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Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Wolfgang J. Luhan ,
Martin G. Kocher  and
Matthias Sutter
Wolfgang J. Luhan
Affiliation:
Center for Social Science Methodology, University of Oldenburg, Ammerlaender Heerstrasse 114-118, 26129 Oldenburg, Germany
Martin G. Kocher*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, CREED, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Universitaetsstrasse 15/4, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria
Matthias Sutter
Affiliation:
Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Universitaetsstrasse 15/4, 6020 Innsbruck, Austria Department of Economics, University of Göteborg, P.O. Box 640, 40530 Göteborg, Sweden
*
e-mail: martin.kocher@uibk.ac.at
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Abstract

While most papers on team decision-making find that teams behave more selfishly, less trustingly and less altruistically than individuals, Cason and Mui (1997) report that teams are more altruistic than individuals in a dictator game. Using a within-subjects design we re-examine group polarization by letting subjects make individual as well as team decisions in an experimental dictator game. In our experiment teams are more selfish than individuals, and the most selfish team member has the strongest influence on team decisions. Various explanations for the different findings in Cason and Mui (1997) and in our paper are discussed.

Keywords

ExperimentDictator gameTeam behaviorSocial preferences

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior D70: General C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior C72: Noncooperative Games

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 26 - 41
Copyright
Copyright © Economic Science Association 2007

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