Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-mzp66 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-27T01:28:38.652Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power and Implied Guarantees under Chapter III of the Constitution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2025

Wendy Lacey
Wendy Lacey*
Affiliation:
School of Law, University of Adelaide; University of Tasmania
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

The separation of judicial power from executive and legislative power has long been recognised as an important measure for guaranteeing individual liberty and for safeguarding against tyranny. As Winterton has noted, '[d]ividing governmental power is the oldest device for restraining it, and thereby protecting liberty'. However, it has also been widely recognised, particularly in recent years, that by entrenching the separation of federal judicial power, Chapter III of the Australian Constitution may offer individual guarantees beyond the arbitrary exercise of executive or legislative power. Consideration of exactly what these guarantees may include has significantly contributed to the recent interest in Chapter III of the Constitution. As one commentator proclaimed in 2001, the move of Chapter III to centre stage has been 'one of the defining features of the last decade of Australian constitutional law'. This trend has raised many questions relating to the nature of judicial power and judicial independence, and the extent to which it does, and can, protect individual liberties.

Type
Research Article
Information
Federal Law Review , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , March 2003 , pp. 57 - 86
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 The Australian National University

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 James Madison wrote in The Federalist No 47, 'The accumulation of all powers, legislative,

executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.'

2 Winterton, George, 'The Separation of Judicial Power as an Implied Bill of Rights' in Lindell, Geoffrey (ed), Future Directions in Australian Constitutional Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Leslie Zines (1994) 185Google Scholar.

3 Harrison Moore, W, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (2nd ed, 1997) 322Google Scholar; Winterton, above n 2, 187-8; George Williams, Human Rights Under the Australian Constitution (1999) 198.

4 Wheeler, Fiona, 'The Rise and Rise of Judicial Power under Chapter III of the Constitution: ADecade in Overview' (2000) 20 Australian Bar Review 283, 283Google Scholar.

5 See, eg, Kinley, David (ed), Human Rights in Australian Law: Principles, Practice and Potential (1998)Google Scholar.

6 Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 362 (Gaudron J) and 326 (Deane J); Re Tracey; Ex Parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 579 (Deane J);Re Nolan; Ex Parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460,493(Gaudron J).

7 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1992) 176 CLR 1, 29 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ); Re Tracey; Ex Parte Ryan (1989) 166 CLR 518, 580 (Deane J); Re Tyler; Ex parte Foley (1993) 181 CLR 18, 34 (Deane J); Polyukhovich v Commonwealth (‘ War Crimes Act Case‚) (1991) 172 CLR 501, 614-6 (Deane), 684-5 (Toohey J),and 703-4 (Gaudron J); Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 502-3 (Gaudron J).

8 Leeth v Commonwealth (1992) 174 CLR 455, 483―92 (Deane and Toohey JJ), and 502―3 (Gaudron J); Queensland Electricity Commission v Commonwealth (1985) 159 CLR 192, 247―8 (Deane J); Kruger v Commonwealth (‘Stolen Generations Case’) (1997) 190 CLR 1, 94―7 (Toohey J).

9 See, eg, Williams, George, 'Civil Liberties and the Constitution—A Question of Interpretation' (1994) 5 Public Law Review 82, 83Google Scholar.

10 I H Jacob, 'The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court' (1970) 23 Current Legal Problems 23, 51; Keith Mason, 'The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court (1983) 57 Australian Law Journal 449, 458.

11 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 196 (Brennan CJ), 201 (Toohey J), 216 (McHugh J),259, 266 (Kirby J), 275-6 (Hayne J).

12 While the constitutional text alone is recognised as being inadequate for the purposes of constitutional interpretation, it still remains fundamental. As Sir Anthony Mason has observed, 'There is a need to identify other reference points and indicators to supplement the text without deserting it, for fidelity to the text is generally regarded as the foundation of constitutional interpretation, a badge of legitimacy, so to speak': 'Theoretical Approaches to Constitutional Interpretation' in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions: Theories, Principles and Institutions (1996) 13.

13 Justice Paul de Jersey, 'The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court' (1985) 15 Queensland Law Society Journal 325, 330.

14 Jacob, above n 10, 25: 'Because it is part of the machinery of justice, the inherent jurisdiction of the court may be invoked not only in relation to the litigant parties in pending proceedings, but in relation also to anyone, whether a party or not, and in respect of matters which are not raised as issues in the litigation between the parties.'

15 De Jersey, above n 13, 330.

16 See, eg, s 200 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld), which provides that the Supreme Court 'shall have the same jurisdiction power and authority as the superior courts of common law and the High Court of Chancery in England'. Differently worded provisions may be found in relation to the Supreme Courts of other states: Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) ss 22-24; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 10; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 16; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 6; for Tasmania see, Supreme Court Act 1856 (Tas) s 2, Supreme Court Act 1887 (Tas) s 9, Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 400(3), Australian Courts Act 1828 (Imp) 9 Geo 4, c 83.

