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Robustness of the Incentive Compatible Combinatorial Auction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

R. Mark Isaac  and
Duncan James
R. Mark Isaac
Affiliation:
University of Arizona, Department of Economics/Tocson, AZ 85721, USA
Duncan James
Affiliation:
Fordham University, Department of Economics/Bronx, NY 10458, USA
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Abstract

Goods are said to be combinatorial when the value of a bundle of goods is not equal to the sum of the values of the same goods unbundled. Investigations of combinatorial allocation problems should recognize that there are two separate aspects of such problems: an environmental distinction between multiple-unit allocation problems which involve combinatorial goods and those which do not do so, and an institutional distinction between auctions in which combinatorial values can be expressed as part of the bidding rules and those in which they cannot. Forsythe and Isaac (Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 2 (1982). Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, Inc.) reports the extension of the Vickrey auction into a demand-revealing, multiple unit, private goods auction that can incorporate combinatorial values. This current paper places that theoretically demand-revealing institution in a series of experimental environments in order to generate results (e.g. efficiencies) which may serve as a benchmark for other auctions (combinatorial or otherwise) whose implementation characteristics may be more favorable. To aid in interpretation of our Vickrey experimental results, we also provide results of alternatives to Vickrey allocations from both institutional and heuristic sources, as well as a discussion of the source of the Vickrey auctions high efficiencies even in the presence of misrevelation.

Keywords

combinatorialauctionsVickreyexperiments

JEL classification

D44: Auctions C90: General

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , June 2000 , pp. 31 - 53
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 Economic Science Association

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