1).
240 McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 231 (McHugh J), see also 168-9 (Brennan CJ), 188 (Dawson J), 291(Gummow J); Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1, 152 (Gummow J); Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399, 410 [14] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
241 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 128.
242 Section 74 of the Constitution indicates the Constitution' s framers were aware of the possibility of conflict between state statutes: Mobil Oil v Victoria (2002) 189 ALR 161, 190 [109] (Kirby J).
243 Section 109 of the Constitution.
244 See, eg, Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 81-3 (Mason CJ), 93-8 (Wilson and Gaudron JJ), 116-117(Brennan J), 133-4 (Deane J), 150 (Dawson) 164 (Toohey J); McKain v Miller (1991) 174 CLR 1, 36-7 (Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ), 45-6 (Deane J), 55 (Gaudron J). See also Gummow, above n 208; Georgina Whitelaw, 'Interstate Conflicts of Laws and Section 118' (1994) 5 Public Law Review 238; Peter Nygh, 'Full Faith and Credit: A Constitutional Rule for Conflict Resolution' (1991) 13 Sydney Law Review 415; David St Leger Kelly, Localising Rules in the Conflict of Laws (1974) 100-24.
245 (2000) 203 CLR 503, 533-4, 541 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ),556-8 (Kirby J), 576 (Callinan J).
246 Ibid 534 [65].
247 Indeed, Davis suggests that Pfeiffer has exacerbated uncertainty about s 118's operation:Gary Davis, 'John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson: Choice of Law in Tort at the Dawning of the 21st Century' (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 982, 993.
248 Kirk, above n 10, 72.
249 Lipohar (1999) 200 CLR 485, 534 [120] (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). Their Honours also referred to the possibility of covering cl 5 and s 109 of the Constitution providing a constitutional basis for the doctrines. Applying these doctrines to the Australian context means that 'a person already acquitted or convicted of an offence in one part of Australia cannot be retried for that offence in another': Kirk, above n 10, 61.
250 Kirk, above n 10, 86. See also Gummow, above n 208, 1019.
251 McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 168-9 (Brennan CJ), 188 (Dawson J), 230-2 (McHugh J), 291 (Gummow J); Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399, 410 [14] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
252 (1958) 99 CLR 132.
253 Ibid 148 (Dixon CJ). Lamshed v Lake has been described as a 'watershed' on the basis that it was the first time the Court 'approached the Territories power as one which was integrated with the rest of the Constitution, rather than as a disparate, non-federal power': Tom Pauling, 'The Constitutional Differences Between Territories and States' (2000) 20 Australian Bar Review 187, 187-8.
254 Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth);Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth). Norfolk Island has been granted a more limited form of self- government: Norfolk Island Act 1979 (Cth).
255 Brian Opeskin, 'Constitutional Dimensions of Choice of Law in Australia' (1992) 3 Public Law Review 152, 169.
256 See, eg, ibid 170; Michael Tilbury, Gary Davis and Brian Opeskin, Conflict of Laws in Australia (2002) 525-6; Kirk, above n 10, 88-9.
257 Opeskin, above n 255, 169–70. See also Kirk, above n 10, 88.
258 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41.
259 Ibid 149.
260 Ibid 138.
261 Ibid 137-8 (Deane J).
262 (1992) 177 CLR 248, 272 (Brennan, Deane and Toohey JJ), citing Lamshed v Lake (1958) 99 CLR 132, 154.
263 Australian Communist Party v Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1, 193 (Dixon J);Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510, 560 [137] (Gummow and Hayne JJ);Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2 (Unreported, Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne and Callinan JJ, 4 February 2003) [31] (Gleeson CJ), [103]-[104] (Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ). See also Selway, above n 7, 230.
264 Kirk, above n 10, 86-7.
265 (1988) 169 CLR 41, 123. See also University of Wollongong v Metwally (1984) 158 CLR 447, 467 (Murphy J); Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471, 527 (Gaudron J).
266 (1999) 200 CLR 485, 553 [171].
267 Pfeiffer (2000) (2000) 203 CLR 503, 536-7 [75] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ), 551 [124] (Kirby J).
268 Breavington (1988) 169 CLR 41, 128-9.
269 Ibid. See also Macleod v Attorney-General (NSW) [1891] AC 455.
270 Mobil Oil v Victoria (2002) 189 ALR 161, 188 [103] (Kirby J).
271 (2000) 203 CLR 503, 536-7 [75] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
272 Mobil Oil v Victoria (2002) 189 ALR 161, 187 [102] (Kirby J).
273 To borrow the terminology used by Stone, above n 88, 10.
274 McKain v Miller (1991) 174 CLR 1, 53 (Deane J). Arguably, the High Court indicated it would view favourably a predominant territorial nexus test in Port MacDonnell (1989) 168 CLR 340, 374 (the Court).
275 (2000) 203 CLR 503, 551 [123] (Kirby J).
276 Lipohar (1999) 200 CLR 485, 554 [171].
277 Kirk, above n 10, 72, 85-8.
278 Ibid 72, 86-7.
279 This is not to say that there are no difficulties associated with the predominant territorial nexus test. For example, how is the predominant territorial nexus to be determined? See, eg, Opeskin, above n 255, 164. In Breavington, Deane J observed that the analogical use of private international law rules might prove to be of assistance, although the possibility was not explored in any detail: (1988) 169 CLR 41, 137. See also McKain v Miller (1991) 174 CLR 1, 53 (Deane J).