17 See, eg, Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1, 21 (Dawson J).

18 See text accompanying nn 53-80.

19 DJL v Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226, 240-1 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh,Gummow and Hayne JJ).

20 Wheeler, Fiona, 'The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia' (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 248, 266Google Scholar.

21 Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167, 188. See also Williams, above n 3, 202.

22 See Zines, Leslie, The High Court and the Constitution (4th ed, 1997) 171Google Scholar.

23 (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357.1

24 Zines, above n 22, 171.

25 (1956) 94 CLR 254, affirmed [1957] AC 288 (PC).

26 Winterton, above n 2, 188.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 See Tony Blackshield and Williams, George, Australian Constitutional Law and Theory:Commentary and Materials (3rd ed, 2002) 629-47Google Scholar.

30 Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348;Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1. See also Blackshield and Williams, above n 29, 638-47.1

31 (1996) 189 CLR 51.

32 Mason, above n 10, 458; de Jersey, above n 13, 326.

33 Jacob, above n 10, 23.

34 De Jersey, above n 13, 326.

35 Jacob, above n 10, 25.

36 Ibid 27-8 (citations omitted).

37 Ibid 51.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 P Twist, 'The Inherent Jurisdiction of Masters' [1996] New Zealand Law Journal 351; Jacob,above n 10, 24-5. It must be noted that Jacob actually views the court's inherent jurisdiction as being only a part or an aspect of its general jurisdiction, rather than as incidental or ancillary to it as Twist does. This point is, however, qualified by his assertion that inherent jurisdiction is certainly part of procedural rather than substantive law.

41 See Twist, above n 40; Jacob, above n 10, 24-5.

42 Seonaid Abernathy, 'The Status of the District Court' [1990] New Zealand Law Journal 360.

43 Twist, above n 40, 351; De Jersey, above n 13, 326; Jacob, above n 10, 24; Mason, above n 10,449.

44 (1972) 127 CLR 1, 7.

45 High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) s 5;Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 5(2);Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 21(2).

46 De Jersey, above n 13, 326.

47 Twist, above n 40, 351.

48 Mason, above n 10, 449-58.

49 Jacob, above n 10, 32-51.

50 De Jersey, above n 13, 326-9.

51 (1989) 168 CLR 23.

52 Ibid 27-30 (Mason CJ).

53 Such an approach had been adopted in the New Zealand case of Moevao v Department of Labour [1980] 1 NZLR 464, 470-1, 473-6, 478-82. Mason CJ quoted from the judgment of Richardson J in his decision inJago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23, 29-30.

54 (1987) 162 CLR 612, 618.

55 High Court of Australia Act 1979 (Cth) s 5;Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 5(2);Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 21(2).

56 Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612, 618.

57 Ibid 619.

58 Ibid.

59 (1998) 193 CLR 502, 511.

60 Ibid n 39: cf General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125,137; State Rail Authority of NSW v Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd (1982) 150 CLR 29, 38-9 (Mason and Wilson JJ), 45 (Brennan J). (Kirby Jy J′s footnote).

61 (1979) 143 CLR 1, 16 (Mason J).

62 Ibid.

63 See Jago v District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23, 73 (Gaudron J); Wentworth v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 239, 251-2 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ).

64 (2000) 201 CLR 226, 240-1 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted).

65 Ibid 268 (Kirby J) (footnotes omitted).

66 (1987) 162 CLR 612.

67 Ibid 623-4 (Deane J), quoting from the judgment of Bowen CJ in the same dispute: (1986) 12 FCR 267, 272.

68 Ibid 630-1, quoting from a decision of the Federal Court in Parsons v Martin (1984) 5 FCR 235, 241.

69 Jackson v Sterling Industries Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 612, 640 (Gaudron J).

70 Ibid.

71 (1989) 168 CLR 1, 16-17 (Dawson J).

72 (1989) 168 CLR 23, 74 (Gaudron J).

73 Ibid.

74 (1944) 68 CLR 571, 589.

75 (1992) 176 CLR 239, 252.

76 Ibid.

77 DJL v The Central Authority (2000) 201 CLR 226, 240-1 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh,Gummow and Hayne JJ).

78 See also the decision in ASIC v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559, 590 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ).

79 (1944) 68 CLR 571, 589.

80 (1992) 176 CLR 239.

81 ASIC v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559, 590 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ).

82 Williams, above n 9.

83 D A Smallbone, 'Recent Suggestions of an Implied “Bill of Rights” in the Constitution, Considered as Part of a General Trend in Constitutional Interpretation' (1993) 21 Federal Law Review 254, 267.

84 (1998) 193 CLR 173 ('Nicholas').

85 Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19.

86 Crimes Amendment (Controlled Operations) Act 1996 (Cth).

87 (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27; Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 185 (Brennan CJ), 208(Gaudron J), 220‐1 (McHugh J), 232 (Gummow J).

