¹ A poll conducted in December 2003 indicated that 57 per cent of those polled wanted a further referendum on the republican issue: Newspoll, 6 January 2004 (<http://www.newspoll.com.au/image_uploads/cgi-lib.11730.1.1202_2004_polls.pdf> at 27 June 2004).

² For example, five of the six options in the current options paper of the Australian Republican Movement answer this description: Australian Republican Movement, '6 Models for an Australian Republic' (Discussion paper, 2001).

³ See McGarvie, Richard, Democracy: Choosing Australia's Republic (1999) 18-19.Google Scholar

⁴ A sustained, but unconvincing argument that the Governor-General is Australia's true head of state is made in David Flint, The Cane Toad Republic (1999) ch 3.

⁵ Constitution s 2.

⁶ Constitution Alteration (Establishment of Republic) Bill 1999 (Cth) sch 3, cl 1.

⁷ For example, some of those happiest to see Sir William Deane interpret his office expansively would have been appalled by any corresponding action on the part of Dr Peter Hollingworth.

⁸ Undoubtedly the best treatment is to be found in George Winterton, Parliament, the Executive and the Governor-General: A Constitutional Analysis (1983).

⁹ Constitution s 58.

¹⁰ Constitution s 5.

¹¹ Constitution s 68.

¹² See, eg, Dicey, A V, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, 1915) ci-cii.Google Scholar

¹³ See, eg, Bagehot, Walter, The English Constitution (1867) 111.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Admittedly, 'legitimacy' in this context is an imprecise and not very wieldy term, but it is difficult to arrive at a superior alternative. One possibility would be 'respect', but this too readily confuses feeling towards the incumbent with feeling towards the office. There is a limited analogy between the type of institutional legitimacy referred to here and the more commonly encountered 'democratic legitimacy', denoting not merely the fact of political power, but valid democratic title thereto; and see n 15, below.

¹⁵ As Winterton states (George Winterton, 'The Evolving Role of the Governor-General' (Paper presented at the Annual Public Law Weekend, Canberra, 7–9 November 2003)), a Prime Minister certainly will enjoy 'democratic legitimacy'. Yet this is a quite different sort of legitimacy to that enjoyed by the Queen and the Governor-General. It reflects a popular (and often highly grudging) acknowledgement of a right to power, rather than any particularly strong element of institutional respect.

¹⁶ The Queen retains certain theoretical constitutional discretions, including the very theoretical discretion to dismiss a government, but it is virtually impossible to imagine situations where the more significant of these powers practically could be exercised: see, eg, Stanley de Smith and Rodney Brazier, Constitutional and Administrative Law (7th ed, 1994) ch 6. The Governor-General certainly enjoys reserve powers, but these have been exercised only once in over a century of federation.

¹⁷ See Dicey, above n 12; and Bagehot, above n 13.

¹⁸ For example, it is hard to imagine the Queen actually exercising the reserve powers: see Winterton, George, Monarchy to Republic: Australian Republican Government (1986) 32-3.Google Scholar

¹⁹ For example, the vicious attacks on the 'politicians' republic' by the No case during the 1999 referendum may well have done long-term damage to popular perceptions of parliamentary government.

²⁰ Again, such ideas seem to underlie some of the thinking of Dicey and Bagehot in relation to the monarchy: see Dicey, above n 12; and Bagehot, above n 13.

²¹ See, eg, Winterton, above n 15.

²² See, eg, Sir Stephen, Ninian, 'Depicting a Nation to Its People', The Weekend Australian (Sydney), 7 January 1989, 12.Google Scholar

²³ By reference to such considerations, Article 13.7 of the Bunreacht na hÉireann (the Irish Constitution) requires that government approval be forthcoming before the Irish President can address the nation.

²⁴ For a general critique of the public dimensions of a directly elected President, see McGarvie, above n 3, 136–9.

²⁵ Analogous views underlay much of the feeling at the 1998 Constitutional Convention in favour of a similarly free-wheeling directly-elected President: see, eg, Commonwealth of Australia, Report of the Constitutional Convention (1998) vol 3, 42–5 (Ted Mack), 101–3 (Phil Cleary).

²⁶ See Winterton, above n 15.

²⁷ For example, the media advice proffered to and acted upon by the Governor-General, particularly in the early stages of the crisis, consistently served to worsen his position.