88 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 196 (Brennan CJ), 201 (Toohey J), 216 (McHugh J), 259, 266 (Kirby J),275‐6 (Hayne J).

89 Per 188‐9, 196 (Brennan CJ), 209 (Gaudron J), 216, 224‐6 (McHugh J), 258‐9, 266 (Kirby J),275‐6 (Hayne J).

90 Winterton, above n 2, 190, 199.

91 (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 ('Chu Kheng Lim').

92 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 186. Brennan CJ also added his own statement that '[s]ubject to the Constitution, the Parliament can prescribe the jurisdiction to be conferred on a court but it cannot direct the court as to the judgment or order which it might make in exercise of a jurisdiction conferred upon it'.

93 (1992) 176 CLR 1, 36‐7.

94 (1991) 172 CLR 501, 607 (Deane J).

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid 703‐4.

97 Ibid 689.

98 (1992) 174 CLR 455.

99 Ibid 486‐7.

100 Gaudron J stated [at 502] that '[i]t is an essential feature of judicial power that it should be exercised in accordance with the judicial process', and that, '… 'the concept of equal justice‐ a concept which requires the like treatment of like persons in like circumstances, but also requires that genuine differences be treated as such‐is fundamental to the judicial process.'

101 See the decisions of Brennan CJ, Dawson, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ in Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1.

102 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 220.

103 Ibid 185.

104 Ibid 188.

105 Ibid 208―9 (Gaudron J).

106 Ibid 209.

107 Ibid 224 (McHugh J), 258 (Kirby J).

108 (1995) 184 CLR 19, 31.

109 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 226 (McHugh J).

110 Ibid 272 (Hayne J).

111 Ibid 275.

112 (1995) 184 CLR 19, 34.

113 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 197 (Brennan CJ).

114 Ibid 202 (Toohey J).

115 See, eg, ibid 191 (Brennan CJ), 202 (Toohey J), 210‐11 (Gaudron J), 238 (Gummow J), 273(Hayne J).

116 On proportionality see Adrienne Stone, 'The Limits of Constitutional Text and Structure: Standards of Review and the Freedom of Political Communication' (1999) 23 Melbourne University Law Review 668; Jeremy Kirk, 'Constitutional Guarantees, Characterisation and the Concept of Proportionality' (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 1, H P Lee, 'Proportionality in Australian Constitutional Adjudication', in Lindell (ed), above n 2, 126.

117 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 188‐9 (Brennan CJ).

118 See, eg, ibid 234‐8 (Gummow J).

119 Ibid 188‐9 (Brennan CJ).

120 See Grassby v The Queen (1989) 168 CLR 1, 16 n 67 (Brennan CJ).

121 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 190 (Brennan CJ).

122 Ibid 208 (Gaudron J).

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid 207.

126 Ibid 209.

127 Ibid 272 (Hayne J).

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid 276.

130 Ibid.

131 (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27.

132 Commonwealth v Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners (1922) 31 CLR 1, 12 (Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ); Williamson v Ah On (1926) 39 CLR 95, 122 (Higgins J).

133 Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 189 (Brennan CJ).

134 (1926) 39 CLR 95, 108.

135 CLR 173, 191.

136 Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ).

137 (1983) 152 CLR 570, 608.

138 Ibid; quoted in Nicholas v The Queen (1998) 193 CLR 173, 187 (Brennan CJ).

139 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 191.

140 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 202 (Toohey J).

141 Ibid.

142 (1991) 172 CLR 501, 689.

143 Ibid.

144 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 208‐9 (Gaudron J).

145 Ibid 209.

146 Ibid 210.

147 Ibid.

148 Ibid 211.

149 Ibid 238 (Gummow J).

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid 277‐8 (Hayne J).

152 Ibid 191 (Brennan CJ), 234‐7 (Gummow J).

153 Ibid 278 (Hayne J).

154 Ibid n 410: Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). (Hayne J's footnote).

155 Ibid 278 (Hayne J).

156 Ibid 277.

157 Ibid 278 (Hayne J), 237 (Gummow J).

158 Ibid 220 (McHugh J).

159 Ibid.

160 Ibid 222 (McHugh J).

161 Ibid.

162 Ibid 224‐5.

163 Ibid.

164 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 266 (Kirby J).

165 [1967] 1 AC 259.

166 (1998) 193 CLR 173, 262‐4 (Kirby J).

167 Fiona Wheeler, 'The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Constitutionally Entrenched Due Process in Australia' (1997) 23 Monash University Law Review 248.

168 Ibid 265‐6.

169 Ibid 265.

170 Ibid 265‐‐6.

171 Winterton, above n 2, 207.

172 Blackford, Russell, 'Judicial Power, Political Liberty and the Post-Industrial State' (1997) 71 Australian Law Journal 267, 283Google Scholar.